VALUE LANGUAGE ANALYSIS AND CARL ROGERS' PSYCHOTHERAPY: TWO APPROACHES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE HUMAN PERSON

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School of the

University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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

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Notre Dame, Indiana
February, 1969

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many persons in many ways have helped me with my dissertation. I wish I could publicly thank them all. But since doing so is impossible, I would like to express special gratitude here to those whose help was indeed special.

I wish to thank Professor William J. Kerrigan, Department of English, California State College at Fullerton, for years of rich conversation which often touched on Shakespeare, The New Yorker and the meaning of man; Sister Assumption Bocan, S.S.C.M., doctoral candidate, Department of English, University of Notre Dame, for her assistance with the section on Shakespeare; Reverend Herman Reith, C.S.C., Sister Bernadine Pieper, C.H.M., Mother Magdalen Wilmes, C.H.M., and Sister Marie Ancille Kennedy, C.H.M., for showing sincere interest and for making it possible for me to study for the doctorate in philosophy; Miss Marge Strantz, secretary to the Dean of Students, University of Notre Dame, for patiently caring for and typing the entire manuscript; Reverend Joseph Simons, C.S.C., counseling psychologist, University of Notre Dame, former member of Carl Rogers' staff at the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, La Jolla, California, and my friend and colleague, for his faithful concern and much-needed encouragement during my research and writing and for his critical reading of the whole dissertation; Reverend David B. Burrell, C.S.C., teacher, dissertation

director and friend, for exposing me to the values of linguistic analysis, for supporting my interest in Shakespeare and Rogerian psychotherapy, and for instructing me during the past two years with consistent patience, kindness and critical care.

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INTRODUCTION

There are many ways of approaching large and fundamental questions. Sometimes, if we start from one center and advance upon the question, and then start from a second center and approach the same question, at a certain point we will meet, overlap, see divergencies or mutual enrichments. The two approaches serve to check, confirm and enrich each other.

Surely among our contemporary fundamental questions are these: What is the structure of the human person? Is he goal-oriented? If so, are his goals definite? Is a person already oriented or does he orient himself toward goals if he has them? Where does he find his norms or how create them?

I would like in this dissertation to attend to those questions. And I would like to approach them from two centers: first, from the center of analysis of language; second, from the center of Carl Rogers' client-centered psychotherapy. I would like to see what, to be specific, an analysis of our value language, of its free and nuanced uses, leads us to say about the language-users, about persons, their structure, goals and orientations.

I would then like to take the results of the analysis and pose them as questions to the psychotherapeutic theories of Carl Rogers. These theories arise, not from language analysis but from clinical relationships with persons. Finally, I would like to compare results

of the two approaches: do they agree, confirm each other, correct, enrich or in any way modify each other? The underlying thesis to be tested in this dissertation is this: Doing linguistic analysis and theorizing from clinical psychotherapeutic experiences are productive, complementary and mutually enriching approaches to questions about the structure, goals and goal-orientations of the human person.

If this research does find that the two approaches mutually confirm each other, then a theory lying behind the use of value language analysis may in turn be strengthened. The theory is that language is a "way of life." By that I mean that language is not a mere representation or expression of ideas but is itself a way in which human persons live and act. According to this view, thought, emotion, impulses and imaginings can, so to speak, at least find completion and a way of being through their formulation and articulation in language. Persons, moreover, act by means of speech; they do things with words as their tools.

If this interpretation of language is at least plausible, then an analysis of language should prove helpful in discovering something about the structure and orientations of the human person. If what we discover through language analysis correlates with conclusions from another approach to questions about the human person, then we have some confirmation of the theory that language is a way of life.

Forecast

I will now give a fuller forecast of the two halves of the dissertation. The first part of the thesis approaches the person-questions

from an analysis of value language. I chose value language because, first, it narrows the area of linguistic analysis from the impossibly broad "way we speak" to at least the "way we speak about what we consider worthwhile." Secondly, values do seem to define persons, to be themselves goals and limits; values are realized in persons and give shape and thrust to a personality. And the language in which we speak of values is bound up not only with goals but also with human activity, motivation, inclination, emotion, instinct, decision; any attempt to account for its uses will certainly lead into questions about the structure and orientations of the person using the language.

Value language is, moreover, among those language games exhibiting such freedom, precision and nuance that it can lead us to wonder what accounts for such complex yet common usage--what is there in the language-user to account for this general freedom and precision? The response concerning the language-user will be, I think, in terms of his goal-orientation, of his whole person with its complex of emotions, drives, thoughts, impulses, feelings, conflicts, decisions and interpersonal relationships.

In the first part of this dissertation section I will summarize the value language analysis of Patrick Nowell-Smith and attempt to show that we can, while using the main lines of the Nowell-Smith approach, get behind value language to the structure of the human person using the language. I will then analyze value language in three Shakespearian plays (as classical source) and in The New Yorker magazine (as contemporary source).

In the second part of the dissertation I will approach the questions about person from the viewpoint of Carl Rogers' theories of personality as he draws these theories from his practice of psychotherapy. I will summarize main points of the therapy methods and of the theories, indicate the type and extent of the research supporting his theories, and then pose seven person-questions, gleaned from the value language analysis, to Rogers' writings. I chose Rogers because he bases his theorizing mostly upon actual interviews with persons in a clinical setting, because he has supported his findings with published research, because his theories have developed in a unified and expanding way over a period of thirty years and have been the subject of extensive writing by Rogers himself over this period.

CHAPTER ONE

NOWELL-SMITH ON VALUE LANGUAGE

The concern of the first half of this dissertation is to discover whatever we can about the structure and orientations of the human person through attempting to account for the way we talk about our values.

In Chapter One we will summarize the value language analysis of P. H. Nowell-Smith and will attempt to show that we can, while using the main lines of the Nowell-Smith approach, get behind value language to the structure of the person using the language. In the next chapter we will illustrate and add to these findings by an exemplary analysis of certain value language selections in literature.

Before taking up the study of Nowell-Smith, it seems well to repeat that in approaching questions about the human person through value language we are both making an assumption and testing an assumption about the relation of language to the person. The assumption is that we are so involved in our language that its analysis can show itself to be an analysis of ourselves, of our personhood. We assume that our language is so much a part of us that an important way to find out about us is by way of and within our language.

As we mentioned in the Introduction, another way to say this is to say that language is a way of life. Words are not labels but tools we use in many ways as part of our living human life. Using words is

part of our behavior; our behavior embodies and gives form to feelings, thoughts, aspirations in us. Language is a way we exist, a way we act, a way we manifest ourselves, a way of relating ourselves to others and to the world. Take a look at language and you take a look at people. Testing this assumption is part of the work of this dissertation.

By 'language' we will mean mainly certain groupings of grammatical structures which have related, convention-bound uses. There are many ways of making and finding such groupings. We can divide human talk in many ways, according to the sorts of relationships we wish to find. We can talk about the language of science, the language of art, the language of business, and so on. The analysis in the dissertation will be of value language. By this language I mean those grammatical structures which we find people using in relation to what they consider worthwhile; value language is the forms of expression to which we have recourse to articulate "the worthwhile." Some simple examples are, "He is a good man" and "That was a fine film." An analysis of value language means here an investigation of the jobs we perform by means of this language.

1. "Attitudes" And Value Language

When Nowell-Smith attempts to provide a new logical apparatus for value language,[1] he gives a center position to what he calls in a loose and broad way the "pro- and con-attitudes." His analysis hinges

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[1] P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics. (Harmondsworth, 1954). Numbers appearing in parentheses in this dissertation chapter refer to pages in Ethics.

on the presence of such attitudes; and these attitudes, as he views them functioning in value language, can be an opening to understanding much about the structure and orientation of the persons using the language.

Nowell-Smith goes so far as to say that there would be no value language at all if there were no pro- and con-attitudes. Removing these human orientations removes value language. Briefly, his thesis runs this way: Within an ethical context we are trying to discover what jobs we perform with practical discourse or value language. We are asking of value terms, For what job is this word used? And under what conditions is it proper to use this word for this job? (69) The second question gives us a key. To discover the job we are really performing here and now with value language we must place the language in its here and now context (98). That context, says Nowell-Smith, will always include some human "attitude." If human beings, their interests and their attitudes were removed, there would be no value language at all (74).

Nowell-Smith arrives at attitudes in his attempt to provide a new "logical apparatus" for practical discourse, an apparatus that could dispense with a strict analytic-synthetic division, with peculiar non-natural properties, with utterly non-cognitive explanations such as expressions of emotion--in short, with any ready-made model for value language. "I shall try to show how the nature and purpose of practical discourse has been made unintelligible by the attempt to elucidate it

by means of a logical apparatus unsuited to the purpose and to substitute a new logical apparatus that may be more successful (61)."

2. Logic Of Adjectives

After showing why he is dissatisfied with former logics of value language, Nowell-Smith launches into his own theory by analyzing the logic of those adjectives used in practical discourse, of which the most important are 'right' and 'good' (62). It seems easy to give a logical explanation of these adjectives by saying that they denote, refer to or stand for something. They look like names of properties or characteristics.

But an explanation proceeding from this family of assumptions has proved insufficient. Nowell-Smith proposes instead the now familiar thesis that different sorts of adjectives operate in logically different ways. And to discover the ways in which they are operating we must ask not, What does this word always mean? but rather, For what job is this word used? and Under what conditions is it proper to use this word for this job? For Nowell-Smith, words are not mere labels or names; they are tools with which we do things.

There are at least three major kinds of jobs we can perform with adjectives; and within each of these major kinds there is a variety of other kinds. Each of the main kinds of jobs has its own logic. To explain these types Nowell-Smith arranges into classes the words which are usually put to these tasks. Yet he cautions that it is misleading to refer to these classes of words, expecting them to be hard and fast

arrangements; for "there are different purposes to which words can be put and, in a special context, almost any word can be put to almost any purpose (90)." But it is simpler to talk of "classes of words": adjectives grouped according to the usual types of contribution they make to ethical discourse. They are Aptness-words, Descriptive-words and Gerundive-words--in shorthand, A-, D- and G-words (72).

The Aptness-words indicate that an object has properties which are apt to arouse a certain emotion or range of emotions. The Descriptive-words merely describe or give a factual account (71-72), while the Gerundive-words indicate that someone ought to do something about something (73). Examples would be 'terrifying' as an A-word, 'extensive' as a D-word, 'praise-worthy' as a G-word (70-73). Description, then, is only one among many functions of adjectives. A-words especially involve in their lived context certain human emotions and attitudes. And furthermore if these emotions are involved in the context, they are involved in the use--or meaning--of the words. To put it another way: A-words are able to be used only in a context where there is some attitude operating.

3. The Logic Of Sentences And Arguments

But to characterize the behavior of A-words it is necessary to see them actually in use and therefore in sentences and arguments. Nowell-Smith then begins to theorize about the logic of the sentences and arguments of practical discourse. He immediately rejects for practical discourse the concept of strict logical implication or of analytic

connection of the rigorous sort found in mathematics. The materials of practical discourse, the jobs for which the language is used, do not lend themselves to such stringent connections. They are, rather, more amenable to a looser sort of implication which Nowell-Smith calls "contextual implication" (90). "A statement p," he says, "contextually implies a statement q if anyone who knew the normal conventions of the language would be entitled to infer q from p in the context in which they occur (90)." The appeal here is to what is "normal," what is "usual," and therefore to what admits of exceptions, and not to what is absolutely and necessarily so.

From the viewpoint of revealing something about the language-user, the contextual implications of the A-sentences especially assume real importance; for the contextual implication will always include expressing or implying pro- or con-attitudes. From the start A-sentences are practical and therefore involve attitudes.

Nowell-Smith gives three rules of contextual implication, with the third rule particularly important for the logic of A-sentences (81):

> Rule 1. When a speaker uses a sentence to make a statement, it is contextually implied that he believes it to be true. And, similarly, when he uses it to perform any of the other jobs for which sentences are used, it is contextually implied that he is using it for one of the jobs that it normally does (81). . . .
>
> Rule 2. A speaker contextually implies that he has what he himself believes to be good reasons for his statement (81). . . .
>
> Rule 3. What a speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his audience (82).

In practical discourse this third rule assumes special importance because according to it any sentence giving a reason for choice or action, etc., turns out to be practical from the start and is not merely a statement of fact from which a practical sentence can somehow be deduced (83).

4. The Role Of A-Sentences

After outlining a new approach to the logic of those words and sentences comprising value language or practical discourse, Nowell-Smith applies the new approach more thoroughly by investigating the role of his A-sentences, those sentences usually containing an A-word each of which is connected with a specific human reaction. As he enters this section of his study, he lists some typical A-words ('terrifying,' 'hair-raising,' 'disappointing,' 'ridiculous'); notes that the likeness among them is that each is connected with a specific human "reaction" (being amused, frightened, impressed); and then says that "reaction" here includes attitudes that people might take up, emotions they might feel, things that happen to them, and things that they do (85).

It is helpful to notice that this broadening of the word 'reaction' is important from the viewpoint of revealing something about the language-user. There is no one word, it seems, that generically covers all the human tendencies, conations, aspirations, impulses that provide the context for value language. "Reaction," a word implying both emotion and action, receives a use broader than usual so that the

argument can proceed without cumbersome listings; yet these rich listings must remain operative if the argument is to succeed. Nowell-Smith seems quite aware of this (85).

What is the role of the sentences of practical discourse in which A-words appear? Once again, Nowell-Smith reminds us that to understand the logic of an A-sentence we must ask, not "What does it (always) mean? but What does its use in this instance contextually imply? What would it be logically odd to question (85)?" Here the contextual implication of value language is an opening to reflection on the language-user. There are, according to the author, four elements that seem to be contextually implied in typical uses of A-sentences: the subjective, the predictive, the generalizing and the causal. He assures us, however, that it is not necessary that every element should be present on every occasion and that the relative prominence of the different elements will be different on different occasions (85).

He describes the elements as follows:

a. The subjective element. In default of other evidence the use of an A-sentence usually implies that the speaker has the appropriate reaction. . . . (85)

b. The predictive element. An A-sentence is sometimes used to imply that someone would have the appropriate reaction to something if suitable circumstances arose. . . . (86)

c. The generalizing element. Sensible people do not make predictions (or retrodictions) except on the basis of evidence, so that a man who uses an A-sentence to make a prediction contextually implies (by Rule 2) that he has what he believes to be good reasons for making the prediction. If he does not, he is either lying or abusing language. . . . (86)

> d. The causal element. . . . . To be told that something has an A-characteristic is not to be told just what causal properties it has that gave it that characteristic; but it is contextually implied that it has such properties. . . . (87)

What do these elements reveal about uses of Aptitude-sentences? Mainly that the jobs these sentences perform are all jobs which presuppose an operating matrix of human action and reaction, human tendencies and instincts. More precisely, they imply that the reactions have causes which are always in terms of what human persons want or want to avoid--or, to come closer to Nowell-Smith's more careful language--what human persons have attitudes for or against.

5. Purposes And Roles Of Value Words

According, then, to his own logic, Nowell-Smith can say that the words and sentences most operative in practical discourse or in value language--his A-words and A-sentences--do not name properties nor refer to entities but rather express or imply or predict reaction. He then proceeds to investigate the purposes of practical discourse and the roles which value words are able to play (95).

The commonest practical words, he reminds us, do not have just one use. They have many uses and can be employed at the same time on the same occasion to perform several different jobs. Nor is it enough to ask, For what job is this word used? The next question must follow: Under what conditions is it proper to use that word for that job? What, in other words, are the contextual implications associated with its use? (95)

At this point Nowell-Smith notes two advantages of using the new model for the logic of value words, the model of words as tools with which we do things rather than as names or labels which we attach to things. This model, he says, reminds us how close the connection is "between doing things with words and doing them with smiles, nods, winks, and gesture and of the importance, in ordinary speech, of emphasis, tone of voice, and manner (96)." All of these are "more or less irrelevant to the dry, precise, and 'objective' uses to which mathematical language and the language of empirical science are put, but they are exceedingly important in ordinary, and especially in practical discourse (96)."

This observation can say something about the structure of persons using language. In carrying on our way of life we use gestures, facial expressions, a tone of voice, a manner; and we use words. Movements and language are both ways of getting on in practical living. Viewed from another angle, the close link between gestures, nods, winks, manner and the words we use, both doing similar jobs, can point up the value of investigating our uses of words to find out what we are like.

But the second advantage of using the new model is of particular interest to our thesis. The model reminds us, Nowell-Smith says, of the way in which "different uses of words shade into each other, a point which is obscured by the labelling model since things labelled are distinct from each other in a way in which the jobs for which a tool is used are not (97)." The important phrase here is the "way in which the uses of words shade into each other." Who does the shading, we may

ask, and how and why? To answer, we must always check the context, Nowell-Smith says. And this context may include an emphasis by the speaker which in another context could make the same sentence operate in a different way.

For example, "That was a disgusting thing to do" might simply express a man's disgust. A curl of the lip might do the same job, though perhaps not so clearly. But in other contexts the phrase might mean much more than this. By his use of 'disgusting' the speaker might imply that the object in question is apt to arouse disgust in any normal person and that his own disgust was not therefore peculiar or unusual. In other contexts the phrase might have gerundive force; the speaker might imply that his disgust was justified and that other people ought to be disgusted too (98). In other words, to discover the jobs the word is doing requires investigation of the lived context; there may be many performances going on thanks to the particular orientations of the speaker.

Why do we need such versatile tools? How do we learn to use them? Do their uses have a purpose? Are they capable of being listed or are they seemingly endless? How do we learn to precise and nuance their uses? One way of helping to answer these questions would be by investigating the structure and orientations of the language-users.

6. Focus On Value Words

Nowell-Smith immediately narrows his focus to those words with which, he says, "moral philosophers have specially to do, which are

usually called 'value-words' (98)." For these words the old model of labelling is not just misleading; it is "wholly wrong." To restrict the nuances of value language or to place its meaning in a reference to a non-natural property means simply leaving value words without an adequate accounting. We have not got into them yet.

But when we look at them through the new model, we are able to see that value words play many different parts; their almost endlessly varied activities form the "complex web of moral discourse (98)." These words are used, he says, "to express tastes and preferences, to express decisions and choices, to criticize, grade, and evaluate, to advise, admonish, warn, persuade and dissuade, to praise, encourage and reprove, to promulgate and draw attention to rules; and doubtless for other purposes also (98)."

This is a list of varied but related activities. Within each item, other lists could be elaborated. The list is open ended; and yet, as Nowell-Smith goes on to discuss, there remain real connections among all these uses. Spelling out the connections and their logical status is not strictly relevant for our thesis. It is enough to note that Nowell-Smith does trace connections among these activities and that he does identify the connection between these uses as "partly logical and partly a matter of fact; and it is for this reason that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy breaks down." The connection is what he calls a "quasi-logical one" between, for instance, approving and exhorting, or preferring and choosing (99).

To reveal the connections requires that we observe what a man is doing with a particular value word at a particular time--in other words, that we observe what he says in its context. What interests us here is simply the fact of the connections and the fact that they are only "quasi-logical," that they require investigation into the here and now uses of the words, investigation into the user and the total context of the use. Here the person is central. Such variety and nuance with connections of almost endless variety and nuance; such combinations and such shadings-together-- What is the human person like if he can use language that escapes exact categorization, that exhibits such richness and yet acknowledges precision and propriety as well? (98)

7. Choosing and Reasons

Beginning a more detailed analysis of various performances of value words, Nowell-Smith focuses on the activities of choosing, deciding and preferring. He begins with these performances because of their connection with the question he had before posed as fundamental in practical discourse: What shall I do? He first gives a detailed analysis of choosing, then shows the connection among choosing, deciding and doing, and between choosing and preferring. For our purposes it is enough to say that he situates choosing, deciding, preferring and doing--all central performances of value language--within the context of human action. "Choosing is something that we do (100)."

Our chief concern here is with Nowell-Smith's examination of what counts as a good reason for choosing. For when he investigates

what counts as a reason, he points to the central and explanatory position of what he calls in a very wide sense human attitudes. In other words, to account for the performance of 'choosing' and of all the uses of value words related to 'choosing,' we must turn not to non-natural properties of things but to the structures and orientations--complex, varied, almost endless--of the language-user.

By "reasons for choosing" Nowell-Smith means, not morally good reasons, but logically good ones: ". . . the task is not to discover propositions that entail a decision to act but propositions which are such that, once they are granted, it would be logically odd either to ask for further reasons for doing something or for a further explanation of why someone did it (105)."

What sorts of propositions are these? Do they all belong to the same logical type? Nowell-Smith begins his answer by showing the inadequacy of a same-logical-type explanation. He centers his critique on the work of Hobbes, since Hobbes, according to Nowell-Smith, fails not because of the direction in which he seeks explanation but precisely because of an oversimplification of the logic involved. Hobbes attempts to explain all action as caused by desire or aversion. According to Nowell-Smith, to place all causes of action in just desire and aversion is to grossly oversimplify.

The main difficulty he finds in Hobbes' view is that desire and aversion both involve a reference to feelings (110); yet there are many expressions which resemble desiring and wanting in that they provide "logically impeccable explanations of choice," but which are unlike

desiring and wanting in that they do not "obviously involve a reference to any feelings at all (111)." To liken all these expressions to desiring in Hobbes' sense is "to suppose that all these explanations must conform to the same pattern, and this tempts us to invent logical analogues in these cases for all the elements that must occur in cases of desiring (111)." Hobbes makes this very mistake because, by calling all motives 'desires' he tempts us to believe that motive-explanations all conform "to one pattern and specifically to the itch-scratch pattern." And to do this is to distort the logic of many of these explanations (111).

There is no one pattern of explanation for choosing. There are many patterns; but, as Nowell-Smith shows, all of them are related and related not merely to itch-scratch desire and aversion but to a far more complex configuration of human tendencies, aspirations, emotions, activities. Hobbes fails, says Nowell-Smith, not because he centers explanation for choosing, and hence the uses of value language, in human conation but that he oversimplifies that conation. The sign of oversimplification is the need to distort the logic of the language to fit the explanation. Once again the structure and orientation of the language-user is brought into focus because of their close connection with the way value language is used. The complexity of usage opens onto the complexity of the user (111).

8. The Shiftiness Of Value Language

In his critique of Hobbes, Nowell-Smith makes a helpful observation about the shiftiness and adaptability of value language. Using

an example, he asks, What do we mean by 'hunger' and by 'fear'? Is hunger the desire to eat or is it the sensation in the pit of your stomach? Does the word 'hunger' have just one meaning, one use? Not at all. "As is always the case with a complex of different sorts of elements, the same word or phrase can be used to refer to the whole complex situation or to any important element in it (109)."

He invokes his own "Janus-principle"--the principle that a given word can not only do two or more jobs at once but also is often, in the absence of counter-evidence or express withdrawal, presumed to be doing two or more jobs at once (100)." 'I feel hungry' is a Janus-phrase, doing two jobs at once; it refers to my sensations and also expresses a desire to eat. Why is it so used? The answer rests with people: "it is an empirical fact that people who have the sensation referred to also want to eat (109)."

'Fear,' a Janus-word, refers to trepidations, nausea, quickening pulse; it expresses a desire to run away and is part of the tendency to run away. The word can be used for any or for all of these jobs. 'Fear,' then, is a flexible word. To grasp its use or uses on a given occasion we have to find the person using it, the context in which he uses it. What is there in him that makes such flexibility in language possible and desirable?

Now if Hobbes' treatment of all motives as desires fails to account for our uses of practical discourse, it by no means fails because it employs the general distinction between 'endeavor toward' and 'endeavor fromward' in accounting for motives for choosing. It is

precisely in such context of human orientation and action that Nowell-Smith centers his own theory; the improvement he makes is to provide instead of the one Hobbesian pattern of motive-explanation a great variety of patterns which he discerns operating in practical discourse.

But these patterns operate within the context of "endeavor toward" and "endeavor fromward." To find reasons for choosing one must look in the areas of some sort of "endeavoring." But what sort? Just one or many sorts? According to Nowell-Smith the answer is clearly "many sorts." Sorts of what? And here the language problem becomes acute. Is there a generic word that can cover his little yearnings, his violent passions and his most permanent and deep-seated desires? No generic word seems available. By reason of its vagueness, 'wanting' seems close but it would be hard to extend its uses to include hysterical passion and religious longing. And so with hesitation Nowell-Smith chooses the expressions 'pro-attitude' and 'con-attitude' to fulfill the required role (111-112). The point is this: Sentences containing pro- and con-words provide logically complete explanations of choice. And if choice is closely related to all the other uses of practical discourse then whatever in human persons is bound up with pro- and con-words is central in value language analysis.

9. The Pro- And Con-Words

In giving a list of pro- and con-words, Nowell-Smith deliberately includes different logical types in order "to make clear that the use of the phrase 'having a pro-attitude towards' should not be restricted

to any one pattern (112)." The pro-words include 'like,' 'enjoy,' 'approve of,' 'love,' 'want,' 'pleasure,' 'comfort,' 'interested in,' 'fond of,' 'try to achieve,' 'try to prolong.' The con-words include 'hate,' 'dislike,' 'disapprove of,' 'reject,' 'decline,' 'shy away from,' 'pain,' 'aversion,' 'try to avoid,' 'try to stop.' (112)

Nowell-Smith has so construed his lists that "anything which could be offered as a logically good reason for or against doing anything must be included in the lists (113)." The proposition that any statement which gives a logically complete reason for choice must include a reference to a pro- or a con-attitude is thus a frank tautology. The function of the tautology is to draw attention to the existence of a class of words that have just this force (114).

To give a logically complete reason for choosing is to refer somehow to a pro- or con-attitude--that is, to at least one of a variety of orientations and tendencies in the person. If there are no orientations, no attitudes in Nowell-Smith's wide sense, then there are no reasons for choosing, and ultimately no choice. And if there is no choice then, because of the connections among all the jobs value language performs and especially because of the hinge-importance of choosing--then there is no value language. Value language and human attitude or orientation seem co-extensive. If therefore we have value language then we have oriented persons. If we have a complex value language whose logic reveals a variety of impulses, passions, directions, wantings and an apparently inexhaustible variety of ways of

expressing these 'attitudes,' then we do have, it seems, a real inroad to the structure and orientations of the language-users.

Of course there are objections to holding that "giving a reason for choosing" and "referring to a pro- or a con-attitude" is a tautology. Do we have a pro-attitude toward all the means we take to ends? Nowell-Smith answers that we need not have a direct pro-attitude towards the means. The next objection points out that we sometimes give a statement of fact as a reason for choosing. We might say, for example, that we choose this car because it has leg room. Nowell-Smith responds that we give such a reason only when a pro-attitude is so common that it can be taken as understood. Most people buying a car have a pro-attitude toward leg room.

Finally, the objections go, is there not a sense in which A-sentences do not give reasons and do not constitute a reason for my choosing? For example, could I not say that this book is amusing and yet not choose to read it? Nowell-Smith answers that the explanatory function of A-sentences is partly that of showing that the choice was not an unusual one and partly that of implying the presence of reasons for choosing and of indicating of what general type they are without specifying them. But to make an A-sentence a reason for my choosing, it is not enough for it to express a reaction, or the aptitude of the object in question to excite such a reaction; rather, the speaker himself, if the A-sentence is to function as a reason for choosing, must have a pro-attitude toward the reaction expressed in the A-sentence.

"My belief that a book will amuse or enlighten me (or you) is not a sufficient explanation of my choice unless I also have a pro-attitude towards my (or your) being amused or enlightened.(119)."

So far we have seen that, according to Nowell-Smith's view, value language has a logic that involves reference to human reaction as expressed or predicted or implied; and that whenever we give a reason for choosing we either express or imply the presence of what he calls in a very broad sense pro- or con-attitudes. This logic of value language is apparent in what he calls Aptitude-words and Aptitude-sentences.

When we use value language, we are using a language with a complex logic, a language with many patterns for expressing reasons for choice; yet all of these patterns will somehow involve expressing or implying the presence of a pro- or con-attitude in the speaker. 'Attitude' here takes on a very wide sense that can include everything from vague wanting to violent passion. Such a broad and flexible value language, especially as it is exhibited in the performances of choosing, seems to indicate some of the complexity of the orientations of the speakers, of the persons whose way of life includes their language.

10. Appraising And Pro-Attitudes

Among other jobs that we perform with value language is the job of appraising. What are we doing when we appraise? What does appraising contextually imply? Can this job we do by value language tell us anything about ourselves?

First of all, to appraise is not to choose nor to advise nor to make a decision to do something; it is to make a judgment, a judgment that something meets certain standards or fulfills certain criteria. The appraisal does not, then, need to involve the tastes of preference--the pro-attitudes--of the speaker. Nor do the criteria have to be made explicit in order for someone else to understand that I have appraised something.

Are pro-attitudes involved at all? Yes, says Nowell-Smith. If we appraise in terms of criteria and without ourselves having a pro-attitude toward what we judge good, at least when the criteria were established they were established in terms of someone's pro-attitude. The present criteria are somehow connected with criteria established when and because someone had pro-attitudes toward the object in question. The original connection with the "natural" pro-attitudes may be now entirely lost; yet the present criteria would not function as criteria were the connection non-existent. "In many cases," he says, "the criteria now used are connected to natural criteria only through a long process of change and have become modified to such an extent that their original connection with natural pro-attitudes has been entirely lost (173)."

To pose the problem another way: sometimes we seem to use the word 'good' to appraise something, and all we seem to mean is that the object in question meets certain criteria. It appears that no pro-attitude is involved. Why, for instance, we call this dog in the dog show 'good' may depend solely upon the established criteria which seem

to have nothing to do with human pro-attitudes. The same situation may come up in questions of fashion and of fads. A thing becomes good because it meets certain seemingly arbitrary criteria, and tastes are formed after, not before, the criteria are established.

Nowell-Smith tackles the problem by saying that we would not even think of using the word 'good' to appraise in such a situation unless somehow and at some time there were pro-attitudes involved. We would not employ value language for appraising in this case unless such appraising were somehow related to choosing, praising and advising where this "set of words" also operates. The logic of value language is so bound up, according to Nowell-Smith, with human attitudes and orientations that unless these attitudes are in some way operative in the context it is impossible to understand why the value terms would be employed at all in the situation (172-173).

The association of applying criteria with calling something 'good' comes about because we apply criteria in cases where we use the criteria we do because our desires, interests and tastes are what they are. Since such is the case, then men "can come to acquire a taste for what counts as 'good' under the accepted criteria even in cases where the original connection between the criteria and the taste has been lost (173)."

To conclude: accounting for the language of appraisal, like accounting for the language of choosing, demands that we turn to the person of the language-user and find in his structure and orientations the basis for the possibility of the logic we have found operative in

the language we are analyzing. Once again, in talking about words we have had to talk about human persons, their structure and orientations.

11. The Good Life And The Expert

After examining value language in its functions of choosing and of appraising, we are able to repeat what we said at the beginning of this chapter: in Nowell-Smith's interpretation of value language, pro- and con-attitudes are central. Before going on to discuss where this centrality might lead us, it seems helpful to examine briefly two other points which Nowell-Smith makes in his Ethics. He has significant comments to make about 1) a person's overall goals or "Good Life" and 2) the "expert."

When he is discussing freedom and responsibility (313), Nowell-Smith says that we use our practical discourse, all our value language in the context of what he calls our "vision of the Good Life." By this he means a man's conception of the sort of world that he desires, so far as it rests with him, to create (313). The Good Life is the ground and the direction ultimately of all the pro- and con-attitudes that give rise to value language. "It is ultimately by reference to this conception that all . . . choices are made (314)."

This Good Life, while operating almost as a telos, remains both complex and vague. No one yet, from Plato onwards (13), has succeeded in giving a fully satisfactory account of it. An individual person's own conception of it can be altered through, for example, meeting some person whose life reveals new values to him or through accident.

through an unlooked for discovery. Perhaps a man "meets someone whose character, conduct, or aguments reveal to him new virtues that he has never even contemplated; or he may do something uncharacteristic and against his principles without choosing to do it and, in doing it, discover how good it is (313)." The overall conception of the Good Life, grounding a man's choice, is open to change, to re-definition, to new patterns.

It seems then that the set of principles most important in a man's life can be extremely vague and even unfixed. How do we operate in terms of them? Perhaps to answer we must look again to Nowell-Smith's complex pro- and con-attitudes. These attitudes range from mere wishing to mad passion, from faint desiring to religious consecration. Would it be by attention to the shape, the direction and the interplay of these "attitudes" that we would be able to discern general and developing lines of "what we want"? What can this vague character of the overarching Good Life, and this variety and openness of attitudes indicate about us, the persons with the attitudes that ground our value language?

Although Nowell-Smith has relatively little to say about his "Good Life," what he does say seems to open further possibilities for discovering something about the structure and orientation of the value language-users.

Now to the "expert." In other chapters of this dissertation we will take up the question of what or who constitutes the "criterion" of human values. But how do we identify the good man, the good human

person? Who can say that this person or that person is humanly good? In the examples of value language which we will examine in the chapter on Shakespeare and The New Yorker, some persons will appear as criteria of human values. In Chapter Four we will consider the Rogerian position that the "fully functioning person" is the locus of evaluation. Does Nowell-Smith have anything to say on this question?

At the beginning of his Ethics (13, 19-20), he mentions that moral philosophy books cannot teach moral living. He adopts the Aristotelian position that moral philosophy cannot teach an individual how to be a good man. To learn right living one must look not to the general principles and guidelines of philosophy but to the living person in whom the norms of human living have come to concrete existence. What lies behind this opinion is the view that concrete action varies so much with the person, the situation, the times, the whole context that no general principle could ever cover it in its totality. Only the good man would have the relevant data, the practiced discrimination, the well-directed "appetites," and the experience, to be able to make the prudent judgment. Nowell-Smith indicates, then, that he espouses Aristotle's view that the good man, the "prudent man," is the criterion of human goodness.[2] And in his discussion of the "expert" (174-175) Nowell-Smith makes statements that can also significantly contribute to the study of the criterion of human goodness.

When he discusses the value language job of appraising, he examines the sources of the criteria we use in making judgments of

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[2]Pierre Aubenque, La Prudence Chez Aristote (Paris, 1963) 33-63.

value. Again with Aristotle, he holds that all criteria, whether natural or conventional, have some connection with human pro-attitudes. He even takes up cases where such a connection seems lost and then argues for its presence at least remotely if there are to be criteria at all. He distinguishes "natural pro-attitudes" as the ultimate base for establishing criteria. By these he means attitudes that most persons in most societies hold without having to learn them. For instance, in his terms benevolence and love for life are natural pro-attitudes. Given these pro-attitudes, when we seek criteria we will give "higher ratings" to whatever will promote what we are already preferring. In this way criteria are generally and ultimately established.

Even then where we have "conventional criteria," there will be some connection with natural pro-attitudes. The criteria we have for a good postage stamp, for example, are conventional but are related to natural pro-attitudes. What will count as good music will have some basis in our hearing apparatus as well as in our development of tonal structures in a culture.

But if we examine the basic natural pro-attitudes, we will see that they will not be enough to account for many of the criteria by which we judge. Once we begin to become more specific and to require finer discriminations and finer gradings, we can no longer look to the vague and general tendencies. We will look to the person whom we call the "expert." In Nowell-Smith's view, he is the man who possesses the necessary conditions for making good judgments, although he may in fact fail in applying criteria. But the necessary conditions are those

required for establishing and distinguishing criteria. The expert will have a fine sense of discrimination, trained faculties, necessary experience, and will be accountable to others in his area of competence as well as be subject to any available "objective" tests of his discrimination.

There seems to be another way of putting these requirements for the expert: he is the man to whom the relevant data are available and who has the apparatus needed for interpreting that data. Take, for example, the expert in music. He is the man with the necessary intelligence, education, taste, discrimination, experience and familiarity with others knowledgeable in his field. When we want to know if Schönberg's Fourth Quartet is good music, we may wish to ask him. What he says may of course be wrong or inadequate, but we still do well to consult this expert. He has a good chance of being helpful to us because the data are available to him. He can, so to speak, make more specific what a natural pro-attitude has indicated in a general and vague way.

When it is a question of human goodness, where do we find the criteria? From what Nowell-Smith has already said about natural pro-attitudes and criteria, it seems that we would have very general and vague criteria for what constitutes the good man. Cultures, societies, all of these would help determine more specific criteria within the general guidelines of the natural pro-attitudes toward human goals. Yet is there a sense in which we might have an "expert" in human living, a person who might in some way establish criteria of human goodness?

Is there a sense in which we could consider the good man an expert in human living? It seems possible to do so. We accept that most men have broad, vague pro-attitudes toward human goals. Yet, as we have seen, these goals are extremely vague and indefinite, capable of endless forms of realization. The complexity of the attitudes in man further complicates the discovery of the humanly good. We would seem indeed to have need for an expert among us if we are to discover in specific terms what would constitute human goodness.

This "expert" will be the man who is realizing in himself those goals or values which most enhance him as a human person. But because of their indefiniteness, the good man must be an ongoing process of discovering these goals. He must be aware of the direction of his tendencies; he must permit these attitudes to be themselves and to find their own harmonies; he must be testing, appraising, revising as he experiences more and more of human living; he is probably in conflict and is making mistakes--but trying again. He will be discovering determinations, specifications of his vague goals. Yet, if the flexibility and precision of value language are giving correct indications, this good man is finding these goals to be open ended and capable of many ways of realization.

As he continues in the process of discovering and actualizing his goals, the good man will be permitting "human goodness" to come into existence in him. Human values will turn out to be for this man simply himself existing in a certain way. There are several ways of viewing this situation. First, there is a sense in which the good man

is the criterion of human goodness for himself. He can ultimately look only to himself, to the direction and interplay of his attitudes, in order to recognize the contours of his real goals. His attitudes become his criteria. As the values come into existence in him, they exist as specific determinations of this particular man; they are in concrete existence as one way of realizing the broad and general goals of human goodness. What others see exhibited is this man's way of becoming a good human person. The general and natural pro-attitudes will have found one recognizable way of fulfillment. Perhaps this "expert" in human living will be telling others to find their own ways in terms of their individual orientations within the general pattern of human pro-attitudes. The good man, in this sense, will then provide no definite, transferable pattern of human values to others.

And yet because of the likeness among the basic pro-attitudes of most men, the good man may indeed have something definite to exhibit about human values for everyone. This man's justice, for example, may approach what I desire but what I must desire in my terms and according to my specific orientations and life-situation. But seeing justice exhibited in the good man both inspires me and provides me with guidelines. Again, in cases of grave complexity and difficulty it will be to the good man that others will look for a decision requiring the discrimination and rectitude of the "expert."

As for what the phrase "good man" means, it would seem well to consult this "expert" in human living. For the good man has experienced human goodness and therefore knows it in a way that others cannot

know it. As he lives the reality of his goals, he realizes their openness, their limitations, their possibilities, their ramifications. What he means by 'good' will undergo an interior meaning shift as he himself experiences new aspects of the values, new aspects of what it means to be a human person. His are the meanings bearing special weight in the value language community.

What we have said here does go beyond the value language analyses of Nowell-Smith; yet what his analyses revealed was an existing framework within which such an interpretation of the criterion of human values could be developed. We will return to these questions when we analyze value language exemplars in Chapter Two and when we take up the question of the locus of evaluation in the theories of Carl Rogers.

12. Summary Listing

We will now list those parts of Nowell-Smith's analysis of value language which seem both important in his theory and important as openings to further questions about the structure and orientations of the persons using the language.

First, Nowell-Smith recognizes that the language in which we speak of what we consider really worthwhile is a complex web; the terms and statements in it have many uses; sometimes, indeed often, we combine several uses at once. All the uses have some connection with one another. How we are using the language comes to light only if we consider our discourse in its many-faceted context.

The uses of the language "shade into" one another; the tone, the emphasis, the very life-cast of the speaker bears upon the meaning

of his value discourse. The uses by no means function in the same way; rather, there are many logical patterns involved in value language, and any one-pattern explanation of the uses fails because it leaves a great deal of the language without explanation. If value language is the language in which we speak of what we consider worthwhile, then its complexity, shadings and variety of patterns seem certainly to have something to say about the person using the language.

Secondly, Nowell-Smith centers value language in what he calls in an extended sense human "attitudes." The word itself is weak and failing, as the author himself admits; and its very weakness, its failure to become really a generic word for all Nowell-Smith means by it, indicates well the variety and difference of all the human tendencies and dynamisms he wishes it to cover. It must touch everything including an inclination for martinis, sensitivity to Bach cantatas, hatred of structure and institutions, distaste for fried liver, all the fears nameable and unnameable; vague interests as well as stalwart loves. The fact that we wince in grouping all these together and in calling all of them simply "attitudes"--while at the same time recognizing Nowell-Smith's point in using the word--tells us quite a bit about the complex and dynamic structure of the language-user.

But the main point about the attitudes is that they are attitudes, that they are orientations, tendencies, actions, motions toward and away from. If we are talking about what is worthwhile we are talking in terms of movements toward or away from. We are somehow

expressing or implying action, motion. The good of man is in the context of going somewhere, going onward.

Thirdly, while not drawing directly on language analysis, Nowell-Smith does recognize that the Good Life in terms of which we act remains an obscure and changing goal, capable of refinement and specification. Not all these qualities receive explicit treatment in his work, but what he does say of the Good Life does indicate its vagueness. Again, he situates criteria for appraisal within the context of pro-attitudes, and he shows the place of the expert in discerning and applying criteria. All of these observations will prove helpful in coming to know more about the structure and dynamisms of the value language-user.

13. The Person Of The Value Language-User

After examining the new logical apparatus Nowell-Smith proposes for value language, we will attempt now to show what value language, as he has analyzed it, can reveal about the structure and orientations of the human person.

As we said in the summary, when we are speaking of what we consider worthwhile, when we are talking value language, we are employing words and sentences for many functions. These functions are delicately nuanced, precise and connected; and the words and sentences are open to new and related uses. All of these value language functions operate from a matrix of human pro- and con-attitudes.

In attempting now to show what our words reveal about us, we will center our study on the human attitudes that are the root explanation

of the complex logic of value language. All the uses of value language and especially the functions Nowell-Smith explicated at some length--choosing, to which all other uses are related, and appraising--arise from human "attitudes." 'Attitudes' here becomes a generic word covering all forms of human emotion, impulse, passion, desire, wishing, wanting, longing for, liking, hating, pursuing, avoiding and so on.

13.1. Goal-Direction

Attitudes, in Nowell-Smith's sense, are all directions toward goals. All the items listed under the pro- and con-attitudes are in some way motions to or away from something in some way accepted as good for or harmful to some human person. No matter what they turn out to be specifically, the attitudes are in some way motions and directions: they are goal-directed. If so, then the person who possesses these attitudes is to that extent at least goal-directed.

It seems possible to say that if "attitudes" are at the basis of value language uses, then the person using value language correctly must be a complex of goal-oriented tendencies, impulses, actions, motions, emotions, volitions.

13.2. Variety Of Goal-Directed Tendencies

That there is variety among the goal-oriented tendencies in the value language-user appears clearly when we consider how complex the logic of value discourse is. Nowell-Smith criticized Hobbes for reducing the explanatory attitudes to "desire" and "aversion" because these two attitudes, says Nowell-Smith, cannot cover the spectrum of human

endeavors toward and endeavors fromward which lie at the root of value language. The complexity of the language signals the complexity of the language-user in whose structure and orientations the logic of the language has its foundation.

When he searches for a generic term to cover all of these "endeavors," Nowell-Smith lists many of them and shows how various they are. Even 'wanting' falls short of covering everything. For instance, he says, not all the tendencies involve feeling; again, some are weak and some are violent; some are cognitive, some are impulsive. The language points to the presence of all of these in the language-user. To cover all of these orientations Nowell-Smith feels forced to extend the word 'attitude' and to explain the special sense in which he is using it so that it may include the immense vareity of differing tendencies all operating as the matrix of value language.

Another indication of the great variety among attitudes occurs when Nowell-Smith explains why the model of words as tools is especially suitable for value language. For the function of naming or labelling would not allow for the great flexibility of the value words; tools with many and varied functions provide a far more helpful model. These words must be available for many and different jobs because the language-user has many and varying attitudes that call the language into play.

13.3. Harmony Among Attitudes

Does value language indicate any harmony or pattern among all these various attitudes? Although Nowell-Smith does not treat this

question directly, several elements of his discussion do seem to support the presence of a harmony among many of the tendencies. First of all, one reason for supporting the tool-model for value terms is that this model allows for more flexibility in functioning. And such flexibility is necessary because the uses of many of the value terms "shade into" one another. If such shading is so common then there would seem to be a close relationship among attitudes. This relationship would manifest itself when one word could function for attitudes whose closeness would require the word uses to blur lines of distinction.

Secondly, Nowell-Smith sees a connection among all the uses of value language. The contextual implications of any value term will reveal relationships between the current use of that term and other uses of value language. For example, the performances of preferring and deciding will always imply some relationship to choosing; the performance of appraising is at least ultimately connected with desiring. And all these performances function within the context of human action. The most important questions with which practical discourse is concerned are "What shall I do" and "What ought I to do (11)." The total context of value language and the connections among all the uses indicate that there is a relationship among the attitudes: some seem subordinated to others; all have some contribution to make to a common "goal"--an action.

At a certain point Nowell-Smith appeals to the "empirical fact" of the concomitance of two attitudes in order to account for the logic of certain phrases. According to his Janus-principle, a given word is,

in the absence of counter-evidence or express withdrawal, presumed to be doing two or more jobs at once (100). The Janus-phrase, "I feel hungry," refers to sensations as well as expresses a desire to eat. How account for these two simultaneous performances? Why is the phrase so used? The answer rests, according to Nowell-Smith, with a unity discovered in the persons using the language: ". . . it is an empirical fact that people who have the sensation referred to also want to eat (109)." The fact that most of the time there is a union of certain attitudes in a person allows for the "Janus-usage" of a term or phrase.

When Nowell-Smith discusses the Good Life, he indicates that there is a unity or harmony among the attitudes. For it is in terms of this conception that, he says, ultimately all a person's choices are made. Not only are the attitudes united by the goal of human action, but human actions themselves are further unified in terms of an overall vision of the Good Life (313-314).

Although value language analysis does not directly treat this question, it is possible to conclude that, given the interconnections among all the uses, the value language-user has not only goal-directed tendencies but as well some unified or harmonious goal or goals for his whole person.

13.4. Character Of The Goals

Can value language analysis indicate in any way what the goal or goals of the human person might be like? Once again, though we seem to have only clues, these clues may prove revealing. The complexity of

both the value language uses and their underlying attitudes favors complexity in the goal or goals. No one tendency would account for the orientation of the whole man nor would a goal of any one attitude be a goal for the whole person.

If there is a harmony among the attitudes, as value language analysis suggests, it would seem that for the whole person there would be a complex but ordered goal or goals in which all the tendencies would come into play. The immense variety among the attitudes with almost endless possibilities of fulfillment would argue against any one determinate, specific goal centered in one or a few attitudes. Rather, even the complex goal or goals would seem open to great variety in specific realizations.

Even for the individual tendencies there would seem to be rather few fixed, determinate and final goals. The indication of this is the great flexibility and openness of the value language uses. There seems to be an ongoing character to the attitudes. Both the tool model and the Janus-principle fit value language analysis well because we language-users seem to be relentlessly finding new but related uses for our value discourse.

Yet while we are capable of nuance, of shading of uses into one another, we are also exhibiting in this free usage a remarkable precision. When we find new uses, we seem to know somehow what is appropriate and what is not. Even when the reasons why a given usage is "right" are not forthcoming, there will be a "feel" or "sense" of rightness. Here we seem faced with the phenomenon of recognizing

something previously unknown. What seems to make such recognition possible is the orientation of the attitudes attuned to their objects. Nowell-Smith mentions this phenomenon almost as an aside when he is speaking of the classifications of pro- and con-attitudes. "In spite of the heterogeneity of the lists," he says, "it can be shown that there is a genuine basis for the distinction (between pro- and con-attitudes) by remarking that the reader would have no difficulty in most cases in saying into which list, if either, some new concept ought to be put (112-113)." It seems possible to conclude that there is a vagueness, an indeterminacy about the goals; yet the goals remain normative because of the directionality in the attitudes. While the person using value language, then, seems searching for indeterminate goals, his search is not a random one; there is a directionality in his attitudes that seems to recognize what it searches for without fully knowing beforehand what that object will be like.

The only explicit treatment Nowell-Smith gives to the character of human goals does not occur during his value language analysis; yet what he does say can be legitimately grounded in what the analysis has already indicated about the language-user. When he speaks of this Good Life in terms of which all choices are ultimately made, he characterizes it as a general conception capable of changes and refinements as a man's life progresses. There is obviously no one pattern for the Good Life nor even anything absolutely fixed, unchanging and determinate. In the introductory sections of his Ethics he says that no one, from Plato onwards, has been able to spell out what the Good Life of

man must consist in (11-13). There is an open, tentative character to this life, and as value language indicates, the search is restless, ongoing, moving in a direction whose limits are not clearly and precisely determined.

It seems also true that the flexibility-precision characteristics of value language usage support the view that a man's goals are "open ended." The nuance and extension of uses, the employment of the "tools" for shadings and precisions, seem almost inexhaustible. They bespeak an inexhaustibility in the possible realizations of goals.

From the foregoing discussion we may conclude that the goals of the person using value language are vague, indeterminate, open ended, capable of further refinement and definition as the person carries on a directional but non-specific search for "what he wants," for what will fulfill him. The variety, flexibility, nuance and precision of the value language uses supports this interpretation. Nowell-Smith's additional discussion of the Good Life also confirms this view.

13.5. Characteristics Of The Attitudes

Can value language analysis say anything about the characteristics of the attitudes? Are they conscious or unconscious, rationally controlled or not subject to reason? Neither the analysis itself nor the listing of attitudes operative in value language will treat directly of "conscious" or "unconscious," "controlled by reason" or "irrational." But a mere citing of the value language uses and of the

attitudes operative in them shows the presence of all these characteristics, or at least of their possibility, in the tendencies of the language-user.

Among the language jobs are desiring, praising, wanting, choosing, passing verdicts, appraising, preferring. Several of these could be conscious or unconscious, controlled by reason or not. Of the pro- and con-attitudes appearing in Nowell-Smith's lists, some are rational, conscious, controlled by reason; some are not directly rational; some could well be unconscious or not fully conscious; some are impulses, itch-scratch feelings; others are conscious volitions, appraisals and decisions. Although Nowell-Smith does not discuss this, from the listings alone we can see that some of the attitudes might not come into a person's awareness, might be hidden from him or denied by him. There would also be a sense in which we could say, relying upon the listings, that a person might be both "directed" and "directing" in relation to his varying tendencies.

13.6. Awareness; Conflict And Other People

Value language analysis indicates that the goals of a person may be vague, indeterminate, changing, the objects of an ongoing search; yet they can function as goals thanks to the directionality found in the many attitudes operative in the person. The attitudes are sensitive to their objects even when those objects have been previously unknown. If a person, then, wanted to discern the shape of his vague and open goals, he might make some headway by being aware of the

directions of his many and varied attitudes. Attentiveness to those attitudes, awareness of their orientations, would help him discover some lineaments of his complex, over-all goals.

How would this awareness come about? Might a person come to awareness of the real shape of his tendencies through conflict? through interaction with other persons? These are not questions which Nowell-Smith considers in his value language analysis. But they are questions which will come up later in this dissertation. They will appear in Chapter Two when we analyze salient examples of value language in Shakespeare and in The New Yorker. They will recur as key problems in the theorizing of Carl Rogers as we examine his work in Chapters Three and Four. In this present chapter, therefore, it seems well to ask if there is anything in Nowell-Smith's analyses which might provide a context for these questions--which might, so to speak, set the stage for their emergence later. If we do look at what Nowell-Smith has said, we will, it seems, find aspects of our value language usage which provide plausibility for the propositions that interaction and conflict are integrally operative in the value language-user and could lead him to awareness of the nature of his attitudes.

From what Nowell-Smith does say in his study, we are able to find all the materials for a real conflict that might lead a man to wonder where he is going and how. For instance, both pro- and con-attitudes lie at the root of value discourse. Each includes a host of varying types of tendencies, impulses, volitions. Each attitude itself, as the precise, nuanced, flexible language indicates, seems restless,

ongoing, capable of recognizing or trying to recognize ever-changing determinations for its objects. The harmony existing among the attitudes could well be an ideal, almost an abstraction. If the focus of all the uses on human action provides the basis for the harmony; if human action is complex and fallible; and if such action calls upon such a complexity of varying orientations, then there would seem, on the basis of usage alone, ample room for the presence of conflict.

We may find another grounding for conflict when we consider that among the value discourse functions are appraising, re-appraising and passing verdicts. Appraisal is necessary perhaps not only for the discovery of values but possibly because the tendencies, the pro- and con-attitudes are sometimes in conflict. Perhaps many of the changes in usage arise from discoveries made through conflict of tendencies, through appraisal and choice in the face of tension and opposition. The next chapter will have something to say on this point.

Does value language indicate interaction with others, an interaction which might lead to awareness of one's own attitudes? First of all, by simply being a language, value discourse does indicate the interaction of the speaker with other persons. To say this is to invoke the theory that language is a way of being for a community. The presence of rules and conventions demands the presence of a community of persons, both disposed to learning and forming rules and able to take new members into its own "way of life."

The theory assumes that a person is, so to speak, born into the language community and has native ability to grasp the conventions,

rules and uses already operative in the linguistic interaction of the community. Language as such would, it seems, be an inter-relational entity whose existence would be impossible without at least the implied presence of many people. Since it is not our purpose to argue this theory, let it suffice for us to say here that if the theory is true--and it is assumed to be true in Nowell-Smith's language analysis--then there is basis in analysis of value language for at least the presence of a community of interacting persons.

But value language analysis has even more to say on this point. If its jobs include praising, approving, advising, exhorting, persuading, appraising, giving verdicts, then many of its jobs either imply or require interaction with other persons. It is impossible that even to persuade or exhort or pass verdict upon oneself would require that the "performance" have been learned through interaction with others.

If we were to investigate what the attitudes were about, we would discover that other persons are often involved. If, according to Nowell-Smith, the context is a determining factor in knowing the uses of the word or phrase, then the context of value language would often reveal the presence of others as calling into play many of the complex attitudes operative at the core of the language.

In regard to the function of appraising alone: If the criteria for appraisal, according to Nowell-Smith, require in some way the presence of pro-attitudes, and if the appraiser himself may not have the pro-attitude, then his applying criteria and making the appraisal does imply some interplay with other persons. The expert as

establishing criteria is another instance of the influence of others upon a person's uses of value language.

Does all this indication of interaction among persons say that such interaction will lead to awareness of one's own tendencies? In the value language analysis of this chapter there does not seem to be direct basis for such a conclusion. Yet many of the functions of value language, such as approving, appraising, praising, would indicate that the interaction with others might indeed influence one's awareness of one's own tendencies and goals. When Nowell-Smith discusses his ideas of the Good Life, he does say that a person can come to a revised conception of the Good Life through meeting new values in other persons. That this observation could arise merely from the language analysis is doubtful. Yet the analysis does provide groundwork for such a statement.

13.7. Criterion Of Values

If the person using value language appears as goal-oriented and yet is searching, testing and discovering new determinations of these goals, does he in any sense become the criterion for the values he is seeking? Does the meaning of the values change as he begins to realize them in himself? Value language analysis may have a real contribution to make toward answering these questions.

In the job of appraising, for example, Nowell-Smith finds the function of the expert very important. It is in the end the expert whose judgment counts as to what will operate as criteria. The expert

here is the one most cognizant of all the ramifications involved in the situation, of all that is relevant in the context of the object in question. He alone has a grasp of all the elements that should be operative in the appraisal. His is the judgment that counts.

When it is a question of what counts as the 'good man' it would seem that the only person really grasping all the aspects of the case would be the person himself, the one who is actually becoming a real man. He alone would have the facts of the case. For he is the man with the harmonious complexity of attitudes, with awareness of the directions and interplay of these attitudes, with experience of their restless and open ended search for realizations that can take many different forms. Sensitive to the shape and thrust of his own tendencies, he alone could determine what would count as fulfillment. He alone would seem to be the real expert in the case of judging what it is for him to be the "good man." His awareness of the already evaluating directions of his attitudes and his sensitivity to varying realizations of goals will be both articulated and partly accomplished in his value discourse. Although this response about the expert in human living does not proceed directly from value language analysis, that analysis does nevertheless provide evidence on which such a response can be plausibly built.

But if we do accept the good man as the expert who is in a sense the criterion for 'good man,' then value language analysis itself can make a direct contribution to an understanding of the human person. If the good man is criterion, then changes in the man will bring changes

in the meaning of the value terms. The discourse will function in a different context; and the content will be different. For the good man is now experiencing what the values are really like as they come into existence in himself. No longer knowing them abstractly, he will experience their contours, their limitations, their openness and possibilities. And therefore the uses he will make of value language will have fresh nuances and new precisions. Thanks to his development, there will be in the value terms themselves an "interior meaning shift."

If this man becomes in some real sense the criterion of human values, then he will influence both other persons and value language. His life will count as a criterion not only for himself but in some real sense for other men who can look to him for at least one realization of human goodness. Meeting the values as they exist in this man--meeting this man normed by these values, this man existing in this way,--other persons will experience something of the cast of the real values and will be drawn to recognize them as desirable. But the meanings of the value words would seem to be in some sense chiefly the good man's meanings. His uses of the discourse will bear special weight. The next chapter of this dissertation will go deeply into the question of the interior meaning shift in value terms thanks to changes in the language-user; in regard to this point value language analysis itself can make a direct contribution to an understanding of the human person.

Nowell-Smith's position on the complexity of the logic of practical discourse and his ample evidence of the shadings, nuances and

precisions of value language all support the supposition that the meaning of the value words will change as a man experiences more and more of what it is like to realize these values in himself. His language of value reveals that he is constantly opening onto new uses for his words, that he needs words that can function as apt and versatile tools capable of assuming new but related jobs. At least there is in value language every basis for an assumption that as a man becomes more and more the values he seeks, as he discovers their shape, he finds that his grasp of what they really are will undergo a change. He employs the tools of a language that will allow him to articulate many of these changes.

Although Nowell-Smith does not treat this question as part of his language analysis, he does have something to say about the good man as criterion. He notes that moral philosophy books fail to give us a way of life or to tell us how to live (13). He cites Aristotle in regard to this and agrees that for learning how to live we have to look to the men who are living well (15). At the close of his book he speaks of discovering values through other persons whose way of life reveals new possibilities to us. A man's conception of the Good Life can be altered when "he meets someone whose character, conduct or arguments reveal to him new virtues that he has never contemplated (313)." Here is then a sense in which a good man can become the criterion for human values because he reveals in himself the contour such values assume when they come into existence as norms of the human person.

Is it good or bad for a person to accept another person as criterion of human goodness? Would there be a way of viewing another as simply one possible way to realize human values, while not accepting his precise determinations ~~of~~ the values as the proper determinations for oneself? Would there be danger of taking in the determinate values of another as one's own real orientations? Value language analysis does not deal directly with these questions. Both ways mentioned here could find grounding in the analysis.

13.8. Conclusions

In conclusion: There is ample reason to think that the human person using value language is a complex, oriented being in search of goals as yet vague and indeterminate; that the shape of these goals is indicated by the directions of the person's many "attitudes"; that these "attitudes" are complex, varied and yet basically harmonious and interconnected; that a person may come to awareness of these orientations and of their goals possibly through conflict and through interaction with others; that the good man himself is or can be in some sense the criterion for what it means to be a good man; that the meaning of value words will shift as the person begins to realize the values in himself; and that these values or goals are ongoing, open ended, perhaps capable of unending fulfillments.

While value language analysis by no means directly treats all these questions, it does nevertheless provide a schema for drawing these conclusions about the structure and orientations of the human person who employs value language.

CHAPTER TWO

AN ANALYSIS OF VALUE LANGUAGE IN SHAKESPEARE AND THE NEW YORKER

In Chapter One we began by explaining why value language analysis was a helpful way to discovering something about the structure and orientation of human persons. The main part of the chapter examined P. H. Nowell-Smith's analysis of value discourse and showed what in the person of the language-user might lie behind the usage.

This second chapter will analyze some pieces of value language with the same purposes in mind: to find ultimately what we discover about the structure and orientations of the persons using the language. At the close of the chapter we will sift and summarize the findings.

In doing this analysis we will adopt Nowell-Smith's view that to understand the jobs a word or sentence performs we must understand what that word or sentence contextually implies. And to understand well the contextual implications we would have to know, especially with value language, who is speaking, in what circumstances and with what intentions.

One source for finding persons whose language, lives and situations are publicly accessible is good published writing--we find publicly available lives in fiction, drama and even in good magazine

features. It is in these places that we will study value language now. We will use Shakespearean drama as a classic source, and The New Yorker magazine features as a contemporary source for uses of value discourse.

An additional advantage to studying value language in good literature is that such artwork selects, clarifies, arranges and heightens the relevant elements in ordinary discourse. If someone were to object that Shakespeare, for example, hardly represents ordinary discourse we might mention a distinction between what a tape-recorder picks up in a noontime cafeteria and what an artist, by judicious selection, arrangement and addition, refines out of that talk as one pattern of its logical and emotional structure. The artist becomes our instrument of precision, magnification and clarity, of condensation and focus. What would take us a long time to collect from street corners and would need a gifted sensitivity to get sorted out and focused can come to us in, so to speak, a "prepared" state by way of good writing.

1. 'Noble' In Julius Caesar

Our first value language analysis centers on uses of the term 'noble' in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. The statements in which this word is operative exhibit the Janus-quality of value terms: when the characters use 'noble' they are commending, approving and appraising. Yet even more significant is the "interior meaning shift" in the word both as it occurs in regard to different people and as it occurs at

different times in the play in regard to the "noblest Roman," Brutus. What lies behind such uses of value language seems to reveal several valuable items about the persons both using the language and experiencing the values.

The term 'noble' is dramatically operative in the play. Quite obviously the conflict arises from a conflict of values--who is really noble; which is better, personal power or the country's welfare--or is the personal power of the great man really the country's welfare?

1.1. Interior Meaning Shift

As an introduction we might notice an interesting "interior meaning shift" due to an interior shift not in the characters in the play but in members of the audience. The same person seeing the play at different periods of his own development in a way sees two plays. What he understands by the pivotal term 'noble' may have profoundly changed.

For instance, we might recall the time when the usual American sophomore high school student had to study Julius Caesar in class. To some of these students the play did make sense. They knew many meanings of the words, caught on to some of the conflict and the activity, could scrub together a character sketch of Cassius or Brutus or Antony, and, when prodded, could come up with worthy uses of 'noble.' They would, I think, agree that it was a praise word, a commendatory action word; that it expressed approval and made an appraisal. But some good give-and-take might go on in class if you

asked, why are these men praising others as noble? Does Antony praise Brutus for the same reason Brutus praises Caesar, when each uses the word 'noble'? Twice Antony calls Brutus noble--once in the funeral oration, once after Brutus' death. Does 'noble' function in the same way both times? Whose use of the word 'noble' would you trust the most?

Yet, were these teenage students able to answer all these questions we would still feel that they were not really in the heart of the play. We might surmise that few of them had experienced enough people, enough conflict, enough sting from bumped-into limits, enough data for and practice in evaluation to be able to find those uses of 'noble' that function as the root conflict in this play which asks, who is truly a man? Few teenagers could ferret out the ambiguity of the tragedy's response. For we are left in the last moments with Brutus, soon to receive Antony's praise of having "elements" so harmoniously "mixed in him," acknowledging the greater power of Caesar's ghost. 'Noble' internally shifts. Only experience, awareness of feeling, sensitivity to life-styles, and judgment can, as it were, let one into these uses of 'noble'; for without our altering a line, the play changes as the audience grows up.

But now we can focus on one of the reasons within the play itself why even for a mature audience the word 'noble' internally shifts. The use of the word at any one point depends precisely on which person in the play is using it. The variety arises out of the orientations of each person; each assesses nobility differently; and

his assessment is influenced by the sort of man he himself is, by his experience, by his self-awareness, by his ability to judge, by what he would conceive, however vaguely, the Good Life to be, and by the kinds of men he knows and admires. Brutus, Caesar, Cassius, Octavius and Antony are all called noble.

The funeral oration scene provides a good sampling of meaning shifting with shifting appraisals, and appraisals shifting with differences in personal orientations. Notice:

> Citizens: The noble Brutus is ascended: silence! . . . .
> (Later) Noble Antony, go up . . . .
> (After Antony's oration) There's not a nobler man in Rome than Antony . . . .
> Most noble Caesar! we'll revenge his death.
>
> Antony: The noble Brutus hath told you Caesar was ambitious.[1]

Throughout the scene the uses of praising, of approving, of appraising remain; the vague meaning of "best sort of man" remains, but the specifications of what sort of man is appraised as best shift quickly--thanks to lack of critical appraisal in the case of the Citizens, thanks to acute appraisal plus ironic use in the case of Antony. And, were Brutus to call someone noble at this juncture we would feel that we had still another meaning for the word thanks to the kind of man Brutus appears to be.

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[1] "Julius Caesar" in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Edited by W. J. Craig (London, 1905 & 1943).

Look for a moment here at some of the influences on the appraisals expressed in the language of this scene. For instance, simply contrast the Citizens with Brutus and Antony in terms of 1) concepts of the Good Life, 2) awareness of the direction and force of one's own emotions, 3) conscious decision about what one considers worthwhile, 4) 'locus' of values--whether realized in oneself and consciously accepted, or simply taken in without much awareness, discrimination or judgment. The power of this one central scene, with a value-term dramatically operative, depends very much on the fact that persons have orientations, dynamisms, tendencies, and on the fact that values are their norms, boundaries and definers.

1.2. Criteria For 'Noble'

Now we can pose a question which functions as a theme in the drama and which can prove helpful to our own thesis. The question is, What man is truly noble? Who is noble? And we can go on to ask, By what criteria do we judge? What does nobility mean? In attempting answers, we will be articulating something about 1) where we find the criteria for a value such as 'noble'; 2) how value is related to the person as his norm; 3) what the person in whom the value has reality discovers about it.

If we ask, What man in the play is truly noble, our first response might well be 'Brutus.' Mark Antony calls Brutus noble and lists some criteria when he salutes the dead Brutus at the end of the play with the well-worn lines:

> This was the noblest Roman of them all;
> All the conspirators save only he
> Did that they did in envy of great Caesar;
> He only, in a general honest thought
> And common good to all, made one of them.
> His life was gentle, and the elements
> So mixed in him that Nature might stand up
> And say to all the world, 'This was a man!'

The criteria are acting for the common good and harmony in character. But placed so coldly and simply the criteria seem thin. Nobility in Brutus, we might say, means so much more. In fact there is a sense in which we discover these criteria for nobility by knowing Brutus, whom we experience as noble, and the lineaments of whose character might serve as standards for nobility. Brutus, as we meet him alive in the play, gives existence to the goodness and greatness which, in combination, we find noble. We met the dramatized Brutus displaying the qualities Antony lists while at the same time displaying much more than these "criteria" hold. Nor would we necessarily be able to list many more qualities than Antony mentions. In fact we probably could not spell out all the criteria. But in meeting Brutus we know we met nobility. Meeting Brutus was a discovery of nobility <u>in reality</u>, nobility actualized. There is a sense in which Brutus <u>is</u> nobility, for the 'value' has existence and determination in him. He himself, then, can function as a criterion for nobility.

A corollary to this line of thought is that the 'value' of nobility has existence in Brutus precisely as Brutus-existing-in-a-certain-way, Brutus normed, Brutus oriented, Brutus actualizing a life-style whose limit is the value. To meet the noble in Brutus is

to meet Brutus. I think we can say at this point that to understand at least one major function of the value-term 'noble' in Julius Caesar we have to look to persons, and these persons as normed by values, by what is to them the worthwhile; we have to look to persons oriented in certain directions.

If the noble man himself can become the criterion for the meaning of 'noble,' is there anything which he himself can tell us about that meaning? Does experiencing the value as an actualization of oneself reveal anything about the value? and therefore anything about the "goals" and limits of a man? I think Brutus himself realizes that he is not all that nobility can be; he goes through such a development that at the end of the play he himself would seem to agree that nobility means more than well-mixed elements and a brave and generous heart. The two limitations he experiences, and that we are aware of in him, are his mistakes in judgment about how to promote the good of the state, and his adherence to a life-style that prohibited deep experience of and expression of emotion.

We watch him achieve political power with the best of intentions but with a subtle blindness to what he is really doing. He hallows Caesar's murder--which Antony will call butchery--with a ritualistic interpretation which turns it into sacrifice; and he exercises his political power in accordance with a private morality that does not fit the situation.[2] His judgment that the state must be

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[2]William and Barbara Rosen, Introduction to Julius Caesar in Signet Classic Shakespeare edition (1963) xxiii-xxiv.

saved is indeed noble, but his assessments of men and situations in relation to the goal prove almost consistently faulty. Conflict and defeat in addition to personal sorrow help Brutus develop enough in the play that he is able finally to experience that nobility is open to yet further growth. We see him apologize for his misjudgment of a slave; and he admits that his reasonings, judicious calculations and enrollings in the Capitol, his balancing of common good with certain means, have failed in the face of a power that cracks upon categories:

> O Julius Caesar! thou art mighty yet!
> Thy spirit walks abroad, and turns our swords
> In our own proper entrails.

The second limitation on his nobility as he comes to awareness of its actualization in him is his Stoic repression of emotion. This repression limits the noble quality of "balance." Is balance enough? We watch here a development in Brutus of awareness of his own needs and of other meanings besides "balance" for nobility. First he refuses to weep or even to express sorrow when Portia dies; but near the end of the play he admits that the dead Cassius deserves tears--and will get them--even though only later:

> Friends, I owe more tears
> To this dead man than you shall see me pay.---
> I shall find time, Cassius, I shall find time.

Finally, having kindly invited his defeated soldiers to rest awhile, he sits down upon a rock and cries. So, as he develops in his nobility, the noble man seems to realize that there are always new possibilities to his values, that he himself does not experience all that nobility

can be, that if this indeed is his norm, his "goal," the cast of his life-style, then that norm-goal-life-style has an openness which he becomes more aware of as he experiences through conflict the limitations in himself.

But for us, appraising others in the play, another limitation on the nobility of the noble man is the presence of three other men in the drama who have some real claim to nobility. The interior shift in the meaning of 'noble' will depend partly on the presence of three different realizations of nobility. First, Cassius, whom Brutus loved and called noble, does show better practical judgment and warmer feelings: he advises against the attack that does in fact destroy them; and he is obviously grieved by Portia's death. Caesar, of course, is great enough to stay, as it were, in command after his own death; and he has inspired a great love in both Brutus and Antony.

But it is Antony himself who probably best qualifies Brutus' nobility. First of all, we trust his judgment of Brutus because we have recognized nobility in Antony. While we cannot approve all his ambitions, we do admire his brilliance, his good military judgment, his command of men, his irony, his poetry, and his "flair," his passion that places reasonable calculations in error. True, Antony is probably morally inferior to Brutus; yet he is superior to him in qualities of political judgment and human passion. Unlike Brutus he acts in terms of large values of proper order in the state, not merely in terms of values as they fit the individual person. As for awareness and expression of human emotion Antony is clearly superior

to Brutus. Unlike Brutus, Antony weeps. After the murder of Caesar, for instance, Antony says to the grieving Servant,

> Thy heart is big, get thee apart and weep.
> Passion, I see, is catching; for mine eyes,
> Seeing those beads of sorrow stand in thine,
> Began to water.

And his love for Caesar, admittedly mixed up with questionable motives, is one real reason why Brutus was defeated and Caesar's power remained alive. Notice the passion with which Antony speaks over Caesar's corpse:

> O! pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth,
> That I am meek and gentle with these butchers;
> Thou art the ruins of the noblest man
> That ever lived in the tide of times.
> Woe to the hand that shed this costly blood!
> Over thy wounds now do I prophesy
> Which like dumb mouths do ope their ruby lips,
> To beg the voice and utterance of my tongue,
> A curse shall light upon the limbs of men . . . .
> And Caesar's spirit, ranging for revenge . . . .
> Shall in these confines with a monarch's voice
> Cry 'Havoc!' and let slip the dogs of war . . . .

If Antony's nobility includes an acute sense of political order, along with awareness and expression of emotions such as love and daring, is he more noble than Brutus? The question seems unimportant and perhaps unanswerable because nobility in each man is a slightly different nobility. To be Brutus, and noble, is to <u>be</u> Brutus in a certain way; and the same with Antony. Each is a different realization of 'noble.'

1.3. The Language-User

At the close of this analysis of the uses of the value-term 'noble' in <u>Julius Caesar</u>, we can ask our overriding question; what

does such an analysis lead us to say about the person using value language? What appeared in the analysis were items of usage Nowell-Smith had pointed out: there are many uses; for value discourse there is great flexibility in the usage; the meanings shift and shade into one another; to grasp the functions of the word it is necessary to discover what it contextually implies, and this contextual implication will involve much about the language-user; value language operates within the context of pro- and con-attitudes and within the context of conceptions of the Good Life; meanings will shift as conceptions of the Good Life change; these conceptions can change because of an accidental discovery, because one meets new values realized in persons; the expert exhibits the criteria; and, if we extend Nowell-Smith here, the expert in human living is himself the criterion of the Good Life; values, the boundaries of the person, are open-ended.

To remain with our first chapter elaborations, such items point to goal-direction in the language-users, to a multitude of drives, tendencies and orientations; to the capacity for appraisal and reappraisal. Surely in Julius Caesar the Good Life is not fully determinate and yet men are acting in terms of it; as the meanings for value-words interiorly shift we are watching the development of a person's awareness of his own needs and aspirations, of his own boundaries, and of their open-ended possibilities, and this awareness often comes through conflict--and at least for the onlookers here, through meeting other people in whom these goals are realized in a

different way. What we call values come to actualization in persons, as the way a person simply is.

2. 'Foul' In King Lear

Our next project in this paper is an analysis of some value language in Shakespeare's King Lear. The way the word 'foul' operates in the Third Act of the play, and the way 'love' functions throughout the play shed light on some normal functions of value language and provide helpful leads to talking about the person of the language-user. First, an analysis of the value discourse in which 'foul' appears in Act Three.

Surrounded by lightening, thunder and rain, King Lear, betrayed by his two older daughters, wanders with the Fool on the heath. Later Edgar as Poor Tom joins them. In the Act the word 'foul' functions in regard to three things: the weather, the daughters, and, in the mouth of Poor Tom, the fiend. The foul weather and foul fiend, both acting, so to speak, according to their natures, become polar points for the foul daughters whose foulness is unnatural. Lear himself compares the weather and the daughters. At one point the word 'foul' seems to apply directly to both. The passages we are looking at are these:

(First line of Act III) Kent: Who's there, besides foul weather?

(III, 4) Edgar: Do poor Tom some charity, whom the foul fiend vexes.

(III, 2) Lear: Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks!
rage! blow! . . .
You sulphurous and thought-executing fires,
Vaunt-couriers to oak-cleaving thunderbolts,
Singe my white head! And thou, all-shaking
thunder,
Smite flat the thick rotundity of the world!
Crack nature's moulds, all germens spill
at once,
That make ingrateful man!

Rumble thy bellyful! Spit, fire! spout, rain!
Nor rain, wind, thunder, fire, are my
daughters:
I tax not you, you elements, with unkindness;
I never gave you kingdom, called you children,
You owe me no subscription: then, let fall
Your horrible pleasure; here I stand, your
slave,
A poor, infirm, weak, and despised old man:
But yet I call you servile ministers,
That have with two pernicious daughters joined
Your high engendered battles 'gainst a head
So old and white as this. O! O! 'tis foul.[3]

The functions of the word 'foul' in this value discourse would include appraising, passing a verdict and reproving. The language here expresses probably several "con-attitudes" in Nowell-Smith's terms. The accepted and varying uses of the word 'foul,' both now and in Shakespeare's day, in the capacity of inplying the reasons for the disapproval, include the following: the word can apply to something so offensive to the senses as to cause disgust; something extremely dirty; putrified, rotten food; indecent language; abominable action; unfavorable weather; treacherous, dishonest action not according to the rules of the game.

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[3]"King Lear" in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, op. cit.

2.1. Flexibility

The first thing to notice is the flexibility exhibited in the uses of 'foul' in this passage from Lear. The language-users here do not follow a set logical pattern that could clearly account for their applying the same word to weather, treachery and devils. Nor could they give one meaning or formulation which, unchanged, would nicely fit the uses of 'foul' for weather, women and fiends. In fact, to achieve the dramatic tension one formulation must not fit; we need the pull of natural and unnatural foulness, of the differing assessment of bad weather, bad women and bad spirits. Again: the speakers had to make out similarities in quite dissimilar items: the words and actions of two women, a storm and a preternatural being appearing in the pretended delusions of Poor Tom.

The speakers seem to have got the point of the difficult resemblances. And, even though Lear does spell out some of the similarities, we know he has not exhausted them when we respond with such emotional resonance to his final "O, O 'tis foul." I do not think we could list the similarities exhaustively; nor would the list, even if possible, really convey what the actual use of the word manifests in this Act. Yet we too are getting the point. And anyway, as the play shows, we are not at all disturbed that the characters so quickly and dexterously shift the word around with striking appropriateness; we ourselves do not require a long thinking over before speaking. They are doing what we do all the time with such ease; analysis follows after and then is usually inadequate.

Another point in this line of thought: Lear at least, and the others by implication, criticizes one use of the word as inadequate in comparison with another use. Though weather is foul, the word in this case articulates such a limited foulness that it becomes almost inappropriate when we place it alongside of 'foul' used for the daughters. Lear says to Kent,

> Though think'st 'tis much that this contentious storm
> Invades us to the skin: so 'tis to thee;
> But where the greater malady is fixed,
> The lesser is scarce felt. . . . Filial ingratitude!

To look at this situation from another angle: though 'foul' fit the weather well, Lear, and we, were able to recognize a new use when we considered the daughters.

(In ordinary living we exhibit this ability to recognize the inadequacy of past uses and to recognize the suitability of new uses for value-terms. Look at the difference in what we mean by good music, good painting, good Catholic, over the space of twenty years. What qualified as a good refrigerator in 1940 would scarcely make the grade today. Sometimes the criticism of the past uses and the recognition of the future uses is not so spontaneous, admittedly. It may take not only interest and native ability but discussion, study and repeated listenings before a person, at home with Mozart, Bach and Beethoven, can truthfully agree that Schönberg's Fourth Quartet is good music.)

Now what in the language-user can account for this combination of freedom, precision, unclarity-certainty that results in the

flexible value language? First of all, in the Act Three uses of 'foul,' we have Nowell-Smithian con-attitudes operative. None of the speakers wants or approves of any of the items dubbed 'foul'; and the contextual implications of the word itself, the requirements of the conditions for its use, demand the presence of a con-attitude somewhere. But in talking about this aspect of the word, we discover that there are several con-attitudes involved. We have here a variety of tendencies. The 'objects' are different and call for a different grouping of attitudes. The 'foul' daughters excite disgust, anger, sorrow, and even hatred in Lear while the weather would not arouse all of these nor even some of them with the same intensity and contours. And the reason why daughters would excite these responses differs greatly from the reason why weather would be called 'foul.' To add the foul fiend is to add elements perhaps of terror not present in quite the same way in the reaction to the daughters and weather. For Lear in this Act we are led to posit a profusion of tendencies, attitudes, aspirations that come to focus and expression in his flexible use of value language.

2.2. Goals

How about clarity of goal-direction for all these tendencies? If Lear reacts so to weather and daughters we can certainly have some idea of what his goals are. They must include love, respect, some comfort. But when we reflect how the specification of those goals has already by Act Three changed from Act One where the two older

daughters were lavishly praised, and when we compare even the Third Act Lear with the final scene Lear, we can easily conclude that though goals are discernable their determination can fluctuate and even radically change.

We can ask next, how aware is Lear of all his tendencies operating in his evaluative language? He does not need to sit down and figure out how he feels; he feels, and the articulation of those feelings is part of the feelings themselves. The attempt to list and separate the various con-attitudes witnesses to the difficulty of separating and identifying all the tendencies responding to the total situation of daughters-weather-fiend. I think there are two points to notice here: 1) Lear is already articulating evaluators within himself, tendencies whose directions themselves are norms for evaluation. Of these Lear does not have to be completely conscious, though awareness of them could make a real difference in his judgment. There is a certain sense in which Lear, as manifested in his value language, is "programmed," already set in certain directions against which orientations it might prove dangerous to act; and yet whose orientations may not have come to full awareness in Lear; nor would he be able to be aware of, or conceptualize, all of them. 2) Conflict within himself and between himself and his daughters has already brought him to new awareness of what his tendencies are and, by the end of the play, will have led him to a consciousness of his real attitudes and feelings, his powers and limitations--will have led him to new values. 3) But there is also in Lear conscious evaluation, conscious appraisal, and

conscious passing-verdict. He gives reasons why he condemns his daughters. There is a decision even to extend the meaning of the word 'foul' so that its disapproval can light upon not only the storm but also the women. To say the least, the Lear who discourses about 'foul' exhibits complex tendencies.

2.3. The Language-User

There are some points that this ability to extend the uses of the word and to discover resemblances in dissimilar things can reveal about the language-user. Although as we have seen Lear is a complex of tendencies, and although conflict is present among them, there may be a harmony too, a total directionality that can allow almost a hierarchy of reactions, a hierarchy of disgust, disapproval; the profusion of tendencies seem able to work together. From the very capacity to extend uses of the discourse we have an indication of a unified interplay among all the forces in the person of the language-user.

But I think this capacity to extend uses, the change in specification of goals, the growth in awareness, and the whole "movement" of attitudes in their directions give strong witness to the view that the value language-user is involved in an ongoing process of becoming something; that he himself simply is a process of conscious and unconscious, basically harmonious, yet often vague and in some sense amorphous movement, tendency, aspiration, conation. There is the possibility of growth or deterioration, but a merely static structure would hardly account for the flexibility in value language that is part of a life-style of the language-user.

2.4. Criterion

As a summary of what the uses of 'foul' in Act Three of Lear might reveal about the language-user, we can work on the question, Against exactly what standard or criterion are the daughters measured so that they come out not fair but foul? I think Lear would find it hard to spell out all a daughter should be as well as all that his two daughters have done to merit his disapproval. First of all, he, and we, seem to have a feel for oughtness here; we have an obscure but sure feel, sense of rightness so that, even though we cannot spell out beforehand in detail everything involved in fair and foul daughterliness, we can, when presented with cases, recognize the fair and the foul. Here again the language indicates a given orientation, directionality in us toward perhaps what we can call here too the Good Life for man. We have something in us already evaluating because already tending in a direction.

But affairs are not even this simple. Right away we have disagreement about certain actions as fair or foul. Even Lear himself changes his mind: at the opening court scene honest, blunt Cordelia is the bad daughter while the oily talkers win the prizes for filial piety. So I think more than directionality is involved here. The speaker himself is perhaps an ongoing process; he is constantly searching, constantly attempting to make goals more specific. The search or the process is at least partly conscious and depends to some extent on conscious evaluation, decision and choice. We must look to the speaker not only as directed and actively tending toward a vague 'good'

but as himself also an assessor both of the specific goals and of the situation at hand. In our contingent world where often what happens waits on our decision, the goals, the means, the situations are, as we have seen, often obscure, vague, ambiguous. Lear himself must act not only from experienced tendencies but as well from conscious appraisal and decision.

Involved in this conscious appraisal are his tendencies active in the situation, his past and present experience, his intelligence, his age; even more than this, involved are his culture, the times he lives in, the place, the customs, education, the general thought-cast and spirit of his age; the people he lives with, the people who oppose or favor him. The two daughters' recent insults have already made him recast what he thinks daughters should be; mere talking love falls short; deeds count too--and which deeds, which words. Because he is the father and the wronged father his appraisal differs even from sympathetic Edgar's or Kent's. Thanks to the involvement of the speaker, to his total orientations, there will be something unique in his use of value language.

In the end, then, the criterion for judging these two daughters 'foul' is in Lear as appraisor and judge; Lear as oriented toward a vague Good Life; Lear as having many tendencies whose direction already is an evaluation and of which he must become aware in order to make wise conscious judgment and decision; Lear as having rational, self-aware powers which can narrow down or specify the vague goals, which can consider all his other feelings and impulses, which can in

attunement with his tendencies evaluate the situation; Lear in the process of becoming the person his self-deceit had covered. In Act Three, Lear, by feeling, instinct, reason, impulse, appraises the way his daughters fit into human living. He packs an almost endless profusion of orientations, his entire self as an ongoing process, into his discourse about his elder daughters who merit more than the storm his verdict of 'foul.'

3. 'Love' In King Lear

In the value discourse in King Lear the word 'love,' both as noun and verb, plays an important role. Love is an object of pro-attitudes from almost all the major characters, both heroes and villains, and once becomes the object of a con-attitude when Lear in bitterness says he will not love. Love is a value placed in question in the play. What 'love' means to Lear sets off the drama's conflict and then, having changed, forms the thematic resolution. The uses of 'love' as they shift throughout the play are really, I think, the revelation and articulation of the profound change in the person of Lear himself. In grasping through experience the deeper meanings of love he is coming to realize in several senses what it means to be Lear. The shift in meaning signals the shift in person. I will focus on what the "interior" shift in the meaning of 'love' can lead us to say about persons.

3.1. Uses Of 'Love'

First a summary. In Act One in Lear the word 'love' abounds. It appears on the lips of Gloucester, Goneril, Regan, the King of France, Cordelia and Lear. For the aging king love as a value is the criterion for dividing his kingdom among his daughters; and Lear thinks he knows what 'love' means. He selects as exhibitions of love his elder daughters' frequent speaking of the word; he thinks love should bring him what we might call possessive honor, let him remain center of attraction while he throws off responsibility for others; he thinks love is that kind of total giving that excludes other loves and therefore accepts the married Regan's protestation that "I am alone felicitate in your dear highness' loves." He seems to think that public words ensure love and give its measure because he says, "Tell me, my daughters . . . which of you shall we say doth love us most? . . . . Goneril, our eldest-born, speak first." He even judges that he loves Cordelia well; and he does, but with a love that will profoundly change. He said, "I loved her most."

As the play progresses his viewpoint on love alters. After he has experienced discrepancies between words and deeds, between words that incarnate the heart and those which do not, Lear so shifts his grasp on love that he devalues it: "No, do thy worst, blind Cupid; I'll not love." And the villain Edmund even provides a counter-use that in another way devalues: "To both these sisters have I sworn my love . . . Which of them shall I take?" His love, inspiring jealousy and murder, is so devalued that it has to be not merely spoken but sworn.

The players give love another nuance that enhances its worth when Cordelia in Act Four overlooks Lear's insult and injustice and comes to help him: "No blown ambition doth our arms incite, but love, dear love, and our aged father's right."

As the play reaches its climax Lear's grasp of the meaning of love is transformed through his own experience of conflict that leads him to new self-awareness, through his new experience of Cordelia and her love, and through his experience of love's coming alive in himself. Something interesting in regard to the language occurs here. While Act One flourished in uses of the word 'love,' in Act Five, when both Lear and Cordelia are changed persons, obviously loving each other, neither of them uses the word 'love.' What they experience love to be, the appraisal they make of it then, so contrasts with earlier uses in the play--including their own uses--that they seem to be afraid of using the old word for the new reality.

3.2. The Language-User

What, we may ask now, does such usage reveal about the sturcture and orientation of value language-user? If the changes in the meanings of 'love' reflect the changes in the person of Lear, and if those changes are profound, then we can say at least that the Lear who speaks of love is not a static reality but some sort of ongoing process; he is changeable, and the changes are changes in his norms, in what he considers worthwhile for himself. There is a real orientation in this process, for it does go, in Lear, in the direction of

greater self-awareness, better grasp of what it is to be this man Lear. The goal here--to be the real Lear--does not seem to have a definite end. The point is at the end that his love is just beginning. It is possible to view the death of Lear and Cordelia as a way of allowing this love to grow in a better world more suited to it.

3.3. Conflict

The self-discovery which Lear achieves and which his language articulates comes to him through an experience of conflict with other persons and with natural forces, a conflict which leads him to face conflict within himself. Suffering through this conflict is a process of becoming aware of what his real needs, demands, impulses, feelings, wishes, are. He is a very different person from the one who opened the drama with a display of self-deceit that appears almost ludicrous. He begins to make assessment and conscious decisions in view of his impulses as they really are; what he means by 'love' signals the change.

His own inner forces, at first unknown to him, burst out in violence and near madness during the storm. At the end, all of them, accepted in awareness, achieve a new integration; and Lear begins to make assessments and decisions with far better consciousness of all his inner forces; what he means by 'love' signals this radical personality change.

Since the value discourse in question is about love, the change in its meanings can reveal something about the change in person-to-person relationships, thanks, in this case, to Lear's becoming aware

of the shape and direction of his own powers, tendencies and resources. Because he has shed many delusions about himself and has come to find a better integration of the real orientations within him, he simply sees people differently and perceives his relationship to them in a new way. His new feeling of pity for the poor people while he is on the heath in the storm shows a first step in this direction; his Act Five relationship with Cordelia, in its considerateness, playfulness, deference and intensity, is of course the most remarkable example of a change. But it is also thanks to interpersonal relationships that Lear comes to self-discovery. Cordelia, Edgar, the Fool love him, accept him even with his failings and share his exterior hardships and, in sympathy, his interior weaknesses.

There is a sense in which the quality of Lear's love defines him. The Act One Lear's meanings for 'love' reveal the cast and direction of his personality. The same is true of Act Five Lear: the love he values reveals the orientation of his personality, the orientation of the process which is himself. The value of 'love' really is here Lear-in-a-certain-way; it is the shape and outline of this man. It exists not only in him but <u>as</u> him-in-a-certain-way.

What does a person discover about such a directionality in himself? For Lear, 'love' in Act Five would articulate an experience which would not be exhausted in its articulation. There would be so much more than he could put in words. The very absence of the word 'love' points up this fact. He seems to experience that he does not even live love in its fullest possibilities; he is apologetic; he

wants to kneel before Cordelia. He seems to sense the openness of love to further growth as he talks of what he and Cordelia will do as they turn their prison into a park. As I mentioned above, it is possible that death functions dramatically as a release for a love that has become unearthly.

4. 'Love,' 'Rome' And 'Egypt' In Antony And Cleopatra

In the value discourse of Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra[4] three terms are thematically prominent: 'Rome,' 'Egypt' and 'love.' The apparently neutral terms, Rome and Egypt, appear constantly in value contexts where they become summaries and symbols of entire life-orientations, entire ways of being men.[5] Depending on who is using the word and in what context, the functions of both these words include praise or blame, approval or disapproval. They are both definitely implying in the context of the drama Nowell-Smith's pro- and con-attitudes.

4.1. 'Rome' And 'Egypt'

It is easy to list qualities of the lives that would be 'Rome' and 'Egypt.' To be Roman is to value duty, practical reason, political power; to be Egypt is to value intuition, spontaneous affection and aesthetic values. But it is dangerous simply to list values and

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[4] "Antony and Cleopatra" in Complete Works of William Shakespeare, op. cit.

[5] S. L. Bethell, "Antony and Cleopatra" in Shakespeare: The Tragedies, edited by Alfred Harbage (New Jersey, 1964) 158-160.

abstract qualities for they do not exist in the play except as they have actuality as the norms of persons, except as they simply are persons existing in certain ways. 'Rome' and 'Egypt' really name the orientations, aspirations, choices of persons. In a way both these terms summarize life-styles, forms of the Good Life, the contours of what some men are or would want to become.

What I want to notice here is, first, that to account for the value-weight of 'Rome' and 'Egypt' in the play we must accept men as beings with goal-orientations, with motivations and norms that give quality and identity to their life-styles. Secondly, the functions of these words suggests that the "goals" in mind for men are in a sense themselves; the pursuit of these Good Lives is a pursuit of a certain sort of self with certain orientations, directions, focuses. Thirdly, it is obvious here that the Good Life is multiple and vague; even within either life-style here there are various ways in which it can be realized. Among the Romans, for instance, there are strong differences between the strongly Roman characters of Octavius Caesar and Pompey, between Fulvia and Octavia, Lepidus and Enobarbus; among the Egyptians we have only to contrast Cleopatra with Iras and Charmian. We can, though, identify what are, so to speak, paradigm cases of each Good Life; Octavius Caesar epitomizes Rome; Cleopatra, Egypt. Antony, however, shares something of both and is therefore in conflict. And the resolution of the tragedy seems to consist partly in the amazing fusion of Egypt and Rome in the person of Cleopatra.

According to the value language uses in this drama, the Good Life indeed has no one set determination.

A fourth item to note is that the life-styles here arise from complex sources within the persons they name. For example, how many pro-attitudes with a variety of patterns, depths and nuances, are involved in Cleopatra's Egyptian "intuition, spontaneous affection, aesthetic values"? How many of these pro-attitudes are fully conscious or deliberately controlled? Although conscious decisions reinforce the basic orientations, those orientations are already present, operative and evaluating; they include many feelings, impulses, instincts, aspirations, and are shaped by personal and cultural history.

Finally, I would point out that the uses of the value-terms 'Egypt' and 'Rome' in the play signal changes in persons. As I mentioned earlier, in the end of the drama Cleopatra is a fusion of both Egypt and Rome, with more Egypt than Rome as Antony, also a mixture, was more Rome than Egypt. How does this fusion come about and what does it mean? Cleopatra's becoming Roman really means her becoming aware of the real Roman qualities that were already in her but that had been left unrecognized and undeveloped. Suffering, conflict, her own failure and disgrace, lead her to find in herself a stability, an attention to duty that were only adumbrated earlier in the play. Unlike her mocking and complaining attitude in the beginning, she comes to accept Antony's duty to fight; she helps him arm in Roman fashion, and finally she performs a great Roman deed--suicide to avoid

dishonor--which, while Egyptian in method, was Stoic and Roman in its qualities of courage and stability.

4.2. 'Love'

But to discern personality change through value discourse it is most helpful to analyze Cleopatra's uses of the word 'love.' Obviously she has many pro-attitudes toward love and this value does give shape and direction to her life; in a real sense, the value, love, defines Cleopatra.[6] And if so, the interior shifts in the discourse on love are part of deep personality changes in the woman herself. First of all, it would be impossible to give one definition of love that would fit all the uses in the play or would include all the variations of approval and appraisal. Cleopatra's love in Act Five is simply different from her love in Act One.

At the beginning of the play Cleopatra loves Antony well, but in revelry, teasing, and fiery variations of arts to tantalize him. She disdains his sense of duty and makes fun of his sword. Though the flavor of lust and witchery may predominate here, already Cleopatra reveals that there are in her deeper emotions and aspirations of love that will later receive recognition and power in her. For instance her jealousy of Fulvia who rightly bears the coveted title of Antony's wife indicates her desire for a deeper union of

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[6]Bethell, loc. cit., 163-164; also, Maynard Mack, Introduction to the Pelican edition of Antony and Cleopatra (1960).

person. And, in the midst of almost wanton partying she can say to Antony in Act One, "Eternity was in our lips and eyes, Bliss in our brows bent."[7]

After she has undergone what some call her "purgation through suffering"[8] we realize that her salad days of love are really over; the qualities in her rearrange themselves and, while the arts and variations remain, the qualities of stability, eternity and personal union appear in new force and dominance. The royal courtesan chooses the death of her body for the continuation of her love: "I am fire and air; the rest I consign to baser elements." She calls Antony "husband," in a line reminiscent of the close of the Book of Revelation when the Lamb and the Bride are united: "Methinks I hear Antony call. Husband, I come." She has "immortal longings"; and in her dream speech, which Dolabella thinks is extravagant, she sees her love for Antony in cosmic terms: sun, planets, music of the spheres; an autumn of endless harvesting--in terms of immortality and endless growth. They will love in Elysium with a depth--and playfulness--that will make the gods envious. Perhaps we can say here that when she talks of her love in Act Five that love is now so deeply her experience of herself that she cannot articulate all that it means. We grasp the meaning of the discourse by meeting the value actualized in the woman.

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[7]R. Ornstein, "Love and Art in Antony and Cleopatra" in Shakespeare: Modern Essays in Criticism (revised editions), edited by Leonard Dean (New York, 1967) 400.

[8]Bethell, loc. cit., 168.

What she does say about the love she experiences is that it is to say the least ongoing and open ended; it is transcendent in the sense of drawing the lovers beyond a fulfillment possible in the human existence we know.

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5. The Long-Winded Lady

We will now turn from a classical to a contemporary source of value language. One recent issue of The New Yorker[9] provides some helpful examples of contemporary uses of value language. Some of these examples appear in Talk of the Town,[10] six car advertisements,[11] A Reporter at Large feature on people in an inner city program,[12] and a fictional political boss's assessment of possible candidates for the United States presidency.[13]

The well-known Long-Winded Lady in Talk of the Town writes, "I heard bad news tonight at Le Steak de Paris, where I had dinner. 'The building is coming down'--and the little restaurant is to be swept away, just like that, after more than twenty-six years of hardy life." The Lady's two-page essay assembles observations lying

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[9] The New Yorker, Vol. 43, No. 30 (September 16, 1967).

[10] Ibid., 39-41.

[11] Ibid., 19, 24-25, 32, 87, 94-95, 153.

[12] Ibid., 141-151.

[13] Ibid., 42-46.

behind her use of the word 'bad.' Le Steak is on West Forty-ninth Street just off Broadway. The brownstone building containing the restaurant will fall with neighbor buildings to make room for Office Space. Why is the removal of the restaurant bad news? The Lady answers with three sets of contrasting pictures. These pictures cause, as The Lady mentions concerning one of them, different reactions "according to the nature of the person who sees them."

5.1. Pictures For 'Bad'

First, the future, dark-shadow-casting office buildings contrast with the old city street, "garish and secretive," with its beautifully proportioned old brownstones--"more like the extension of a carnival than like a city street." The old hotel fronts, restaurants and tenant floors "seem part of a stage set." Admittedly, the old buildings have limited value, yet for The Lady their demolition is bad while for the city planners, we assume, their demolition is good, at least "for the sake of." The difference lies not in the buildings but in The Lady and the planners, in their view of what is worthwhile and of what should be done to achieve the worthwhile.

The first of the next set of contrasting pictures shows the nameless out-of-towners who have "diligently" taken in "points of interest" and now on West Forty-ninth Street have "plodded on toward their share of night life." The second picture presents the Le Steak manager, the waiter and waitress, introduced by name, and the one top-floor lady tenant who clings to her apartment and tends green

potted plants on her window sills. The orderly, purpose-bound sightseers overlook Le Steak where M. Guy, Jo and Francine, calm and cheerful, welcome their few, quiet guests.

Picture set three: At a nearby adults-only theater, and at the foot of steps leading up to an old gypsy's parlor, "five big young girls were standing around--not together, not in a group, but just standing around. . . . although we were moving along and they were standing still, before we knew it they were upon us. It was like that, as though they had pounced, just as the lights seem to pounce, causing shame, or distress, or embarrassment, or curiosity, or derision, or excitement, or disgust, according to the nature of the person who sees them." The girls, with dyed hair, demi-mini shifts and solid female legs "like pillars of flesh" excited evaluations that depended on what the beholders considered worthwhile and on their assessment of the meaning of the girls. One woman called them bums.

They were, says The Lady, "a powerful group of young women, and people hurried past them, glancing at them with the furtive attention most of us give to the solemnly erotic photographs in the big glass-covered case that stands outside the movie house." It was "obviously important to avoid the eyes of those girls, because they were the eyes of satisfied furies, or of unsatisfied prison wardresses." The Lady then recalls another girl whom she saw a few summers ago on Forty-ninth Street and who, handbag swinging, had walked with a "ladylike travesty of Marilyn Monroe's walk." Everyone turned to stare at her. " . . . but any one of the girls I saw tonight would make short work

work of her. Those girls looked as though they had been assembled, legs and all, in an automobile factory. They made Forty-ninth Street look very old-fashioned--faded, in fact, and harmless. They didn't go with the street at all. They were ahead of themselves by a year or two. They will go better with the new buildings."

The demolition of the personal, the individual, the warm, the useless and the playful by the impersonal, colossal, powerful, pillared and crassly down-to-business, summed up in the inhuman furies-wardresses demonstrates why, according to The Lady's interpretation of human goals, the closing of Le Steak is bad.

5.2. 'Harmless'

I would like to stop a moment over one value word The Lady uses at the end of the article, the word 'harmless.' West Forty-ninth Street, at first somewhat harmful, becomes on the discovery of new evidence, comparatively harmless. At first The Lady can describe the street as dingy, shabby, garish, secretive, tentative, transient, noisy, very ill-at-ease, shifty. But when the five big girls loom up, the street becomes harmless. The meaning of 'harm' shifts; and the second meaning especially, implying the girls as harm, probably could not be formulated; we would be hard put to it to say what about them, as distinct from the Marilyn Monroe girl,--and about the future--was really "harm."

5.3. The Language-User

In these uses of 'harm' and 'bad' and of the whole value discourse The Lady engages in, several aspects of the human person using the language can help in accounting for the meanings. The whole essay revolves around conceptions of the Good Life. Each life-style has many facets and is concretized mainly by persons: The Lady on the one hand, the Five Girls on the other. Variations of these two life-styles appear in the Le Steak personnel and customers, and in the Marilyn Monroe Girl. The street and the Office Buildings take on human significance as symbols of these Good Lives. Although it would probably be impossible to spell out all that the life-styles contain, we do sense the contours and flavor of each by meeting the persons in whom these styles exist as norms and directions.

The response of The Lady to these life-styles--these people--involves in her conscious comparisons and appraisals, mental evaluations and judgments. Yet these conscious appraisals are in terms of a host of reacting sensitivities, feelings, instincts whose spontaneous and perhaps quite obscure evaluations enter into the conscious appraisal. But The Lady herself does seem more conscious than the ordinary person of the presence and direction of these spontaneous, non-intellectual appraisors. For we have her careful selection of symbols, her delineations in terms of her pictures. Compare her assessment with that of the woman who calls the Five Girls bums. That her reactions are somewhat obscure and not subject to precise listing comes out in the same use of symbol and picture rather than

direct discussion. She seems to want to evoke more pro- and con-attitudes than intellectual analysis can care for. The careful shift in the use of the word 'harm' indicates a sensitivity to a host of reactions that fall, without need for full analysis or deliberation, into patterns.

The Lady herself seems to give us trustworthy judgments. She seems aware of her emotional reactions; she appraises critically; and she communicates a sense of her own person as concretizing the life-style in terms of which she is judging buildings, streets and people. We feel that she experiences what she speaks of, that she herself is, in a way, the criterion, or at least the summary of criteria too complex and preconceptual to fall into a usable list. Her consciousness of values even in the Marilyn Monroe girl, and her near-admiration for the Five Big Girls, reveal a consciousness of the limitations in her own life-orientations. Her Good Life does not, she indicates, exhaust the possibilities for being a person; her life-style at least, she implies, has its limitations.

6. New Yorker Advertisements

Six automobile advertisements in The New Yorker issue display uses of value language involving goal-direction in the buyer. Obviously the ads express a "pro-attitude" toward their product, recommend it as an object of choice, but also imply that the product is just what you want, just what fits your needs, and the "you" addressed seems to have specialized needs in terms of a vague but fairly oriented

life-style. In all six ads, for instance, the "you" has quite a bit of money and wants it to show, or has expensive tastes or pretensions; this "you" appreciates an automobile's 'good' workmanship, 'good' running, 'good' appearance. But even with criteria narrowed down so far, the "you" addressed must split into more special "you's" to fit each of the six ads; the variety of meanings for the three 'good's' above shift according to shifts in buyers' life-styles.

The Chrysler Imperial, for instance, which gives you "more than luxury in your luxury car," has a good appearance different from the Bavarian Motor Works model with its "lean, lithe look." Good workmanship and performance vary from Peuget, "the toughest bargain you can drive" (with criteria like thick body steel, anti-smog system, rock-and-pinion steering) to the GT, with its "reliable, rugged and unbreakable engine," to the "none small" Chryslers with Auto-Pilot, concealed headlights and eight-track stereo tape. Variety of taste, of need, of even non-explicit interpretations of life among affluent readers makes the uses of 'good,' 'fine' and 'great' rearrange themselves in the ads of one magazine issue. Although every one of the six ads is recommending a choice, we could say of no two of them that 'good car' meant the same thing; and this variation would result, not from a performative function of the word 'good' but from variety in life-interpretations and life-situations, in "goals" of the prospective, affluent buyers.

The ads illustrate well that the goals involved here are complex and call into play many pro- and con-attitudes. Use of words

such as 'tough,' 'rugged,' 'lean and lithe,' 'none small,' for recommending cars suggests that many of the orientations to which the ads appeal are not fully conscious when a man makes his selection.

7. Summer In The City Project

The Reporter at Large feature is about people trying to help other people discover their own value. In a project called Summer in the City, Monsignor Robert J. Fox, Sister Judith and about five hundred and eighty other people try to "make the city a place where people can live in a positive way, aware of its values and their own value." "Once people realize their own value," Sister Judith says, "the social structure is turned upside down. We try to create an air of celebration of the city, because most of the people in these blocks will always live here."

I think two spots in the article collect helpful value language uses. The first mentions processions through the streets during the night of a riot when Mayor Lindsey had ordered everyone off the streets. But the illegal processions were "good" not just because they cooled down the rioting but because, according to Monsignor Fox, they prevented the surrender of the streets to the cops and rioters, "the two groups that believe in force." The decision to march came from the priest judging in terms of what he considered worthwhile and of what he considered relevant data.

7.1. 'Good'

Is Summer in the City a good project? The response depends on what the responder thinks a man is and ought to be. Jim Marin, Harvard graduate student in the project, said the Office of Economic Opportunity thinks a person becomes significant when he gets "things." "A lot of the poverty program is locked inside a possession ethic that says what makes a man significant in our society is that he has things. The poverty program is saying that's what it means to be a person." And so the OEO wants statistical results of the project. But the people in the project spend the federal money on things like block parties where people were "speaking to each other who haven't spoken in years." To prepare for the parties women make sandwiches, children decorate fire-escapes, men plug flood lights into their own store outlets. "It may seem foolish to spend federal money on a party," said a Manhattan College musician in the project, but "What I think is important is that the block has realized it has people in it with different values that we can share--a celebration of life."

Jim Marin has given here several possible responses to the question, Is Summer in the City a good project? What does 'good' mean here? Its functions include appraising, approving, recommending for choice and action. But the cast of the appraisals, for example, depends on all that 'good' here would contextually imply without fully stating: the cast of motive, aspirations, thoughts, feelings of the language-user; the vague but operative contours of his conception of

the Good Life. The responses about the 'good' project depend on the complex life-orientations of the appraisers.

7.2. The Good Life

Marin sees two rather definite casts to the Good Life: the OEO, for one, thinks that being a person means having things, while Marin and the Project people think being a person is itself a value and requires not so much having things or changing situations in order to possess more things, but rather recognizing that one already possesses real capacities and aspirations whose conscious activity is itself desirable, is the Good Life; and that these activities involve honest and aware interpersonal relationships. A man celebrates, in this last view, not acquisitions but recognition, awareness and activation of what he already possesses--himself and his communion with others.

Both these life-styles involve goal-direction in persons. To call Summer in the City a "good" project the OEO asks for activity toward making slum-dwellers into property owners. Project personnel, on the other hand, ask for awareness and activation of orientations within the persons. The latter invite the exchange of con-attitudes for a host of pro-attitudes through reinterpretation of what makes a person worthwhile. Without removing a chair from a room a change of life-interpretation will change the social structure. The center of value and of evaluation shifts from outside the city-dwellers--from the OEO and from things--to within them. They discover themselves as valuable; they discover that they too are appraisers of what it means to live the Good Life.

Implied in this article is that it may take recognition from other people to help a person realize his own value. Others who see the person's value can help him become aware of it himself by giving him acceptance, and confidence. And it is in others that a person can discover the shape of certain values he may be led to discover and develop in himself--in this case, the Project persons themselves embody the Good Life they are working for; getting to know them can lead other people to look into themselves to find if they too could live like that--aware of and celebrating one's own humanity with others who share it. There is an open and ongoing character to the Good Life as it appears in the Project personnel and in the city people at the close of the summer: to stop the self-discovery, the communication with others and the celebration would be to lose the meaning again. Summer in the City then would not be a 'good' project because it failed in its purpose: to help persons become persons; and implied here is a process of awareness and activity that keeps on going.

8. The Good Candidate

Another New Yorker article using value discourse is a fictional interview with a fictional man, one Daley Unruh, "one of the most powerful men in the Democratic Party." The question is, who has a chance in the coming presidential elections? The imaginary Unruh's responses about the 'good' candidate center around several points: people have a feeling for what they think is right for the nation; they usually can't spell out what that 'good' of the country consists

in and they cannot usually judge a detailed program. What they want is a person who has this feeling for the right course and has in addition experience of situations and good judgment. When he is in the situation, his combination of feelings for the right thing, his willingness to work for that right, and his good judgment will be the determiners of the course of action.

What many voters will mean by 'good' when they appraise a candidate depends on their own only partly conscious and somewhat indeterminate tendencies along with their conscious aspirations toward the vague goal, good of the country; and it depends on the candidate's similar but more aware feelings and aspirations, wider experience of situations, and his ability to make rational decisions in view of all the factors involved.

For the imaginary Unruh, a good candidate is "not an educator, philosopher, or statesman but a man who wins elections. . . . And (Unruh) judges every potential candidate by the relentless standard of his ability to command money for his campaign and votes from the people."

What makes a man able to command money and votes: Is it his program or himself? To answer, you have to look, according to Unruh, at the judge himself, at the voter, who is in turn looking not at the issues directly but at the candidates precisely as men. "It'll be a question of who do you like best and who do you trust the most." Why?

First of all, because the president has a practical job of making decisions, choices for the good of the country, and this good is what the voter wants. "The average guy . . . does have a pretty good feeling for the way things are going. And on the whole he wants to move in the right direction and do the decent thing and what's best for the country."

But what the right direction and the decent thing are in the affairs of government is extremely hard to know. Few average voters know what specific program is best for the cities or NATO or civil rights; few could assess a detailed plan of action where the details of the situation are unknown. What, then, the voter looks for is a man who wants "the decent thing," who wants, for instance, civil rights and peace, but who has as well the experience, the available information, the judgment to discern, specify, determine the "decent thing" along with the courage to act accordingly. For this is the man who himself becomes the specifier of the goals and the criterion of what plans achieve them. The average voter is looking therefore not directly at a detailed program but for a man of chracter who has the "feeling" for the right way, who has that "sense of rightness," who can assess detailed programs and judge them well. "Once a man's elected," says Unruh, "all you can count on is his character and general sense of purpose. Specific programs are out of date in a month." For instance, if a candidate were talking about the Vietnam war, he need not give a specific program; better to say, "I can't

guarantee peace, but I can guarantee you that I will give every ounce of wisdom and energy I possess to ending this war quickly and with honor."

"You see, that way it's him against Johnson; it's who's the better man? It's a lot firmer ground than matching his program against Johnson's program." Unruh admits, "You have to elaborate all of the points, systematically and factually. And you should indicate some of the things you are going to do. Not in order to come up with a detailed or comprehensive program--which is meaningless, anyway--but just enough to give people some confidence that you really understand the problems and have some ideas." Television helps the candidate because it lets the voters meet the man himself and gives them a chance for a personal assessment of him. The people "are looking for a hero" not a program. They want "a man who really stands for something, who shows he has some courage and sense, and who acts as if he believes in them. Of course, it also takes money and organization, but mostly it takes a candidate."

9. Summary

We have now completed some analyses of value language in classical and contemporary literature and have tried to show where accounting for the usage can lead to discoveries about the structure and orientation of the language-user, the human person. We will now summarize the findings and then will proceed to the next half of the dissertation where we will investigate what Rogerian psychotherapy

has to say on the same questions about the human person. The thesis will close with a comparison of these two approaches to the same problems.

As a summary of the present chapter I will place the findings in seven groups. Each group will be a basis of a question to be posed to the writings of Carl Rogers.

1. In all the value discourse we analyzed in Shakespeare and in The New Yorker, the root accounting for the usage was, in Nowell-Smith's terms, the presence of pro- and con-attitudes in speakers and hearers. The "attitudes" are of many different sorts: they include unconscious impulses, orientations, reactions about such things as cars, cafes and human love; they include rage against unnatural daughters; magnanimous but impractical aspirations and decisions for the welfare of the Roman state; a passionate and deepening love which, calling many tendencies into play, finally found articulation in cosmic images of divine grandeur and unending fulfillment.

These pro- and con-attitudes are by definition some sort of "orientation-toward." Each has a direction. Yet together in a person many of them form patterns either of harmony or of a conflict which can lead to harmony; and these patterns are formed in terms of a Good Life, a life-style, or an overall orientation toward what the person considers in general the sort of life he thinks or feels is best. We found this to be true especially of Lear, Cleopatra, The Longwinded Lady and the Summer in the City people. We can conclude, then, from the background of the analyses, that persons are goal-oriented; that

they have many active orientations of varied sorts and that all of these function at least remotely in terms of some overriding goal which Nowell-Smith would term the Good Life.

2. When it comes, however, to an analysis of the 'goals' of individual orientations and of the overriding Good Life goal, we discover, according to our study, that these goals are by no means always clear, definite and determinate. Lear seeks love and finds it realized in many ways; he discovers through painful conflict that his Good Life, his being who he really is, differs greatly from the life he tried so carefully to arrange and control. The Summer in the City personnel and the OEO held opposing views on how government welfare money should be spent and on the life-style that made human persons valuable. Cleopatra becomes a woman whose qualities surprisingly combine elements of the life-styles symbolized by 'Egypt' and 'Rome.' Yet she is neither the Rome that is Octavius Caesar, the Egypt that is Charmian, nor the Rome-Egypt that is Antony. Both the individual and general goals seem, then, not always too clear, not always determinate. The Good Life especially seems capable of many different patterns and ways of realization.

3. If the person is a complex of active attitudes, tendencies, orientations all somehow goal-directed, and if these conations do form an overall "drive" toward a Good Life of some sort, just how many of these tendencies are created, controlled, patterned by the person himself? Is the person the director of himself or is he to some considerable extent directed toward his goals by orientations within

himself which are not completely subject to his decision, organization and choice? Would growth as a person require not only rational thinking, judgment, decision, choice but also awareness of the tendencies already evaluating within him, acceptance and respect for them and conscious action which takes them into consideration? Such self-discovery appeared most dramatically in Lear, but was also a process present in both Brutus as he comes to see his own inadequacies in judgment and emotional expression, and in Cleopatra whose love for Antony finally calls forward her own powers of stability and heroism. The New Yorker automobile ads play upon strong and motivating tendencies which may remain in the buyer only partly conscious.

4. And yet at the same time a person remains not only "directed" or partly "programmed" but also director, organizer, determiner to some extent at least of the shape of many of his orientations and goals. Conscious evaluation, decision and choice gave cast and direction to many other tendencies as the Summer in the City project attempted to work toward a Good Life different from the one envisioned by the OEO. Cleopatra specifies as well as articulates the quality of her love for Antony in her deliberated choice of her "fire and air" elements, of Roman suicide as a step to realizing love that has reached almost cosmic and immortal proportions. The voter in the next presidential election looks for a man with a "sense of rightness" combined with good judgment, decisiveness.

5. If a person's goals, especially the Good Life in terms of which his attitudes have a somewhat unified direction, can remain

obscure, indeterminate; if they can fluctuate and change directions; then perhaps, as Lear and Brutus illustrate, a person can discern something of the goals by discerning the shape and direction of his "attitudes"--his impulses, tendencies, aspirations, instincts, feelings, emotions, spontaneous thinking and imagining. Sensitivity to these complex orientations and to their conflicts and harmonies can lead a person to discover better towards what his life is developing.

6. But even to discover the shape of the tendencies and aspirations, the feelings and impulses can be no small accomplishment. Coming to awareness of one's real needs may require a conflict that forces a person to look into himself or to admit the presence in himself of orientations whose existence he has denied. Conflict with his daughters and the physical suffering in the storm help Lear discover his own arrogance, pomposity, poor judgment, vanity--and his own need for love, gentleness, need for forgiveness, his own weakness and his own deeper powers of love and courage. External conflict leads him to uncover internal conflict whose resolution brings him new insight into what it means to be Lear. Brutus discerns better the shape of the Good Life thanks to his defeat chiefly at the hands of Caesar's immortal power. He discovers the limitations of his judgment and the goodness of his feelings.

But the discovery of one's own orientations can come through the help of other persons whose acceptance may lead another to accept himself and to see himself for the first time in a truer way. Or others may exhibit values that a person desires and loves; those

same questions can correct or enrich one another. The questions are these:

1. Is a person goal-oriented? actively tending toward goals? Is he perhaps a process?

2. What are the goals like--are they vague, somewhat indeterminate?

3. Is a person tending toward these goals as directed toward them by something within himself other than his conscious decision and choice?

4. Is a person tending toward these goals as directing himself toward them?

5. Are a person's goals at least somewhat revealed through his discerning the orientation of his tendencies, feelings, impulses, thoughts, aspirations? Are these tendencies harmonious?

6. Are the tendencies, aspirations, etc., discovered

   a) through conflict leading to awareness and active reintegration?

   b) through other people?

7. At the conclusion of all these responses is it possible to say that the person himself becomes the criterion of certain values, that the meaning of the values will change as the person begins to realize them in himself, and that he will experience these values as open ended, capable of ongoing changes and development?

others, through their love, may lead the person to find those same values in himself or to develop them. Men like Jim Marin and Monsignor Fox helped the people living in the city discover some of their own capabilities for living and celebration. The Fool, Edgar and certainly Cordelia help Lear by their patience, fidelity and encouragement and love.

7. After "getting behind" the value discourse in, for example, Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra and The Long-Winded Lady, it seems possible to say that persons themselves become the criterion of the values actualized in themselves; that as they experience these values as their own norms--as themselves existing in a certain way--that experience leads them to new knowledge of the values; they realize limitations and possibilities; they grasp that the values are open ended, perhaps inexhaustible, capable of ongoing changes and development. The Lady and the Five Girls, Brutus and Antony, simply are the life-styles and the values the value discourse speaks of. The Lady, King Lear and especially Cleopatra, existing with values as their norms, discover an openness, new possibilities to the love that shapes their personalities. Lear and Cordelia will "wear out packs of great ones" and Cleopatra has "immortal longings" in her.

10. Seven Questions

From these seven groups summarizing findings of the value language analyses I will formulate seven questions which I will propose to Rogerian psychotherapy in order to see how two approaches to the

CHAPTER THREE

INTRODUCTION TO ROGERS' APPROACH TO QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSON

In the second part of the dissertation we will take the seven "person" questions gleaned from value language analysis and pose them to Carl Rogers' psychotherapeutic theories of personality. Our purpose is to see if there will be a correlation between the responses of the two approaches. If there is a correlation, then the two approaches will not only have yielded helpful knowledge but will receive some mutual confirmation as ways of understanding the structure and orientation of the human person.

In this present chapter we will first give reasons for choosing the approach of Carl Rogers; then undertake to show how his approach may be considered scientific; and finally summarize his major theories of personality. In Chapter Four we will pose the seven questions to Rogers.

1. Why Rogerian Psychotherapy

For several reasons Carl Rogers' special form of psychotherapy provides a balance to value language analysis in approaching questions about the human person. First of all, Rogers is himself interested in discovering as much as he can about the human person.[1] His practical

[1] Carl Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (Boston, 1951) 15-16.

aim of helping persons to become themselves requires that he both theorize about the meaning of person and that he confirm his theory through practice with actual persons.

But his explicit aims include the theoretical one of simply coming to know more about human persons. He attempts to formulate real if tentative and fragmentary theories about persons and is willing to call his attempts philosophic.[2]

Another reason for choosing Rogers is that his work may be called in some real sense scientific. As we shall examine later in this chapter, he has conducted scientific researches on the procedures, concomitants and outcomes of his psychotherapeutic approach to the human person. The use of such a scientifically grounded method seems a good balance to the approach of linguistic analysis.

One important reason for selecting the work of Rogers is that it does deal with questions about persons through direct, long-term and "natural" communication with persons. His approach is client-centered, relatively free of techniques, and dependent to a large extent on what persons say and do in their interaction with another human person, the therapist. Such an approach affords a complement to the approach of fairly strict linguistic analysis. Language as a way of life is closely bound in with the structure of the person, as

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[2]Ibid., 479-533; also, Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston, 1961) 199-224. Cf. Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework," in Psychology: A Study of a Science, III, edited by S. Koch (New York, 1959) 184-256; especially 221-235.

our theory assumes; the situation, history, development of the person using the language come into play in determining the uses of words. Any approach rising strictly from theorizing and not in similar direct contact with human persons in concrete situations in time and space would not seem as close to linguistic analysis nor as likely to yield helpfully enriching results.

Even in the practical methods and aims of Rogerian psychotherapy there seems to be much help for discovering something about persons, their structure and orientations. The main "method" of this psychotherapy is the establishment of a natural human relationship between the client and the therapist. Any explicit directions to conform to a certain therapeutic model is explicitly eschewed. And the aim is to release natural processes--to feel, to become aware of feeling--during the therapy session itself. To use such "methods" as central in therapy requires close observation and reflection on human persons in actual situations.

2. Rogers' Method

What is this Rogerian "method" which appears to yield a more and more coherent picture of the structure and orientations of human persons? First of all, it is primarily a way of helping people, not of philosophizing about them; but in the process of helping people, the method brings to light much material from which Rogers is able to draw and confirm theories about personality. This method of therapy depends on hypotheses concerning the human person, his structure and

orientations; in turn, the method of therapy bears out and modifies the hypotheses.

The approach itself is particularly attractive because it demands constant attention to real people in real situations. It is a "method" in a somewhat paradoxical sense because it represents a deliberate effort to create a natural situation. The success of the method depends on whether or not one can truly speak of something natural operating.

The aim of the method is to help persons drop facades and defenses, become aware of their feelings and experiences, and develop into that self which he in some sense really is. A person can discover who he is only if he has the courage to look into himself and the courage to accept and release what he sees. Usually a man experiences such courage only if another person cares about him, accepts him as he is, and, as it were, goes with him in the fearful journey of coming to know himself. The central "method" of Rogerian psychotherapy is simply forming a genuine, warm and accepting relationship between two people--the client and the therapist.[3]

In this relationship the therapist tries to create a climate of freedom, understanding and acceptance. When the client realizes that another human person, seeing him as he is, can still accept him

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[3]Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, op. cit., ix; see also Carl Rogers, "Some Directions and End Points in Therapy" in O. H. Mowrer (editor), Psychotherapy: Theory and Research (New York, 1953) 44; see also, Rogers, Gendlen, Kresler, Truax, editors, The Therapeutic Relationship and Its Impact (Madison, Wis., 1967), 10.

and prize him, then the client feels more courage to look at himself and to accept himself. The real human relationship, developing according to its own natural directions, is the basis for the client's first step to healthier human living.

As the relationship develops through successive interviews, the client comes to greater awareness of those thoughts, feelings and impulses he has been hiding because of fear and shame. With the natural assistance of another person who is caring for him and valuing him, he can begin to allow these thoughts and feelings to be, to come into their own. He releases his powers so that they can follow their natural orientations.

The human relationship grounding the therapy forms and develops very much through conversation between the client and the therapist. When the therapy is working well, both persons are sensitive to the context, the uses, the associations, the way of life articulated, hinted at and lived out in the words and phrases of the conversation. At certain points the therapeutic way comes close to language analysis in the attempt to be aware of all that the language is doing and communicating. The assumption is that very much of the person is present in his speech. But the attention to language here also involves some effort to "get behind" the words to the structure and directions of the person. This effort can be alternatively described, however, as finding out what the client is "really saying."

To accomplish this task, the therapist attends to gesture, position, pause, laughter, crying, eye movement, omission of speech or of

certain information in speech. The therapist invokes more forms of life and communication than has the language analyst.

Also very important is the actual content of the conversation, what subjects the client chooses to talk about, the symbols he uses--or his lack of symbols, what he selects and omits, the interpretations he gives to events, to conversations, to stories, to people. Without, then, denigrating language analysis, the therapist attends to other forms of communication--including the critical interaction with the client--in which he can probe the structure and orientations of the person before him. Theorizing from such clinical data could prove very helpful in coming to understand what it means to be a human person.

3. The Approach As Scientific

While we may recognize the rich materials available for personality theory through psychotherapy, we may well ask how well this material is organized, validated, appraised and made available as data for theorizing as well as for practice? Fortunately, Carl Rogers and his students were pioneers in the 1940's and early 1950's in attempting organized and long-term research on the processes, concomitants and outcomes of psychotherapy.[4] Among the many studies and projects which Rogers and his staff undertook the most complete and available research occurred at the Counseling Center at the University of Chicago.

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[4]Ivan N. Mensh, Clinical Psychology: Science and Profession (New York, 1966) 120.

Results of this four-year study appear in a volume devoted to the entire project.[5]

Throughout his major published works, Rogers refers to relevant researches giving basic support to his theories.[6] In this chapter we will use the University of Chicago study as a sample of Rogers' use of a scientific approach. The Chicago project itself was an integrated series of research activities focused on central problems of personality and involving over the four years approximately ten counseling staff members and up to twenty other assistants at various times (16). The aim of the research was to discover new knowledge about personality and to move toward developing and evaluating personality theory (31).

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[5]Carl Rogers and Rosalind Dymond, editors, Psychotherapy and Personality Change (Chicago, 1954). Numbers appearing in parentheses in this chapter refer to pages in the Rogers and Dymond volume.

[6]For example, see Part V of On Becoming a Person: "Getting at the Facts: The Place of Research in Psychotherapy," 199-272;
Rogers, "Research in Psychotherapy: Round Table, 1947," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 18 (1948) 96-100;
Rogers, "A Research Program in Client-Centered Therapy," Research Publications of the Association for Nervous and Mental Disorders, Vol. 31 (1953) 48-50;
Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework," in S. Koch, op. cit., 185-194;
and especially Rogers, Gendlen, Kresler, Truax, op. cit. This last work is a study of the impact of the therapeutic relationship upon hospitalized schizophrenics and upon matched normal individuals. Its general aim was to make an intensive study of the factors involved in the process of change in personality and behavior as it occurs in schizophrenic and normal individuals during a period of therapy (3). The outcomes showed some degree of small but definite improvement in schizophrenics on various measurements of change (83). "The group of patients receiving the highest level of accurate empathy in their therapeutic relationships showed the greatest reduction in schizophrenic pathology as measured by the subscale for schizophrenic tendencies of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (85)."

It tested a coherent set of hypotheses growing out of a consistent body of personality theory developed over a period of years by Rogers and his associates in their attempts to assist persons through what they called client-centered or non-directive psychotherapy. The hypotheses centered about the capacities of the client for personal growth, about the function of the therapist and about the process of therapy itself. The processes of research were mainly observations, through control instruments, of the order which is inherent in therapy at successive stages of the counseling interviews (23).

3.1. The Experimental Group

The clients participating in the research were randomly selected from the adults receiving therapy at the Counseling Center of the University of Chicago. The Center serves both university students and the general public. Most clients there are self-referred; cases possibly requiring institutional treatment are avoided. The only factors used to stratify the sample for the research were the sex and student or nonstudent status in the proportions found among the clients at the Center during the six months prior to the beginning of the research (41).

The experimental group consisted of twenty-nine clients ranging in age between twenty-one and forty years, with an average of twenty-seven years. There were eighteen men and eleven women; sixteen were students at the University and thirteen were persons from the surrounding community (39).

The "typical client" of this group belongs to the middle class and is above average in intelligence and education. He is defensive and tends to intellectualize and minimize his problems. He is making a reasonably successful adjustment to his life-situation; some idiosyncrasies and atypical emotional reactions would be noted but not considered too serious or important. Yet inwardly the client is quite disturbed; he experiences anxiety, failure, guilt, social inadequacy. He lacks positive goals and has difficulty making decisions. Certain specific problems will also concern him: an unhappy marriage, possibility of failure on the job or in school, homosexual urges (usually not acted upon) or aggressive impulses. The "typical client" in the research group is not a severe neurotic; yet a sizable number of the clients had serious disturbances. Another small group evidenced personalities more healthy than the "typical client."

3.2. Criteria

The criteria used in the research posed special problems. "Success" was not a useful criterion because it had no "solid, known meaning" acceptable to all, especially in the early phases of the development of psychotherapy. In place of "success" as criterion, the research staff approached evaluation by asking, "What are the concomitants of therapy? If therapy is a series of events, what are the characteristics of those events as predicted by theory? Do these characteristics, operationally defined, occur or fail to occur in the experience of clients in therapy?"

For example, according to the theory of client-centered therapy, the individual will change in the direction of viewing others as persons of worth. This prediction can be operationally defined and verified or disproved. Whether this outcome is "good" or means "success" does not enter into the research (30).

3.3. Controls

Although the complexity of the variables also presented a grave problem in selecting controls, the research staff concluded that the importance of controls lay in the adequate accounting for variables presumed to be relevant to therapy. They instituted controls in several ways: there were separate control groups; an own-control method in which the same person provides different measures of himself; and data such as a comparison of what counselors consider "deep points" in therapy with randomly selected passages from recorded interviews (22).

3.4. Hypotheses

In the beginning of the research report, Rogers listed what he considered certain of the central hypotheses of client-centered therapy. These were the working principles of the research (4-5). The hypotheses are as follows:

> 1. The first hypothesis is that the individual has within himself the capacity, latent if not evident, to understand those aspects of himself and of his life which are causing him dissatisfaction, anxiety, or pain and the capacity and the tendency to reorganize himself and his relationship to life in the direction of self-actualization and maturity in such a way as to bring a greater degree of internal comfort.

2. This capacity will be released, and therapy or personal growth will be most facilitated, when the therapist can create a psychological climate characterized by (a) a genuine acceptance of the client as a person of unconditional worth; (b) a continuing, sensitive attempt to understand the existing feelings and communications of the client, as they seem to the client, without any effort to diagnose or alter those feelings; and (c) a continuing attempt to convey something of this empathic understanding to the client.

3. It is hypothesized that, in such an acceptant, understanding, and nonthreatening psychological atmosphere, the client will reorganize himself at both the conscious and the deeper levels of his personality in such a manner as to cope with life more constructively, more intelligently, and in a more socialized as well as a more satisfying way. More specifically it is hypothesized that the client will change in his perception of self, will become more understanding of self and others, more accepting of self and others, more creative, more adaptive, more self-directing and autonomous, more mature in his behavior, less defensive, and more tolerant of frustrations.

4. It is hypothesized that the therapeutic relationship is only one instance of interpersonal relationships and that the same lawfulness governs all such relationships. Thus, if the parent creates such a climate for his child, the child will become more self-directing, socialized, and mature; if the teacher creates such a climate for his class, the student will become a self-initiated learner, more original, more self-disciplined; if the administrator or executive creates such a climate for his organization, the staff will become more self-responsible, more creative, better able to adapt to new problems, more basically co-operative.

These four hypotheses are a distillation of the experience of the staff. It should be clear that they all imply, or build upon, a confidence in the essentially constructive nature of the human organism (4-5).

3.5. Design and Instruments

Following is the basic design of the projects and some of the main instruments employed (36-37).

The first project examined several specific hypotheses about changes in the client's perception of himself. It studied the changing relationship between the current concept of self, the wished-for self, and the proper or socially demanded self. The main instrument used was the SIO Q-Sort, a series of self-referent statements printed on cards which the client sorts to describe himself, how he would like to be and what the ordinary person is like. These data were then analyzed by correlational methods and factor analysis.

The second project studied changes in the total personality make-up of the client and examined more specific hypotheses relating to personal adjustment. The TAT--Thematic Apperception Test--was the instrument employed.

The third project measured possible changes in the client's attitudes towards others. Two measuring devices were used. The first, the Self-Other Attitude Scale, measured attitudes such as ethnocentrism, political-economic conservatism, dependence upon experts, desire to change others. The second device was a role-playing situational test measuring the response of individuals to others in certain critical interpersonal situations.

The fourth project studied changes in the emotional maturity of behavior as indicated by the Willoughby Emotional-Maturity Scale. The instrument provided for the client's own description of his behavior and for the descriptions two friends of the client submit.

Another whole group of projects utilized the recorded interviews and other information to investigate the internal dimensions of the psychotherapeutic hours.

3.6. Outcomes

The outcomes of the research, as Rogers himself summarized them, did generally support the original hypotheses. We will give here a sampling of these outcomes.

From the viewpoint of the client himself, there were several positive results, although none supported the theories without qualification. During the process of therapy the client had come to be, in his own eyes, a person much more similar to the person he would like to be, the ideal self far removed from his original self-concept at the beginning of therapy (417-418).

The changes in the client's "self" were in the direction of greater self-understanding, increased inner comfort, greater confidence and optimism, increased self-direction and self-responsibility, more comfortable relationships with others, and less need for self-concealment. These outcomes, identified at the close of therapy, continued to appear in the client but with lessening intensity, in the follow-up period (418).

The client also perceived that his relationships with others had changed. His goal became less perfect and more realistic; it became a more achievable goal. He began to see other persons as more like himself and as being somewhat better adjusted. At the close of

the follow-up time, the "self" of the client had assimilated into itself a greater proportion of the individual's total experience, including those sorts of experiences previously denied to awareness (418).

From the viewpoint external to the client similar positive results were reported. Trained psychologists, reading "blind" the Thematic Apperception Tests administered at different points to the client, found changes which correlated positively and significantly with the changes in adjustment scores based on the client's own perceptions of himself. They also were positively and significantly related to the counselor's rating of "success" or movement in therapy. According to these external evaluations the personality characteristics of the clients showed significant change away from those labelled as severely neurotic, borderline psychotic, and severely uncomfortable, in the direction of those labelled as milder problems or as being the characteristics of an essentially well-functioning person. This change, which was not discovered in the control group, tended to be maintained through the period following therapy. The change was on the average not great yet significant (419-420).

Those instruments testing the therapeutic process itself yielded results which Rogers summed up as follows. " . . . the process of client-centered therapy, as caught in the factual evidence of these various studies, appears to be based on a warm relationship of mutual liking and respect." The client, moving from a somewhat intellectual discussion of his problems, begins "a personal exploration of himself and an experiencing of his actual organismic reactions to situations.

As he permits more of these actual experiences to enter his awareness, his picture of himself keeps changing and enlarging to include these newly discovered facts of self." The tests confirmed the hypothesis that when the client-centered process is carried through, "the degree of reorganization of personality and behavior is likely to be considerable." (426)

4.4. Summary Of Rogerian Theory Of Person

Before posing the seven specific questions about person to Rogers, it seems good to give a brief summary of the general lines of his theory. Although the four hypotheses of the Chicago research indicate the main points of the theory, this summary will attempt to fill in areas which are directly helpful in treating the seven questions about person.

Carl Rogers' theory of personality, based on the findings of client-centered therapy, rests on the consideration of the human person as a basically healthy organism. Like any organism, the person is a process, not an achieved and static reality. When this fundamentally healthy organism-in-process is aware of all its needs and demands, it can achieve through self-direction, balanced, realistic, self-enhancing and other-enhancing behavior as it becomes more and more that ongoing process which is its real self.

As an organism, the person tends to be directional, and he is moving in the direction of self-actualization. To become that real self, which is a process and not a product, is the goal toward which

the whole organism is oriented and toward which it moves with subtle and ordered complexity.

What blocks the healthy development of this organism of the human person is often the person's denial of the basic tendencies and orientations which are found within him. He will be in conflict with himself because of a false self concept which he will defend, to himself and to others, by distorting his awareness of and interpretation of his own experience. He will even deny certain experiences to awareness. Because of this distortion the organism will exhibit unhealthy characteristics and its development will be hindered.

If, however, the person will remove the distortions and will become aware of his sensory and visceral experience, the basically healthy directionality of his organism will come into play and will seek its own harmony. The person will discover that he is a complex of harmonious and self-regulating needs, tendencies, aspirations and demands. He will discover his own capacities and powers and will more and more allow himself to be the evaluator of his own life and situation. He will depend more on his own potential for self-initiated, constructive handling of the life-issues.

Rogers holds that the human person is innately social. We can know this, he thinks, because it is a social relation that helps free the person to become himself. And, when he is free and is in process, he will find himself becoming more and more social in deeply satisfying ways precisely as he responds to his own self-regulating needs.

Rogers does not, then, consider the human person as basically aberrant. He does not even think of the person as tending toward disorder if left to his own devices. Yet this is not to say that persons do not tend to go in self-destructive and other-destructive ways. Rogers would, however, account for this movement by saying that the organism is being hindered by the person's distortion of experience and by his inability to permit all his inner needs and tendencies to come to awareness and fulfillment. If indeed "left to themselves" they would seek a harmony that would enhance human living.

Nor does Rogers think that human person is totally determined in a mechanistic way. He sees conscious decision and choice, as definite contributors to the growth of the person. And by no means does he see the individual as the strictly rational being who can and should live by reason alone. There are too many other tendencies, needs and "evaluators" in the human person which contribute to the direction of the process of becoming a self.

5. Conclusion

In comparing approaches of linguistic analysis and psychotherapy to questions about the human person, we have now examined certain elements of the psychotherapeutic method, validation and content. Rogerian psychotherapy is both practical and theoretical in its aims, for it hopes to assist persons to become more themselves and at the same time attempts to construct a consistent theory of personality.

The therapeutic methods and outcomes from which the theory is drawn and against which it is tested are particularly distinct from

the approach of linguistic analysis because they involve more channels and modes of communication from the person and from the therapist himself with whom the client has formed, as the central way of therapy, a warm and accepting personal relationship.

Information which these therapeutic methods have yielded about the human person have been subjected to scientific analysis and evaluation through controlled research. In this way, too, the Rogerian approach differs from the approach to the person through linguistic analysis. If there should prove to be significant correlation between the results of both approaches, then the way of analysis of value language and the way of psychotherapy will have some mutual confirmation.

CHAPTER FOUR

CARL ROGERS AND THE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE HUMAN PERSON

After sketching basic lines in Carl Rogers' psychotherapy and personality theory, we will in this chapter bring forward the seven "conclusions" which value language analysis yielded about human persons and will pose these conclusions as questions to Rogers. The main problem will be, how do these conclusions fit with the directions discerned in Rogers? Do the directions discerned in psychotherapy about the structure of the human person correlate with the conclusions from value language analysis?

We will approach Rogers historically by tracing his views on the questions as these views appear in three major books and in one recent radio conversation. These works span a period of twenty-three years: 1942 - 1965. They are Counseling and Psychotherapy (1942),[1] Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory (1951);[2] On Becoming a Person (1961)[3] and "Paul Tillich & Carl Rogers - a Dialogue" (1965).[4]

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[1]Abbreviations will be used in this chapter for these four works. Abbreviation for Counseling and Psychotherapy is C & P.

[2]Abbreviation: CCT

[3]Abbreviation: Person

[4]Abbreviation: Till-R

1. Goal-Orientation

The first question asks, Is a person goal-oriented? actively tending toward goals? Is he perhaps a process?

1.1. In Counseling And Psychotherapy

In this book which both introduced and defended client-centered therapy Rogers described differences between the new method and other methods of therapy, especially directive psychoanalysis. One of the main differences he saw concerned the place of goals in the client's life. In non-directive therapy, in contrast to directive psychoanalysis, the client and not the therapist selects the client's life goals. The whole process of therapy aims to help the client develop to the extent that he becomes able to select and to implement those goals which will bring him maximum satisfaction (126). In Rogerian therapy the client attempts to gain "genuine insight"--a new way of perceiving--which includes "positive choice of more satisfying goals." (206; 208)

Again in contrast to major forms of directive counseling, the non-directive method relies much more heavily, says Rogers, "on the individual's drive toward growth, health, and adjustment . . . freeing him for normal growth and development (29)." When he evaluates outcomes of the then new therapy forms, he says that the client begins to live in a more satisfying way. This satisfying living consists, "not in a life without problems," but in a "life with a unified purpose." "It is this unified purpose, this courage to meet life and the obstacles it presents, that is gained through therapy." (218)

According to his early book, then, Rogers had begun to build his theory of psychotherapy on a view of the human person as an organism with a natural process of directional growth, with a normalcy which, when respected, would lead to the choice of goals most satisfying to the individual. This satisfaction would have its measure in its congruence with the real directions of the tendencies within the person. It is possible that Rogers placed in this work greater emphasis on deliberate decision and choice of goals than he was to show later.

1.2. In Client-Centered Therapy

When Rogers brought out this book in 1951, he was moving toward stricter scientific analysis of the "living, emotional experience" of psychotherapy (xi). He presents a coherent theory of personality and behavior which, he says, remains open to change and which already exhibited an important shift in vocabulary from his earlier and more tentative formulations. In the nineteen propositions of this theory the term "organism" frequently appears, and the whole theory moves significantly toward considering the person in terms of a goal-directed, environmental natural process (481-533).

The central position and ramifications of the concept of person as goal-directed organism appear in the Preface to the book where Rogers calls himself a "midwife to a new personality--as I stand by with awe at the emergence of a self, a person." This emergence of a person in psychotherapy is a "birth process." He says that both he and the client "regard with wonder the potent and orderly forces which are evident in

this whole experience, forces which seem deeply rooted in the universe as a whole." These forces belong to life "with its blind power and its tremendous capacity for destruction, but with its overbalancing thrust toward growth, if the opportunity for growth is provided." (xi) In other words, what happens in psychotherapy can now be formulated in terms of orderly goal-directed, developing organic process.

In "A Theory of Personality and Behavior" (481-533), three of the nineteen propositions of the theory speak in terms of goal-direction of the person. The person, existing in a continually changing field of experience of which he is the center, reacts as an organized, organic whole to this phenomenal field. Admitting that some theorists still concern themselves with an atomistic type of organic reaction, Rogers points to the increasing acceptance of the fact that "one of the most basic characteristics of organic life is its tendency toward total, organized, goal-directed responses (486-7)." It is the total, organized, goal-directed response, both physiological and psychological, which seems really "basic" (487). He sees the organism at all times as a "total organized system;" the study of the reaction of any part, such as the development of an ulcer because of emotional stress, must start from this "central fact of consistent, goal-directed organization (487)."

In the fourth proposition Rogers says that the organism has one basic tendency and striving which is "to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism." He focuses goal-direction of the organism in a definite way when he says that perhaps "all organic and

psychological needs may be described as partial aspects of this one fundamental need" of actualization of the total organism. The "observed directional force in organic life" seems to tend in this way. (488)

In the fifth proposition Rogers sees behavior as "basically the goal-directed attempt of the organism to satisfy its need as experienced, in the field as perceived (491)." There is no doubt that by the time Rogers formulated his personality theory in 1951 he was definitely considering the human person as an organic process with fundamental goal-direction.

1.3. In Later Works

By the time Rogers published On Becoming a Person in 1961, the thrust of his whole theorizing about person was in terms of the goal-directed organism. Goal-direction was by this time taken for granted and his work focused on what these goals are and how they are achieved. He views the person not simply as an "organism" but very much as a "self" with organismic responses. The goal-direction of an organism is simply assimilated into the total personality theory as it becomes more refined even in vocabulary.

One of the most significant chapters in Person was actually written in 1957 when Rogers had decided to work out more clearly the meaning of the "personal directions" which clients seem to take in the free climate of the therapeutic relationship (163). The title of the original paper was important: A Therapist's View of Personal Goals.[5]

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[5]Carl R. Rogers, A Therapist's View of Personal Goals (Wallingford, Pa., 1959 and 1967).

When it appeared without major change in the later book, the paper had the added phrase in the title: "To Be That Self Which One Truly Is," a quotation from Kierkegaard which expressed Rogers' view of the goal of the human person. By this time Rogers could say in his introduction to the chapter that he still approved what he had said earlier in the original paper and that he was even more convinced that there was real basis for his "confidence in the human organism (163)." It seems possible to characterize the whole book as an exploration of what the goal-directions are in the human person, that organism which is a self.

In 1965, Rogers gave one of his most explicit statements about the human person as goal-directed. The occasion was a radio dialogue between Rogers and theologian Paul Tillich. In one of the opening remarks Rogers questioned Tillich about his views of the nature of man. He said that his own view differed from that of some of the existentialists who take the point of view that man has no nature.

"It seems to me," Rogers commented, "that he has (a nature)--I have taken the point of view that man belongs to a particular species. He has species characteristics." He then stated that "simply because man is an organism he tends to be directional. He's moving in the direction of actualizing himself (Till-R, 3-4)."

For Carl Rogers, then, the human person is goal-directed; he is an organism in process of development.[6]

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[6]See also Rogers, "Lessons I Have Learned in Counseling with Individuals" in W.E. Dugan (editor), Counseling Points of View (Minneapolis, 1959) 25; and Rogers, "A Note on the Nature of Man," Journal of Counseling Psychology, Vol. 4 (1957) 199-203.

2. The Goals

The second question gleaned from the analysis of value language is this: What are the goals like--are they vague, somewhat indeterminate?

Rogers seems progressively to move in directions of more and more vagueness, indeterminacy and fluidity in human goals. While his whole theorizing rests on the view of the human person as goal-directed organism, those goals appear more complex, more individual and more changing as the theorizing takes into account more and more clinical experience with developing persons.

2.1. In Counseling And Psychotherapy

When he differentiates client-centered therapy from other forms of treatment, Rogers points out that in the client-centered method the therapist does not perceive distinct goals for the client nor attempt to lead him in certain defined, externally determined directions. The purpose of the therapy would certainly be to help the client achieve his goals, but these are goals which none but the client can perceive. To decide on fixed goals for him would violate the purpose of the therapy. Already there is marked deference in Rogerian theory toward openness and indeterminacy concerning a person's life style.

But in this earlier work Rogers did speak more in terms of gaining insights into oneself with a view to making clearer choices of goals. He was not yet exhibiting as fully as he did later the flux, change and process involved even in these goals. After achieving new insight, the client comes, he says, to orient himself in a new way;

he reorganizes the self in such a way that he can make positive choice of more satisfying goals. (174)

Yet the sense of fluidity and indeterminacy is by no means absent from this earlier work. The biological and social forces with which the therapist finds himself in league are powerful forces tending toward "growth and adulthood." (209) Precisely what growth and adulthood would mean for this individual is spelled out only schematically as Rogers speaks of self-responsibility and socialization. In his summary of personality theory he says that psychotherapy tries to lead the client to "new perception of relationships previously unrecognized, a willingness to accept all aspects of the self, and a choice of goals, now clearly perceived for the first time (216)." How fluid and indeterminate these goals are will receive treatment in later works.

2.2. In Client-Centered Therapy

When Rogers speaks of goals in this book, he does so first in terms of the goals of an organism. He says that the organism tends to move in the direction of maturation, as maturation is defined for each species (488). Especially for the self as sharing characteristics of the organism, there will be movement in the direction of what Rogers now calls "self-actualization."

This goal of self-actualization has only broad and vague outlines. It will involve moves toward greater differentiation of organs and functions; expansion through growth, reproduction and development

of tools; socialization; and greater independence and self-responsibility. What precisely this would mean for the individual would remain indeterminate. (488)

Another statement of the goal of the self is simply "to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism (487)." This enhancement is "not clear" (490-491). The forward-moving process will be inhibited if the individual does not clearly perceive the factors involved in his choices. He may, thanks to inadequate symbolization of experience and lack of accurate differentiations in his experience, mistake regressive behavior for self-enhancing behavior (491). The movement of therapy will be to assist him in coming to clarity about the factors involved, in accepting into awareness all elements of his experience, so that he can make the determination for himself of what is self-enhancing, what is most deeply satisfying, what is his "goal." (491)

Perhaps the most important advance in Rogers' theory in regard to the indeterminacy of goals occurs in his explication of Proposition XIX of his "Theory of Personality and Behavior." The proposition reads, "As the individual perceives and accepts into his self-structure more of his organic experiences, he finds that he is replacing his present value system--based so largely upon introjections which have been distortedly symbolized--with a continuing organismic valuing process (522)."

The values or goals of the individual are not static nor determinate once and for all. Clearly here Rogers places emphasis on the

fluidity, the ongoing nature, of the goals which themselves give direction to the developing self. The individual, depending less and less on others for his goals, "discovers that he does not need to know what are the correct values; through the data supplied by his own organism, he can experience what is satisfying and enhancing. He can put his confidence in a valuing process, rather than in some rigid, introjected system of values (523)."

2.3. In Later Works

By the time Rogers published a group of his articles as On Becoming a Person there was no question but that he considered that the goals of the human person were open, fluid, unfixed, indeterminate, in process. The essays most pertinent to this question have significant titles: "What It Means to Become a Person" (107-124); "To Be That Self Which One Truly Is: A Therapist's View of Personal Goals" (163-182); and "A Therapist's View of the Good Life: The Fully Functioning Person" (183-198).

The line of thought is simple: what the client really wants is to become the self he really is, to become "myself." He does not know what that self is. He comes to see that he must drop fixed goals, static values, externally imposed norms; the self he wishes to become is not a product, not a static entity, but a process whose directions are sometimes not even fully available to consciousness. He comes to accept himself as a "stream of becoming, not a finished product (122)." As we will investigate later in this paper, the client will find that

he will make his goals determinate on the basis of many evaluations happening within himself but that these determinations will be provisional and subject to constant revision.

In developing this theme, Rogers points out clearly that he does not consider the "good life" as a "state" of virtue or a "state" of happiness. It is simply not a state at all. (186) Nor can it be a set way or form which the person can adopt from sources external to himself; it cannot be a rule of life introjected for personal use (170). One of his stronger statements of his position appears near the end of "What It Means to Become a Person":

> I should like to point out one final characteristic of these individuals as they strive to discover and become themselves. It is that the individual seems to become more content to be a process rather than a product. When he enters the therapeutic relationship, the client is likely to wish to achieve some fixed state: he wants to reach the point where his problems are solved, or where he is effective in his work, or where his marriage is satisfactory. He tends, in the freedom of the therapeutic relationship to drop such fixed goals, and to accept a more satisfying realization that he is not a fixed entity, but a process of becoming. . . . (122)

After quoting from a client at the conclusion of therapy, he goes on to say that

> Here is a personal description of what it seems like to accept oneself as a stream of becoming, not a finished product. It means that a person is a fluid process, not a fixed and static entity; a flowing river of change, not a block of solid material; a continually changing constellation of potentialities, not a fixed quantity of traits. (122)

We will in a later question examine how the goals receive provisional determination; here we can remark on the contours of the

answer. The goals cannot be fixed from without because the person alone can be fully aware of what the directions of his organism are; he alone can be knowledgeable about his real situations and experiences; he alone can make assessments realistically in terms of what he is aware of in himself (170).

He must tend progressively toward self-direction as he comes closer to the inner sources of information (174). As the process which is the self develops, the self and personality--the development--emerge from experience, from the interplay of inner sources of movement and experience of the environment and situation. The person determines his goals in terms of his awareness of the changing tendencies within himself and of the changing situation (174).

In the Tillich conversations, although Rogers thinks man has a nature and belongs to a species (5), he constantly speaks of the human person as someone in "process all the time." Such being-in-process "isn't a static kind of goal for an individual." (19)

3. The Person As 'Directed'

Following an examination of Rogers' views about human goals, we will now pose the third question arising from the analysis of value language and aimed at discovering something about the structure and orientations of the human person.

Is a person tending toward these goals as directed toward them by something within himself other than his reason, his conscious decision and choice?

Two central issues in the work of Rogers reveal what his response to this question must be. First, by adopting the natural-organism-in-process as model for the person, Rogers shows that he considers the person a complexity of tendencies and drives, all of them basically harmonious when functioning freely, and all of them directed toward the enhancement of the whole person. Rational thinking and deliberate choosing are only two tendencies within a society of impulses, drives and orientations.

Secondly, the whole Rogerian method of psychotherapy aims to free the person so that he may become aware of all his experiences, sensory and visceral as well as fully conscious and rational. Only when he has become aware of all of these tendencies which, by their directionality, are themselves evaluators, can he begin to allow himself to move, and to move himself, in directions that are truly enhancing and satisfying for him as this particular person. The human relationship in which Rogerian psychotherapy principally consists provides the climate and companionship necessary for the individual to arrive at such awareness and acceptance so that he can move in positive directions.

3.1. In Counseling And Psychotherapy

In this early book Rogers explicitly separated himself from those methods of therapy in which the client is given a diagnosis of his problems and is instructed in ways of solving them. Rogers argued that intellectual knowledge was simply not enough because intellectual

knowledge and conscious, rational decision are not the only factors involved. He pointed to all the other elements whose presence were contributing to the orientations of the client. This person had feelings and emotions which were prime contributors to his perception of goals and values. The point was that he had to discover and accept these other evaluators; his problems often centered on the denial of the existence of many of these non-rational experiences. Rogers said:

> . . . one of the major purposes of the counselor is to help the client to express freely the emotionalized attitudes which are basic to his adjustment problems and conflict. . . . In this process the client finds emotional release from feelings heretofore repressed, increasing awareness of the basic elements in his own situation, and increased ability to recognize his own feelings openly and without fear (173).

3.2. In Client-Centered Therapy

As we noted above, Rogers opened this book with a tribute to "life. . . with its blind power and its tremendous capacity for destruction, but with its overbalancing thrust toward growth, if opportunity for growth is provided (xi)." He spoke of the wonder with which both he and the client viewed "the potent and orderly forces which are evident in this whole experience, forces which seem deeply rooted in the universe as a whole (xi)." When he concludes a discussion of the changes therapy helps to bring about, he says that underlying the entire process of functioning and of change are "the forward-moving forces of life itself. It is this basic tendency toward the maintenance and enhancement of the organism and of the self which provides the motive force for all that we have been describing (195)."

These orderly forces by no means include only rational, volitional or even conscious tendencies. As the sixth proposition in the "Theory of Personality and Behavior" indicates, emotion plays an immensely significant part in the goal-directed activities of the individual. "Emotion accompanies and generally facilitates . . . goal-directed behavior, the kind of emotion being related to the seeking versus the consummatory aspects of the behavior, and the intensity of the emotion being related to the perceived significance of the behavior for the maintainance and enhancement of the organism (492-493)."

Behavior, goal-direction and evaluation are deeply influenced, Rogers holds, not only by the emotions which the client consciously experiences but as well, and very powerfully, by those feelings which he has not admitted to awareness, often because they do not fit with his self-concept (147). Such emotions may be experienced "viscerally," may bring about entire behavior patterns, may help change the direction of a life and yet not be known to consciousness. An example would be feelings of opposition toward a person one loves.

By the process of therapy the client becomes progressively able to so change his self-concept that feelings opposed to it may come to his awareness and/or receive adequate symbolization. They may then operate according to their own logic and be integrated with the other life-forces shaping the person's development. Once again they will influence the person's life-style by means of their own directionality but will be able to fit better with the other tendencies at work in him. When the client permits more experienced data to enter

consciousness, says Rogers, he will achieve a more realistic appraisal of himself and will in turn act differently (139).

Sometimes the unconscious forces within a person will operate in a way that will enhance behavior where conscious feelings and thoughts may have hindered such enhancement. After quoting a client's account of the reorganization of self that took place when she stopped focusing attention on her disorganization and confusion, Rogers commented that "One is somehow reminded here of Angyal's[7] contention that the conscious self often 'tends to take over the government of the total personality, a task for which it is not qualified.' At least it would appear that the organization of personality is, like a good golf stroke, not always best achieved by focusing consciously on it (100)."

3.3. In Later Works

Person supports well the thesis that an individual tends toward his goals as directed toward them by something within himself other than simply his reason, conscious decision and choice. The importance of the "visceral and sensory experiences" become even more pointed in this later work. When he is describing the directions in therapy, Rogers says that "psychotherapy (at least client-centered therapy) is a process whereby man becomes his organism--without self-deception, without distortion (103)."

To become that organism means very much getting back to awareness of visceral and sensory experience. The client ceases, or at least

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[7]A. Angyal, Foundations for a Science of Personality (New York, 1941) 118.

decreases, through therapy, the distortions of this experience in awareness. "He can be aware of what he is actually experiencing," not just of what he can permit himself to experience, thanks to his defending a false self-concept. "In this sense the person becomes for the first time the full potential of the human organism, with the enriching element of awareness freely added to the basic aspect of sensory and visceral reaction." (104)

When all of these feelings, impulses, forces, experiences are allowed to operate freely, the person becomes for the first time "a complete and fully functioning human organism (105)."

The person who emerges from therapy, Rogers says, is a society of impulses, feelings and thoughts that are self-governing (119). "There is a gradual growth of trust in, and even affection for the complex, rich, varied assortment of feelings and tendencies which exist in him at the organic level (119)."

In the Tillich conversations, Rogers considers a person "realistic" when he is able to listen to all the reactions, visceral as well as rational, which are going on within him in a given situation (19). Later he mentions that even the infant, who is far from directing himself by reason, is nevertheless involved in a real "valuing process" because he is attuned to the mass of impulses, feelings and reactions operating within him and oriented toward his overall development (23).

Clearly, then, throughout all his major writings Rogers has supported the view that a person is significantly directed toward his goals by more than conscious thought, decision and choice.[8]

4. Conscious Self-Direction

The fourth question asks, Is a person tending toward these goals as directing himself toward them?

From the viewpoint of psychotherapy there are several ways of answering this question. The first way responds by saying that among all the directional, dynamic and evaluating elements of the human person are conscious thought, decision and choice. A second way of answering focuses on the person himself as the locus of evaluation. Since we will later treat the question of the person as evaluator, we will center in this response on the first way.

Conscious thought, decision and choice figure prominently in Rogers' theory of personality. All of these appear as part of the integrated, goal-directed, organic process that is the human person.

4.1. In Counseling And Psychotherapy

Conscious choice especially received careful treatment in C & P where Rogers saw it as an important outcome of the "insight" which therapy aimed to bring about (208). This insight, which is a new way of perceiving relationships in experience, includes the positive choice

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[8] See also Rogers in Koch, op. cit., 196: "...this basic actualizing tendency is the only motive which is postulated in this theoretical system"; and Rogers in Dugan, op. cit., 25-26.

of more satisfying goals. Rogers found that this element of choice had been neglected in earlier treatments of the outcomes of psychotherapy, but that such an omission overlooked a significant matter.

When the client during therapy begins to see clearly all the factors involved in what gives him present but perhaps infantile satisfaction and in what would give him the satisfaction of adult behavior, he is able, thanks to this insight, to make an adult choice. Before such insight he could not comprehend how adult behavior could bring satisfactions superior to what present, less mature behavior provided.

Thanks to the releasing, non-threatening relationship in therapy, he can now consider his choices with greater objectivity. When he felt threatened, his choice was distorted and limited. Insight frees him for more objective and adult choosing. Rogers added that insight will enable the client to choose more objectively between the goals bringing immediate but temporary satisfaction, and the goals bringing delayed but more adult and permanent satisfaction. (210)

There seems to be a sense, then, in which the releasing and accepting of all the forces in man brings freedom for more perfect conscious choice.

4.2. In Client-Centered Therapy

Rogers summarized several early research programs on the outcomes of psychotherapy in terms of changes in the client's behavior. These studies, appearing in CCT, showed a movement toward more "adult," freer, less-defensive choices. According to the research, in the later

interviews in therapy most clients began to discuss with increased frequency plans they were making and "behavior steps" they intended to take. These plans, and the report of resulting behavior, showed a significant increase in maturity as compared with activities reported by the client in the earlier stages of therapy. (180)

Clients in successful cases showed real improvement in their performance of their life-tasks. This improvement was in the direction of greater responsibility, more maturity and significantly more self-direction. These persons met stress situations with an increase of inner calm which allowed for more responsible judgment (186).

The research pointed toward the changes in behavior precisely as resulting from a change in the self-concept. This self-concept is an organized pattern of perceptions of self and self-in-relationship to others and to the environment. In the person seeking therapy the concept or self-gestalt can be in its basic elements decidedly stable and yet decidedly distorted. It is used as a frame of reference when choices are to be made and thus serves to regulate behavior.

When the person's gestalt is based on only part of his experience, he will tend to deny to awareness experiences that contradict that configuration he considers to be himself. He will then live defensively, finding threat to his self-concept in real experiences which he must distort in his consciousness lest they injure this well-guarded self. His choices, then, are really less free and mature.

After therapy the client has been able to relax this rigid self-concept and has been able to admit many more experiences into his

consciousness. The old gestalt becomes disorganized and a new "self" tends to emerge, a new pattern less rigid and more open to all areas of the client's living. Rogers says, "Where the client does face more of the totality of his experience, then as the new self-structure is organized, it becomes firmer, more clearly defined, a steadier, more stable guide to behavior (194)."

The change in behavior includes a change in the direction of conscious control (195). Behavior becomes consistent with the new concept of self and alters as that concept alters. "Any behavior which formerly seemed out of control is now experienced as part of self, and within the boundaries of conscious control. In general, the behavior is more adjustive and socially more sound, because the hypotheses upon which it is based are more realistic." (195)

4.3. In Later Works

In the essays that form Person Rogers centers much attention on the trustworthiness, innate rationality and basic harmony of the human organism. This organism which is the self by all means remains a thinking, deciding, willing, choosing being. On the one hand, once psychotherapy has helped the person admit much more of his experience into conscious awareness, he can trust more to those reactions, to the inner responses of his whole organism. He can trust his feel for a situation, his intuition of a good behavior pattern. On the other hand, such acceptance of his total experience, of his feelings and intuitions, has granted him much more freedom for practical thinking and for mature choice.

There seems definitely a loosening of conscious control of reactions, of experiences, even of patterns for future action as the person comes to trust his total organism more. But such loosening of control means chiefly loosening of a control that has distorted experience and has forced the person into patterns of action consonant with a false or inadequate self-concept. Such control, in other words, has led to less adult and less satisfying behavior, less living of the truly good life for this person.

The movement toward trust in the organism is a reasonable move because it is toward more realistic and enhancing living. It becomes, for example, reasonable to trust in one's "intuitive skill in finding behavioral solutions to complex and troubling human relationships (191)." The self begins to emerge from experience, as a participator in and an observer of the ongoing process of organismic experience rather than being in control of it in the sense of restricting it to fit a false view of reality.

Rogers finds that for the person who is able to live freely in this way, both behavior and life patterns become "exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeavoring to achieve (194-195)." Rationality, then, is not confined to one faculty or power but permeates the entire organism which, when able to function freely, will reveal an order and harmony most conducive to living the good life.

The tragedy, says Rogers, is that many of us allow our defenses to keep us from being aware of this innate rationality; consciously we

move in one direction while organismically we move in another. Whereas the "only control of impulses" which is necessary is the "natural and internal balancing of one need against another" and the discovery of actions which most closely approximate satisfaction of all needs. The fully functioning person, whose defenses and distortions are few, will "participate in the vastly complex self-regulatory activities of his organism." (195).

Rogers is very clear in his treatment of the freedom both for thought and for choice which self-acceptance and self-awareness can bring. In Person he sees that the process of psychotherapy is a movement to become "psychologically free (191)." In the experience of therapy he finds that

> . . . some of the most compelling subjective experiences are those in which the client feels within himself the power of naked choice. He is free--to become himself or to hide behind a facade; to move forward or to retrogress; to behave in ways which are destructive of self and others, or in ways which are enhancing; quite literally free to live or die in both the physiological and psychological meaning of these terms (192).

In what Rogers calls the "optimum of therapy" he says that the person "rightfully experiences the most complete and absolute freedom." This fully functioning person is liberated in such a way that he can choose to follow "the course of action which is the most economical vector in relationship to all the internal and external stimuli, because it is that behavior which will be most deeply satisfying." In contrast, the person who is defensive and selective in the experiences which he

permits to awareness is decidedly not so free. He may will or choose to follow a given course of action, "but finds he cannot behave in the fashion that he chooses." Because of his defensiveness, his denial or distortion of some of the relevant data, he is not free to make an effective and truly satisfying choice. (193)

The fully functioning person, on the other hand, "not only experiences but utilizes, the most absolute freedom when he spontaneously, freely, and voluntarily chooses and wills" a course of action. For Rogers, the more a person becomes "fully functioning" the more he will experience freedom of choice, and the more he will be able to implement his choices in his actions. (193)

In his conversations with Paul Tillich, Rogers re-affirms his position that man is free and self-determining. He said that he thought both he and Tillich were "trying to push beyond some of the trends that are very prominent in the modern world; the logical positivistic, the ultra-scientific approach, the stress of the mechanistic and highly deterministic point of view which, as I see it, makes man just an object trying to find some alternative stance in relation to life (3)."[9]

5. Awareness Of Tendencies

The fifth question gleaned from analysis of value language and posed to Carl Rogers asks, Are a person's goals at least somewhat revealed through his discerning the orientation of his tendencies, feelings, impulses, thoughts and aspirations? Are these tendencies harmonious?

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[9]See also Rogers, "A Note on the Nature of Man," loc. cit.

The self, then, is a fluid process of complex tendencies. These tendencies can be blocked in their normal development through the person's not acknowledging their existence, not claiming them as his own, not being aware enough to differentiate the feelings. If the self is to become itself--if it is to achieve its goals--if it is to know the directions in which it is to develop, awareness is necessary. The tendencies in their complex pattern <u>are</u> the organism and are moving toward its enhancement and enrichment. To obstruct them is to obstruct growth; not to be aware of them is not to be aware of the direction of one's goals. They <u>are</u> that direction. Since the goal is very vague and indeterminate, discerning it at all entails discerning the directions of the developing organism.

But more: the self is constantly developing in new ways, for no experience is pure repetition of the past. As development continues, the goals change in their specification, for the goal is to be this process which is constantly changing. If the person is unaware of the movements of the process, if he is in other words unaware of his feelings, tendencies, impulses, thoughts, aspirations, then he is unaware of the specification of the goals that will bring him maximum development and satisfaction.

Notice, however, that this awareness has, so to speak, two functions. First of all, awareness of all that is happening in one's organism assists conscious thought and decision because far more of the factors in the situation are available to consciousness and can function as evidence in thinking, planning, deciding and choosing.

But for Rogers the awareness has a second function that comes closer to "discerning the goals by discerning the tendencies." Being one's feelings, tendencies, reactions consciously and openly here and now is being oneself; these movements are oneself. Analysis of them is not necessary, but awareness of them, acceptance of them as belonging to oneself, letting them be not objects of perception but precisely just what one is at the moment--these are the essentials. For Rogers, awareness is not noticing an object called one's own feelings; it is rather a reflective awareness as one lives in these feelings. The goals are coming into being in the moment to moment process. What Rogers presupposes and supports with clinical evidence is that these feelings are basically healthy, forward moving, harmonious, unified in goal; and that goal is for the self to become the self which it truly is.

The meanings, goals and values of experience are not then imposed upon experience but are inherent in it and are discovered within the experience itself. Awareness of what this experience really is--a reflexive awareness of what one is being and becoming at this moment--is necessary for discovering the meaning, value, goal of the experience. This meaning may not be clear, may not be available for analysis, may not receive adequate formulation, but awareness of the experience itself gives a "feel" for the meaning. One knows at least that one is becoming more his real self as he allows all elements of that self to come into play and to react as the situation calls for their reaction.

There is a real sense, then, in which a person discovers his goals through awareness of how his whole organism is reacting. A

That the answer to his question must be Yes for Rogers is apparent after considering answers to the previous questions. In a sense the fifth response is a summary of the Rogerian approach to the problem of person. I will first give the main lines of the response, note the contributions of the two earlier books we have been examining, use Rogers' "seven stages" of the process of psychotherapy as an index to his thinking, and then conclude with comment on a passage from the Tillich-Rogers conversations.

Coming to awareness of all one's experiences, feelings, thoughts; accepting these without condemnation; letting them be themselves, proceed according to their own rhythm and direction; letting them belong to oneself, allowing them to be that self at the moment of their existing; permitting them to find the complex, deeply rational harmony which they, when unobstructed, tend toward; permitting the self to be what it really is--that process of fluid, changing, basically harmonious though often obscure, conscious, partly conscious, unconscious feelings, experiencings; all of these are what the whole of Rogerian psychotherapy hopes to achieve.

The process of therapy is a movement from a fixed, static self conceptualized in an often unreal, frozen construct to a fluid, changing, dynamic self, living in the present moment, being its feelings at each moment. It is a movement from unawareness of feeling, denial and distortion of feeling, lack of "owning" feelings, to a fluid process of consciously living these feelings in the now.

person, trusting more and more in his own organism for the discovery of values and goals, begins to participate with greater awareness in the vastly self-regulatory activities of his organism. He does not always consciously know where he is going. In all of this only attentiveness to one's total organism and to one's real and immediate experience can let goals emerge, consciously or unconsciously, determinate or vague.

5.1. In Counseling And Psychotherapy

If Rogers has changed in any way concerning the importance of awareness in discerning who one is and where one is going, it is probably only a change in the direction of greater clarity, greater certitude and greater breadth of interpretation for his view. In C & P, one of the points distinguishing client-centered therapy from other forms of therapy was that it "relies much more heavily on the individual drive toward growth, health, and adjustment." Therapy, for Rogers, was a way of "freeing" a person for "normal growth and development," of removing obstacles so that the person might "again move forward." This normal growth would, it seems, carry a person toward his goals. (29)

When he discussed insight, he spoke of it in one place as "this understanding and acceptance of the self." Through insight the client "recognizes feelings" which are going in a certain direction (42). Perhaps in this earlier work, especially in his discussion of insight, Rogers relies more on the discernment of relationships, viewing them

in a new light, as the basis for conscious choice. The later insistence on trusting the directions of the organism is not so prominent. He said, "Essentially the individual seems to be saying: 'This is what I am, and I see that much more clearly. But how can I reorganize myself in any different fashion (41)?'"

5.2. In Client-Centered Therapy

A slightly different aspect of the theory appears in CCT where Rogers describes a person's perceptual field as reality for that person. This field is his world and a world known only to himself. As this perception changes, reality changes. It would, then, be impossible to impose on a person his real goals; he alone can discern what they are in terms of the world he alone knows. Helping him to admit into consciousness as much as possible of all that his perceptual field does contain is the way of therapy; but it is the man himself who must discern the directions of the tendencies within him. His determination of goals, discernment of their contours, will depend on his awareness of all relevant data in his perceptual field. (486)

5.3. In Later Works

When he describes what he calls the "seven stages of the process of change" occurring in client-centered therapy (Person, 131-155), Rogers at the same time is giving a rather concise presentation of the relationship between awareness of experience and discernment of the shape of the goal that is "becoming one's self."

At the beginning of therapy the client seems not to be himself. He experiences problems, although sometimes his defenses are so strong that he does not even admit consciously that anything is amiss. This distance from his "real self" correlates with his lack of awareness of his real feelings, along with his inability to distinguish emotions which he does admit to consciousness.

In the early stages of therapy the client neither recognizes nor claims as his own many of his feelings and their personal meanings (130). He has very little, if any, recognition of the ebb and flow of experience. When he does describe feelings, they are usually perceived and expressed as objects not belonging to him, or at least as objects which belonged to him in the past only (134). Even though he may exhibit feelings, he may not recognize them as such or may not claim them (134). But by the time the client reaches the third stage, there will be much expression about or description of feelings and personal meanings which are not now present to him, but he will usually condemn himself for having the feelings. Acceptance is very difficult (135).

Later he will express feelings as present but still will have little acceptance of them. At the same time he begins to differentiate feelings, constructs and personal meanings. As awareness grows, he becomes more sensitive to distinctions, contours of various emotions and experiences.

In the fifth stage, the client will express feelings freely as in the present (139), and he discovers that the feelings really are in him. He will say that the feelings "bubble up" or "seep through,"

often to his surprise (140). There is an "increasing ownership of self feelings, and a desire to be these, to be the 'real me' (141)." Differentiation among feelings continues to become sharper.

Important for our purposes here is the incipient identification of the real feelings and the real self. Awareness seems to be leading to awareness of the directions the process which is the self is naturally oriented to take. Awareness leads to "goal discernment."

In the last stages of the process, feeling flows and is experienced now and fully, with immediacy and richness (145-151). There is sharp differentiation among the feelings. The client sees his own experiencing as a referent against which he can check his attempts at symbolizing it, articulating it in words. He experiences new feelings with immediacy both in the therapeutic relationship and outside it.

He begins to trust in the directions of his organism. He can let himself go, so to speak. He is trusting not primarily in the conscious processes which go on, but rather in the total organismic process (151). As he begins to use the experiencing of his feelings as a referent, these experiences become available to him in his search to discover his real self. Rogers says, "The client quite consciously endeavors to use these referents in order to know in a clearer and more differentiated way who he is, what he wants, and what his attitudes are. This is true even when the feelings are unpleasant or frightening (151)."

In summary: the person is a process of becoming that self which he truly is; the self is itself a process in constant flux. As an

organic process, its tendencies are already working toward the good of the whole person; yet the direction of the tendencies can be distorted and obstructed by the person who fears them. Coming to awareness of the real cast and orientation of these tendencies means coming to awareness of who one really is, for the self is the complex of these feelings, emotions, impulses, thoughts, choices which, when unobstructed, will work together for the harmonious enhancement and growth of the whole organism, the whole person.[10]

In the conversations with Tillich, Rogers brought up the question of what constitutes the optimal person (19). In one passage he links awareness with achieving personal goals. He says:

> This is the question of what constitutes the optimal person. In other words, what is it that we're working toward, whether in therapy or in the area of religion? For myself, I have a rather simple definition, yet one which I think has a good many implications. I feel that I'm quite pleased in my work as a therapist if I find that my client and I, too, are--if we are both moving toward what I think of as greater openness to experience.
>
> If the individual is becoming more able to listen to what's going on within himself, more sensitive to the reactions he's having to a given situation, if he's more accurately perceptive of the world around him--both the world of reality and the world of relationships--then I think my feeling is I will be pleased.
>
> That's the direction I would hope we would move, because then he will be in the process--first of all, he will be in the process all the time. This isn't a static kind of a goal for an

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[10]Rogers in Koch, op. cit., 196; 202 (screening out of experiences not congruent with the self); 205 (denial to awareness).

> individual, and he will be in the process of becoming more fully himself. He'll also be realistic, in the best sense, in that he's realistic about what is going on within himself, as well as realistic about the world, and I think he will also be in the process of becoming more social simply because one of the elements which he can't help but actualize in himself is the need and desire for closer human relationships; so for me, this concept of openness to experience describes a good deal of what I would hope to see in the more optimal person. . . . (19)

6. Awareness, Conflict And Other Persons

If awareness of feelings, tendencies and aspirations is so important to discovering one's personal goals, to discovering one's self, then how does such awareness come about? At the conclusion of the analysis of value language, two ways to such awareness appeared. The question, then, to be posed to Rogers, is this: Are the tendencies, aspirations, etc., discovered a) through conflict leading to awareness and active reintegration? b) through other people?

6.1. Conflict

The conclusion to Question Five leads immediately into the response to the present question. The total organism is in dynamic process toward goals which are themselves fluid and changing, goals which are processes and, within certain lines, indeterminate. Conscious planning and decision do not determine fully the real goals of the person. The key, then, is awareness, attentiveness to all the directions and to all the evaluators. The person must, for instance, be aware of the emotions as evaluators, as they react to what enhances

or threatens the organism. He must make conscious decisions in terms of evaluations he is receiving from feelings and impulses. For fruitful development, awareness is necessary.

But a great help to such awareness is conflict. Persons lacking this awareness often come to therapy because they are experiencing conflict. Usually this conflict is at first focused outside the person in, for instance, his interpersonal relationships or in his work; but later he discovers that the real war is within himself. He seems to have inconsistent, even contradictory, tendencies within himself. He is often defending something within himself and often distorting experience of his own feelings, of his situation and of other people in order to defend his self-position.

This inner conflict signals that the person is unaware of the needs of his total organism and is unaware therefore of the directions of the process which is his real self. He is fighting himself in his attempt to preserve what proves to be a false concept of who he really is. Conflict becomes the key to self-revelation, the key to discovering who he is.

6.11. In Counseling and Psychotherapy

"Counseling can be of help," Rogers said in C & P, "only when there is a certain amount of psychological distress arising out of a condition of disequilibrium (53)." It is only when a person has recognized a problem and is struggling with it that he will take steps to find a solution through counseling. The counseling will attempt to

lead him to an awareness that will reveal the dimensions of the real conflict and the direction change should take.

In this earlier work, Rogers pointed out that the stresses might be almost entirely "psychic in origin, growing out of conflicts of desire," or they might arise from the imposition of environmental demands that conflict with personal values and desires. The community might impose standards which conflict with the standards of the person. (54) In fact, in all conflict there will be, says Rogers, a "large cultural component (54)." Rogers is attentive to the basic problem of the conflict within the self which, when resolved through the "insight" he speaks of here, will lead to new understanding of relationships of the self with others, with the community and with the environment. The self will be reorganized and reoriented (194).

What is not so prominent in these earlier views of the conflicts leading to therapy is the basic opposition between one fixed, static, defensively organized and unreal self-concept and the actual feelings and experiences of the client. Yet there is no question that even in C & P the movement of therapy is not toward solution of individual problems. In pointing out its differences from other forms of therapy, Rogers says that client-centered therapy "aims directly toward greater independence and integration of the individual rather than hoping that such results will accrue if the counselor assists in solving the problem (28)."

The centrality of conflict appears very clearly when Rogers mentions the painful process that therapy will initiate in the person.

The client then will make a choice between stresses. Before he can profit from the therapy, the tensions created by his original conflicting desires and demands must be more painful to him than the stress of finding a solution to the conflict (54).

6.12. In Client-Centered Therapy

As Rogers developed his theories in CCT, he centered more and more on the conflict between a person's rigid, unreal self-concept and the quite real experiences which had to be ignored or distorted in order to defend the concept. Highly reminiscent of King Lear's situation, the client's fundamental difficulty is his refusing to bring to undistorted awareness those experiences inconsistent with his defensively organized self-gestalt (517). Because he must defend himself he feels constantly threatened by many aspects of his real situation and of his own visceral and sensory responses. The experiences whose presence he has kept from himself remain real experiences; the feelings remain real tendencies and responses; but they operate in hidden conflict with the self which the person consciously accepts.

This kind of conflict seems at the root of that suffering which can finally help to bring a person to self-awareness. The "resolution" of the conflict is not so much a resolution as the emergence of a new self. Yet it may be that this healing conflict can come to light only if another sort of struggle or contradiction leads the person to question himself. Until his false self-structure is challenged by the environment, the culture or other persons, he may live unaware that he is defensively distorting experience.

In CCT, Rogers notices this phenomenon (191). He says that the self-structure is an organization of hypotheses for meeting life, an organization which has been relied on successfully at least to some extent. When it is firmly organized and when it perceives no contradictory material, the person himself may never think to question it. For example, the "brilliant" high school senior in a small town may never question his self-concept if his "brilliance" remains unchallenged by wider contacts (191).

A conflict arising from a change of environment, from confrontation with another, may for the first time lead the person to at least question his self-structure which he will have to defend against contradictory experiences. His perception of the external conflict may lead him to become aware of the deeper conflict within himself and may bring him to attempt to loosen the self-gestalt. It seems, then, that conflict can lead to awareness of deeper conflict which in turn can lead to awareness of one's real tendencies and orientations.

One important form of conflict signaling distortion of experience is "anxiety" (502). According to Rogers, research has indicated the presence of what he calls "subceptions."[11] These are "discriminating, evaluative, physiological organismic responses to experience, which may precede the conscious perception of such experiences (517)." When such subceptions detect threat to the self-concept in certain experiences, the person may then, without conscious advertence even to

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[11]See also Rogers in Koch, op. cit., 206 (subception).

the experience, distort symbolization, or even prevent symbolization of what has in reality occurred within him or happened to him. (507)

Anxiety will be that tension which the organized concept of the self manifests when certain subceptions signal that symbolization of certain experiences would be destructive of the self-gestalt (507). Because of the nature of the subceptions, the person will not consciously recognize the causes of his anxiety. But the anxiety may lead him to seek means of greater awareness which will lead him to perceive the conflict between his self-concept and his organic needs (510).

Another form of conflict which may cause a person to seek therapy is the discrepancy between feelings and behavior. Sometimes a person will consistently act in a way opposite to what his perceived feelings would direct. He may, for instance, continually injure someone he loves. Or his behavior may so contradict his manifest feelings that he disclaims ownership of the actions: "It wasn't I who did it." When a person clearly perceives these flagrant discrepancies, he is, in Rogers' words, "often unable to leave them alone (148)." He must seek out their cause. Such seeking should lead to new awareness of more of his real feelings and attitudes.

6.13. In Later Works

The place of conflict in relation to awareness changes mostly only in nuance and in simplicity of vocabulary when we pose the question to Rogers in Person. His list of problems leading persons to therapy is similar to the list in C & P, but he focuses with greater ease and

quickness on the fundamental problem at the base of the others. He finds similarities between his view of the basic problem and that of Soren Kierkegaard. In one place his fuller use of the concept of congruence adds a helpful nuance to his position on conflict.

When he is discussing "what it means to become a person (107-124)," Rogers lists many of the problems that have brought persons to the Counseling Center at the University of Chicago, and then points out what he considers the common underlying problem. The persons who have come include the student afraid of failure, the housewife disturbed about her marriage, the parent disturbed by his child's behavior, the woman who fears that life and love are passing her by. "Yet there is no satisfaction in giving this type of catalog, for, as counselor, I know that the problem as stated in the first interview will not be the problem as seen in the second or third hour, and by the tenth interview it will be a still different problem or series of problems (108)."

But in spite of this bewildering "horizontal multiplicity," he continues, "there is perhaps only one problem (108)." Each person seems to be raising the same question. "Below the level of the problem situation about which the individual is complaining--behind the trouble with studies, or wife, or employer, or with his own uncontrollable or bizarre behavior, or with his frightening feelings, lies one central search." To Rogers it seems that "at bottom each person is asking, 'Who am I, <u>really</u>? How can I get in touch with this real self, underlying all my surface behavior? How can I become myself?' (108)"

Soren Kierkegaard, Rogers notes, pictures "the dilemma of the individual" with keen psychological insight when he points out that the most "common despair is to be in despair at not choosing, or willing, to be oneself; but that the deepest form of despair is to choose 'to be another than himself' (110)." Such despair, such conflict could be the beginning point of a man's seeking to find who he really is. Such conflict may lead to awareness of his real person.

In a chapter (338-346) Rogers calls a "highly tentative document (338)" Rogers defined and explored the construct of "congruence," a construct developed to cover a group of phenomena which seem important to therapy. Congruence could be what therapy aims at achieving in the client. Incongruence would be a conflict leading the person to seek therapy. As Rogers defines it, congruence indicates an "accurate matching of experiencing and awareness (339)." It may be extended to cover a matching of experience, awareness and communication (339).

The incongruence between experiencing and awareness may lead to the anxiety or the tension which prompts a person to seek help through psychotherapy. A person, for example, may feel anger, show it externally yet honestly deny that he is angry. This incongruity is usually spoken of as defensiveness or denial to awareness. The concepts of using a facade or mask instead of expressing one's true feelings would be a form of incongruence. All of these conditions could lead to an ultimately therapeutic conflict. The difference here with earlier modes of expression in Rogers' writings seems in terms of an ease and

sharpness of vocabulary, a closeness to experience. The basic line of thinking remains the same.

6.2. Other People And Self-Awareness

Responding now to the second part of Question Six, we can say that for Rogers, another aid to awareness of one's real tendencies, feelings and attitudes is simply other people. In fact, relationship with another may be the only way to turn even the conflict into a help to awareness. Rogers' process of psychotherapy consists mainly in allowing a warm, accepting human relation to develop between the client and the therapist. The therapist's attitude of understanding and acceptance without either approving or condemning, frees the client to be more understanding and accepting of himself and allows him to face experiences within himself which he has hidden from consciousness. The simple presence of another accepting person lends courage for the journey within.

One of the client's main needs may be for deep human relationships. Yet the presence of that need may not come to consciousness until it is being partially fulfilled in the relationship with the therapist.

6.21. In Counseling and Psychotherapy

"For the first time," Rogers says in C & P, "This approach (client-centered therapy) lays stress upon the therapeutic relationship itself as a growth experience (30)." What Rogers stated here in 1942

proved itself to be a foundation statement followed through and elaborated with greater and greater confidence.

In the earlier work Rogers pointed out that, in this new form of therapy in contrast to other forms, the present situation consisting in the relationship and interaction of client and therapist assumed first importance while the client's past history became far less significant. What was happening here and now between two persons was the actual healing and growth process; the therapy sessions, then, were not mere preparation for solutions to problems or cures. Rogers believed that the significant emotional patterns of the person showed up in his present situation in relation to the therapist. In the interplay of the two persons those patterns would begin to change. Therapy was a life-experience, not a preparation for life (29).

In C & P, Rogers attempted to define the counseling relationship as a "quality of social bond which differs from any the client has heretofore experienced (86)." It was an "affectional bond with defined limits (87)." In later works the implied restrictions and delineations tend to become more tentative and less defined.

6.22. In Client-Centered Therapy

The therapeutic relationship, its qualities, its effects, became central issues in CCT. In one part of the book Rogers described the therapist's role as that of another self for the client (35). The therapist becomes another self, providing a safe opportunity for the client to discern himself more clearly, to experience himself more

truly and deeply, and to choose more significantly. This becoming another self means that the therapist perceives the client's self as the client himself has known it. The therapist, understanding as the client himself understands, accepts all that he knows, whether the client is revealing hostility, "shameful" and guilty feelings, or what he would consider good and noble reactions (41).

When both types of feelings, experienced in some way by the counselor, are accepted by him with the same warmth and respect, the client himself can begin to look at the "shameful" and hidden experiences and can come to accept them as aspects of himself. Thanks to the warmth, respect and acceptance he is receiving from the counselor who is, in some way, experiencing the client's experiences through empathic understanding, the client himself is freed and encouraged to bring to awareness what he would otherwise condemn in himself. He can experience himself "as a person having hostile and other types of feeling, and can experience himself in this way without guilt (41)." He is able to do this "because another person has been able to adapt his frame of reference, to perceive with him, yet to perceive with acceptance and respect (41)."

In his description of the process of therapy and especially of the nature of the therapeutic relationship, Rogers acknowledges in this second book that "we do not really know what is the essential process of therapy (131)." He then gives several hypotheses which had received by then corroboration in experience and in research studies.

Quite a few therapists, he said, take the point of view that the process of therapy is best described in terms of the changing emotional relationship existing between the therapist and the client. These therapists believe that "many of the verbal, attitudinal and perceptual changes are simply by-products of a basic emotional experience in a relationship between two human beings (158)." For them, the actual person-to-person communication and relationship is the therapy. Awareness, then, would certainly come through other people.

According to one hypothesis, Rogers continues, the client does indeed move from false defenses, self-condemnation and repudiation to awareness and acceptance of his hitherto denied feelings and finally to full acceptance of himself as respected and loved, thanks to the "limited relationship with the therapist (159)." But the word 'limited' here can be deceiving. Rogers does not hesitate in CCT to call the relationship one of love.

"'Love' has here perhaps its deepest and most general meaning--that of being deeply understood and deeply accepted (159)." He cites the work of Oliver H. Bown, one of Rogers' staff members, who feels that the term 'love' is "the most useful term to describe a basic ingredient of the therapeutic relationship (160)." In other words, as research and experience progressed, the therapeutic relationship came to be viewed more and more as a natural relationship, one that was not so unique as it had seemed.

Supporting the importance of relationships with others in the client's attempt to come to self-awareness is the growth of group

therapy. In CCT, Nicholas Hobbs points out that if it is valuable to be understood and accepted by a therapist, it is an even more powerful experience to be understood and accepted by several people who are openly sharing their feelings in a mutual search for a more satisfying way of life (287). Often the sense of worthlessness that leads to defensive behavior and denial of visceral and sensory experiences comes very much from a breakdown of interpersonal relations. The client is "tremendously in need of some experiences which will enable him to come closer to others, and discover thereby those denied aspects of himself which are important in his relationship with other people (289)."

The experience of acceptance by a group of persons who share feelings of inadequacy and fear similar to his own, lets an individual enter into an actual interpersonal situation where he can accept himself and still be found acceptable to others. In place of the hurtful relationships that led him to self-distortion, the client, ~~in~~ group therapy, can live a real interpersonal relationship in which acceptance of his true self can take place. As a member of a group, the client learns "what it means to give and receive emotional support and understanding in a new and more mature fashion. The self is redefined in a context not unlike that which initially created the need to distort perception of the self, and of the self in relation to others (291)."[12]

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[12]For further comment on group therapy see Rogers, "Current Trends in Psychotherapy" in W. Dennis (editor) Current Trends in Psychology (Pittsburgh, 1947) 120-127.

6.23. In Later Works

By the time Rogers published Person in 1961 he was seeing the therapeutic relationship as having qualities applying to all interpersonal relationships. What he had learned in counseling he could employ in many other types of communication with others. And in all these relationships, when the bond was genuine, warm and accepting, the same result occurred; the other person was himself freed to become more genuine and more self-accepting (32). As the years of experiment and research accumulated, Rogers was able to say with still greater confidence that the therapist will help the client, not by means of any intellectual or training procedure, but through providing a "certain type of relationship (32)."

If this relationship is provided, "the other person will discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth, and change and personal development will occur (33)." Years of practice and theorizing supported the original cast of client-centered therapy: other people are the way through which a person can come to healing self-awareness.

It is interesting that in this later work Rogers sees the relationship not so much as "becoming the self of the other" as of responding genuinely to the client in the warm and accepting human relationship that has formed between them. The therapist needs to be aware of his own feelings and must never present a facade of attitudes he does not feel toward the client. Only in this way can the relationship have what Rogers calls "reality" (33).

"It is only by providing the genuine reality which is in me, that the other person can successfully seek for the reality in him." This seems to be true, says Rogers, "even when the attitudes I feel are not attitudes with which I am pleased, or attitudes which seem conducive to a good relationship. It seems extremely important to be real (33)." More and more it is a natural, actual human relationship which will help the person activate his own capacity for being real, for being himself.

This conclusion appears again when, in a paper addressed to a conference on communications (Person, 329-337) Rogers applied the findings of experience and research in psychotherapy to problems of both national and international group tensions. When one nation interprets another nation's action as aggression, while the other nation itself considers itself engaged in self-defense, can there be any real communication, any real breakdown of barriers? Here Rogers invokes his theory of the therapeutic relationship as a helpful step, this time not to personal but to international awareness and acceptance. "Real communication occurs . . . when we listen with understanding (331)," when we "see the expressed idea and attitude from the other person's point of view, to sense how it feels to him, to achieve his frame of reference in regard to the thing he is talking about (331-332)."

When in therapy a person can listen to what the client is saying, can understand how things seem to him, can sense the emotional flavor which it has for him, then the therapist "will be releasing potent forces of change in him. . . . We know from our research that such

empathic understanding--understanding with a person, not about him--is such an effective approach that it can bring about major changes in personality (332)." He then applies this theory directly to international understanding.

A final note on the importance of other people in a person's coming to fruitful self-awareness appears when Rogers discusses the "seven stages of process" in psychotherapy (Person, 132-158). The person fixed in a false and rigid self-concept, a person lacking both internal awareness and interpersonal relationships, a person not even recognizing his own feelings and personal meanings, may never even know that he has a problem, much less seek help toward change, unless, without asking for it, he experiences himself as fully received and accepted by another. Since this person, unaware of his real difficulties, will probably not seek counseling directly, he may come to this releasing experience of acceptance through play therapy or through group interaction. Once he has been freed through these less frightening experiences, he may be able to look at himself long enough to perceive the discrepancies his self-concept has led him to hide (113).

Rogers supports his viewpoint here with researches on the characteristics of these relationships which do help facilitate growth in the client (41-44). At the close of his summary of eight studies, he says that, according to these researches, it is the attitudes and feelings of the therapist, rather than his theoretical orientation, which are important. In particular, what is crucial to growth is the way in

which the therapist's attitudes and procedures are perceived by the client (44).

One of the questions Rogers and Tillich discussed in their conversations was what a man, granted complete freedom, would do with that freedom (5-7). In one of his responses Rogers mentioned the effects of "other people" on the person trying to become himself; granting this person his freedom to be would lead, not to destruction, but to deeper self-understanding and more social behavior. ". . . what impresses me is that even imperfect attempts to create a climate of freedom and acceptance and understanding seem to liberate the person to move toward really social goals (7)."

Perhaps a good summary of Rogers' whole position on this question appears in the following response to Tillich:

> I'd like to say a little bit about the kind of relationship in which I think man's estrangement can be healed, as I see it from my own experience. For example, when we talk about--when either of us talks about the courage to be or the tendency to become oneself, I feel that perhaps that can only be fully achieved in a relationship.
>
> Perhaps the best example of what I am talking about is that I believe that the person can only accept the unacceptable in himself when he is in a close relationship in which he experiences acceptance.
>
> This, I think, is a large share of what constitutes psychotherapy--that the individual finds that the feelings he has been ashamed of or that he has been unable to admit into his awareness, that those can be accepted by another person, so then he becomes able to accept them as part of himself (10).

7. The Seventh Question - A Summary

The concluding question about persons, drawn from value language analysis is a direct return to the question of values, of the norms by which a person lives. As we will show at the end of this section, the response to the seventh question for the most part summarizes the Rogerian answers to all the questions posed in this chapter.

The question: At the conclusion of all these responses is it possible to say: a) that the person himself becomes the criterion of certain values

b) that the meaning of the values will change as the person begins to realize them in himself

c) that he will experience these values as open ended, capable of ongoing changes and development?

For Rogers, the response to this question seems to be generally affirmative, although he does not directly treat the second part of the question in the terms in which it is stated. Rogers does not speak of the actual meaning of a value changing as a person experiences that value in himself; at least he does not employ such terminology. Yet that such a change does happen seems to follow from what he explicitly says in regard to the person and his values. Both "a" and "c" find almost direct responses in the work of Rogers. The terminology of "person as criterion of values" does not appear, but what Rogers does say could be articulated by this phrase.

Once more it seems that Rogers' position on a question undergoes change in the direction of greater sureness, wider and deeper

elaboration, and even simplicity of expression. As his work progresses he more and more centers the locus of evaluation in the person himself and more and more perceives the individual person as in a sense a "criterion," a standard which not even he can fully grasp, conceptualize or articulate. In the later works Rogers is even more convinced of the fluidity and openness of the values and goals of the individual. Possibly the widest divergence between the earlier and the later works occurs on the question of values. The difference is mainly one between the first beginnings and the full flowering of a theory.

7.1. In Counseling And Psychotherapy

In C & P Rogers sees that the insight to which therapy should lead makes possible the "positive choice of more satisfying goals (209)." Because of the release that the non-threatening therapeutic relationship brings, the client is enabled to consider his choices with greater objectivity and can allow himself to examine much more of the relevant evidence for his choices. This insight cannot result directly from the counselor's efforts; it must be "earned and achieved by the client." It involves "choices of a sort no one can possibly make for the client (209-210)." The decisions to which insight leads are oriented around new goals and implemented by new actions (211).

The "re-education" through therapy, Rogers says, is not a re-training in all aspects of life. Rather it is a sufficient practice "in the application of the new insights to build up the client's confidence and enable him to carry on in a healthy fashion (218)." Without

using the phrase "locus of evaluation" Rogers has implied that such a locus is indeed the client himself. But as yet he does not work through all the ramifications of his viewpoint.

In one place he adumbrates what he will treat at much greater length later and what points to the person himself as the criterion of values. After speaking of the counseling relationship, Rogers says that it is here that the therapist "finds himself in league with powerful forces--biological and social--which tend to make growth and adulthood a rewarding type of satisfaction (209)." These forces, under other names, will assume greater importance as Rogers views the person as the listener and learner in the presence of the evaluative information his own complex organism provides for him.

As for openness and fluidity of goals, Rogers speaks mainly in terms of reorientation and reorganization of the self in C & P (194-195). Value will change, but as yet he has not developed very far the idea of movement through therapy from a fixed organization of the self to a fluid, changing, dynamic organization which is pure process.

7.2. In Client-Centered Therapy

The "locus of evaluation" receives explicit treatment when Rogers writes about the process of therapy in Client-Centered Therapy. There is, he says, a characteristic shift in that locus as the client progresses during the counseling sessions.

In the beginning, the center of the client's values tends to lie outside himself. It resides in parents, friends, his culture and even

in the counselor on whose judgment the client will often wish to depend (150). "It seems to be true," Rogers comments, "that early in therapy the person is living largely by values he has introjected from others, from his personal cultural environment (149)." He is usually trying to live by what others think, by what his parents taught him, by what his church says, by what he thinks his friends and colleagues expect of him and judge to be right or correct behavior.

As he begins to be dissatisfied with these introjected values, the client usually experiences confusion and uncertainty as he gradually begins to place the locus of evaluation within himself. "Gradually this confusion is replaced by a dawning realization that the evidence upon which he can base a value judgment is supplied by his own senses, his own experience (150)." He discovers that he has within himself the "capacity for weighing the experiential evidence and deciding upon those things which make for the long-run enhancement of self (which inevitably involves the enhancement of other selves as well) (150)."

There is another way of looking at this center of evaluation, a way that points even more clearly to the person himself as the "criterion" of values. When a person first comes for therapy, Rogers says, he is usually allowing his life to be guided by generalizations which are actually inadequate to the task given them. These generalizations will usually have a fixed, absolute, "black and white" character of ought/ ought not, good/ evil. They are usually introjected from others without sufficient testing by the person himself.

Little by little, as he examines the "rich primary experiences" on which such generalizations are supposedly based, the individual himself will begin to expose the inadequacy or falsity of many of these generalizations. Coming closer and closer to his actual experience, his actual feelings, his genuine attitudes, he begins to get a new perspective on them, becomes able to accept them, discriminate among their many aspects. He comes to see that all the rich and complex elements of life within him, all his varied experience, provide a basis for "new and more adequate abstractions (143)."

He sees that he has been "living by the map" and that the map is inaccurate and dangerously misleading. As therapy progresses, he becomes able to turn from the map "drawn by others" to the real territory--his own experiences--which it purported to describe (144)."

As the client begins to see himself more and more as the locus of evaluation, he is also perceiving his experience as fluctuating, many-faceted, tending in new directions. Trusting more and more in what his own feelings reveal to him, he sees that certain behavior patterns, like certain generalizations, need not be unalterable. There is, then, a characteristic movement in the client's valuing process, not only from a locus outside himself to one within, but also from rigid, static goals, to more supple, alterable ones. The goals appear now more "open ended." (141 & 146)[13]

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[13]See also Rogers in Dennis, op. cit., 113.

7.3. In Person

There is a paragraph in Person which seems to summarize and elaborate the positions Rogers had taken in his earlier books when he considered the client in relation to his values. This paragraph itself appears in a central essay of the book, the one Rogers had delivered as an address and published earlier under the title, "A Therapist's View of Personal Goals."[14] In the paragraph the person emerges as the locus of evaluation and the criterion of personal values.

> Still another way of describing this pattern which I see in each client is to say that increasingly he trusts and values the process which is himself. Watching my clients, I have come to a much better understanding of creative people.
>
> El Greco, for example, must have realized as he looked at some of his early work, that 'good artists do not paint like that.' But somehow he trusted his own experiencing of life, the process of himself, sufficiently that he could go on expressing his own unique perceptions. It was as though he could say, 'Good artists do not paint like this, but I paint like this.'
>
> Or to move to another field, Ernest Hemingway was surely aware that 'good writers do not write like this.' But fortunately he moved toward being Hemingway, being himself, rather than toward some one else's conception of a good writer.
>
> Einstein seems to have been unusually oblivious to the fact that good physicists did not think his kind of thoughts. Rather than drawing back because of his inadequate academic preparation in physics, he simply moved toward being Einstein, toward thinking his own thoughts, toward being as truly and deeply himself as he could.

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[14] Op. cit.

> This is not a phenomenon which occurs only in the artist or the genius. Time and again in my clients, I have seen simple people become significant and creative in their own spheres, as they have developed more trust of the processes going on within themselves, and have dared to feel their own feelings, live by values which they discover within, and express themselves in their own unique ways (Person, 175).

Like the creative person who, without knowing all the reasons or even being able to analyze or account for his decisions and actions, has the "sense" or "feel" of what is to be done; so the person who is becoming more and more himself trusts in and looks for direction to the "sense" or "feel" which the complex responses of his whole and harmonious organism give him. The person looks to himself to discover what is truly of value to him what is worthwhile. He is in a sense a listener who is listening to himself, to all the information his feelings, attitudes, impulses, thoughts and aspirations can give him as they move in the direction of their natural orientation and move more and more in the harmony they seem destined to have. In this way the person is in many ways the locus of evaluation and the criterion of values.

The person becomes able to accept himself in this way only when he has come to trust in his own organism, when he has discovered that the self he really is, is indeed a trustworthy process (178). Once the client is able to let his real feelings be and flow in him, he discovers that they do take their "appropriate place in a total harmony of his feelings (177)." He discovers that they do "operate in a constructive harmony rather than sweeping him into some uncontrollably evil path (177)." He can then allow himself to find his own values in place of the inadequate standards he has introjected from others.

What he is trusting in when he trusts in his own organism is by no means something simple. He is listening to more than his intellect, memory and conscious will. He is attempting to discern the flavor of the many feelings and impulses occurring in him because he is trusting in the direction that these feelings, now accepted as good and harmonious, are leading him.

> Often I sense that the client is trying to listen to himself, is trying to hear the messages and meanings which are being communicated by his own physiological reactions. No longer is he fearful of what he may find. He comes to realize that his own inner reactions and experiences, the messages of his senses and his viscera, are friendly. He comes to want to be close to his inner sources of information rather than closing them off (174).

That these values are indeed open ended, capable of ongoing changes and development follows from the fact that the person, discovering values in and through himself is discovering them in and through an ongoing, changing and open-ended process. The self to which he is listening for direction is constantly moving and developing. What the person is sensitive to is an emerging organism in a constantly changing environment. This openness of values becomes apparent when the client has shifted from an alignment with the standards of other people and begins to seek new values in terms of who he himself really is.

Rogers notes the client's "groping, tentative, uncertain behaviors by which he moves exploringly toward what he wants to be (176)." The client, in moving toward "being a process," finds that his feelings, attitudes, thoughts are not always consistent even with themselves but

are rather constantly in flux. When he begins to live in this flowing current, his striving for conclusions and end states seems to diminish (171). He is content to evaluate in terms of a process "of potentialities being born," rather than in terms of being or becoming some fixed goal (172).

Once again Rogers quotes Kierkegaard as expressing "excellently" what clients seem to experience. "'An existing individual,' says Kierkegaard, 'is constantly in process of becoming . . . and translates all his thinking into terms of process. It is with (him) . . . as it is with a writer and his style; for he only has a style who never has anything finished, but "moves the waters of the language" every time he begins, so that the most common expression comes into being for him with the freshness of a new birth (Person, 172).'"

In support of many of his hypotheses about the changing process of evaluation in persons during and after therapy, Rogers examines the researches of N.J. Raskin whose findings were summarized in his article, "An Objective Study of the Locus-of-Evaluation Factor in Psychotherapy."[15] Raskin raised the question, Does the client's perceived locus of evaluation change during therapy? Is there a decrease in the degree to which his values and standards depend upon the judgments and expectations of others, and an increase in the extent to which his values and standards are based upon a reliance upon his own experience? Raskin

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[15]In W. Wolff and J.A. Precker (editors), Success in Psychotherapy (New York, 1952) Chapter 6; in Person, 248-250.

employed twenty judges working independently, on materials from 59 interviews in ten brief but fully recorded cases, all of which had been the subject of other research investigations.

Indicating the shift in the locus of evaluation during therapy, the average score for the first interviews in the ten cases was 1.97, for the final interviews 2.73, a difference significant at the .01 level. On this point the theory of client-centered therapy was supported. Further confirming the findings was that the five cases judged according to other researches as more successful cases of therapy, showed an even sharper shift in the locus of evaluation. The average for the first interviews was 2.12, and for the final interviews 3.34 (250).[16]

7.4. Summary

We will now summarize the Rogerian response to the three parts of Question Seven, a question which in a sense is itself a summary of the six preceding questions. A further summary of Chapter Four will appear in the next chapter when the Rogerian responses are compared with the findings from value language analysis.

The person himself, when he is truly functioning, does seem to become the criterion of evaluation for the human values he adopts. First of all, he is very close to reality, close to his own emotions, impulses and their evaluations. With a minimum of distortion he is attentive to all the data of the situation.

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[16]See also Rogers in Koch, op. cit., 210; and Rogers, "What It Means to Become a Person" in C.E. Moustakas (editor), The Self (New York, 1956) 207.

More specifically, the person himself is the only judge of what is really enhancing for himself, for he is the only one who can be fully attentive to what his whole organism tells him about the direction of the real self, about the 'goal'--what the real self is or is becoming. Who he really is--though he discerns this only vaguely and though this 'who' is a changing process--becomes the criterion for what is enhancing or injurious. The criterion is internal.

In his conversations with Tillich, Rogers restates his position on values when he discusses what he would consider the "optimal person" to be like. This person will "be in process--first of all, he will be in the process all the time. This isn't a static kind of a goal for an individual, and he will be in the process of becoming more fully himself (19)."

Again, he says, that the person who is reasonably open to his experience "is involved in a continuous valuing process; that is, I think that . . . I've sort of dropped the notion of values in the conventional sense of there being certain values which you could list (22)."

But Rogers does think that the person who is open to his experience "is continually valuing each moment and valuing his behavior in each moment" as to whether or not it conduces to his own self-fulfillment, "his own actualization, and that it's that kind of valuing process that to me makes sense in the mature person (22)." He thinks that it also makes sense in a world where "the whole situation is changing so rapidly that I feel that ordinary lists of values are

probably not as appropriate or as meaningful as they were in periods gone by (22)."

Rogers agreed with Tillich in replacing abstract valuations with a "listening love," as Tillich phrased it. Rogers approved the phrase because he thought it could mean a "listening within, a listening to oneself, as well as a listening love for the other individual. . ." He considers that the "optimal person" is continually valuing his experience according to what he calls "an organismic valuing process (23)."

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation we have explored questions about the structure and orientation of the human person. We came at these questions from two centers: from an analysis of value language, and from Carl Rogers' client-centered psychotherapy. The underlying thesis in this paper was this: Doing linguistic analysis and theorizing from clinical psychotherapeutic experiences are productive, complementary and mutually enriching approaches to questions about the structure, goals and goal-orientations of the human person. If these approaches have yielded similar conclusions, then the approaches would confirm each other; and each approach might modify and enrich the other. Again, if the conclusions are similar then certain theories lying behind the approaches might be strengthened.

The most important view presupposed in this paper is that language is a way of life. According to it, we persons do not merely name, refer and express through language; we also act and react, focus, determine and actualize very much of ourselves through our discourse. If language is a way of life in this sense, then an analysis of language should illumine facets of the language-user, his structure and orientations. This would be especially true if the language were attempting to articulate something in the area of values and valuation. If the

conclusions coming from analyzing value language receive confirmation from a different method for revealing the structure and orientations of the speaker, then the presupposition that language is a way of life is in turn confirmed.

Inversely, if value language analysis led to conclusions about persons that supported conclusions of psychotherapy, then certain of the theories of psychotherapy are strengthened. What is inherent in the logic of language might support the view that man is, for instance, better conceived as a complex organic process with many and harmonious tendencies, than pictured in a more fixed and classical manner.

In this concluding chapter we will summarize findings from the two approaches by grouping them under the seven questions we posed to Carl Rogers' psychotherapy. Any correlation and mutual confirmation will appear in this summary. We will also point out in each section where one method seems to modify the other.

1. Goal-Orientation

Question One: Is a person goal-oriented?

1.1. Nowell-Smith

For Nowell-Smith, all the value language jobs operate from a matrix of human pro- and con-attitudes. These attitudes, understood in his special and generic sense, are all directions toward goals. All the items he lists under his pro- and con-attitudes are in some way motions to or away from something accepted as good for or harmful to

some human person. Although the attitudes differ greatly among themselves, they agree in being motions and directions; they are going somewhere; they are goal-directed. If so, then the person who possesses these attitudes is to that extent at least goal-directed.

The harmony found among all the various attitudes indicates that there could in some sense be an overall goal or goals of the whole person. From the studies of Nowell-Smith, there are several reasons for discerning such harmony. For instance, value terms must be flexible tools because the meanings "shade into" one another. Also, the "Janus-principle" fits value language because of the "empirical fact" of the concomitance of two attitudes which accounts for the logic of a phrase doing two jobs at once. Above all, the many and varied functions of value language are interconnected despite their differences even in logic. The performances of preferring and deciding, for example, imply some relationship to choosing; appraising, to desiring. And all these performances function within the context of human action. Such interconnection among the attitudes would argue for a harmony among them and for the possibility of a goal or goals, not only for individual attitudes but for the person as a whole.

1.2. Shakespeare and The New Yorker

All the samples of value language appearing in Chapter Two implied goal-direction in the persons using the value discourse. The shift, for instance, in the meaning Lear gives to "love" involves profound change in what he considers worthwhile and worth living for. In

Antony and Cleopatra, the terms 'Egypt' and 'Rome' represent a complex of goals that form into a life style. There is goal-direction in the Long-Winded Lady who judges demolition of buildings and construction of new ones in a real way "bad."

But neither Nowell-Smith nor the Shakespearian and New Yorker examples treat directly about man as goal-directed. The presence of goals is implied from what is directly treated. Neither source is mainly concerned with the question.

1.3. Carl Rogers

Rogerian psychotherapy, however, is explicitly concerned with the person as directed toward goals. In his theory and practice Rogers considers the person an orderly, developing, goal-directed organism. Goal-direction in the person is in fact central to his psychotherapeutic approach. He hopes through therapy to release a person to move in a free and realistic way toward those goals. He supports his theorizing with extensive research.

Here, what the logic of value language implies, psychotherapy treats explicitly and extensively. In doing so it confirms the direction of the language analysis. In turn, the central Rogerian theory about the person as goal-directed process receives confirmation from the logic of value language.

2. Goals: Vague Or Fixed?

Question Two: What are the goals like--are they vague, somewhat indeterminate?

2.1. Nowell-Smith

Again, although value language analysis does not explicitly treat this question, it does give helpful indications about the character of a person's overall goals. As we saw in the concluding section of Chapter One, the goals of the person using value language seem to be vague, indeterminate, open ended, capable of further refinement and definition. There are several reasons for drawing such a conclusion from value language analysis. The complexity of both the value language uses and their underlying attitudes favors complexity in the goal or goals. No one tendency would account for the orientation of the whole man nor would a goal of any one attitude be a goal for the whole person.

The harmony among the attitudes, a harmony indicated by value language analysis, suggests a complex but ordered goal in which all the tendencies find their place. But the immense variety among the attitudes with almost endless possibilities of combination and fulfillment suggests that there is no one determinate, specific goal centered in one or a few attitudes. Rather, even the complex goal or goals would seem open to many different specific realizations.

Yet the goal is not completely undefined and open. For, while we language-users are capable of nuance, of shading uses into one another, we are also manifesting a remarkable precision as we use our value language with such freedom. When we find new uses, we seem to know somehow what is appropriate and what is not. Even if we cannot give reasons, we will have a "sense" of rightness about a new use; we seem able to recognize something previously unknown. What makes such

recognition possible is the orientation of the attitudes attuned to their objects. Therefore, while the overall goal or goals are vague and indeterminate, they are yet discernable thanks to the directionality found in the attitudes.

Nowell-Smith explicitly treats of indeterminate goals when he discusses the Good Life, that overall conception of what life should be like. It is ultimately by reference to this conception that a person makes all his choices. Yet this conception is not fully definite and can change many times in a person's life.

2.2. Shakespeare And The New Yorker

The question of vague, somewhat indeterminate goals is literally dramatized in Shakespeare. Antony, Caesar and Brutus are all "noble"; but the shifts, shadings and nuances of the uses of that word in Julius Caesar suggest how complex and changing the goal of nobility really is. In Brutus alone the word is modified as he uncovers limitations to his own real nobility.

The interior shift in the meanings of the word 'love' are part of the change in Lear and Cleopatra as they both discover the different levels and possibilities of the value they make decisive in their life style. In Antony and Cleopatra, both Rome and Egypt summarize at least two ways of living, two goal patterns for men. But the complexity is compounded as both Antony and Cleopatra emerge as combinations, each in different proportions, of values from both "Good Lives."

The New Yorker articles deal in a variety of goals. What "good" program means for the persons involved in Summer in the City depends on what each considers a man's goal to be. Involved here are opposing life styles. The car advertisements vary according to varying possibilities of realizing goals of the comfortable and affluent life. Daley Unruh's candidate will get elected if voters can trust him to specify what they vaguely know as the "good of the country."

Here, rooted in the logic of value language and dramatized in literature is testimony to the variety of possibilities open to the human person in his pursuit of goals. Perhaps the key point here is Nowell-Smith's criticism of Hobbes, a criticism which says that to simplify the logic of value language is to over-simplify man and thus to leave value language without an adequate accounting.

2.3. Carl Rogers

There is no question that for Rogers a person's goals are vague and indeterminate. Even in his early work he says that the client alone can discover his own goals; no one else could prescribe for him a set and settled Good Life. But as the later works testify, Rogers becomes more and more sure that a person's growth rests very much in his leaving behind fixed goals, static value systems, and in his allowing himself to become instead a fluid process, open to revision of goals, constantly testing values, being willing to change and revise in the light of new evidence. If a person's fundamental goal is "to become that self which one truly is," and if that self is a changing process, then a person's

goals are indeed vague and indeterminate. Rogers refers to scientific research which reports the change from static to dynamic conceptions of the self and its development in clients during and after therapy.

2.4. Conclusion

In his explicit treatment of indeterminate goals, Rogers does provide a coherent way of explaining what goals would be like if human persons, as Nowell-Smith and the literature examples suggest, do use value language in such flexible, complex, nuanced and precise ways. Rogers can serve here as a completion of the value language analysis. He fills out and carries through what the analysis did not treat explicitly and yet did indicate would be the case were one to take up the question of the character of man's overall goals. Nor has Rogers departed from language analysis; what he says comes in great part from conversations with clients, from his own analysis of their discourse especially about what they consider worthwhile in their lives. Here Rogers seems to carry language analysis further into the human person by coming at language specifically as a way to discovering something about the person. Through his different approach to language, he is free to point out what language can reveal about the language-user. And what he says is in a continuous line of development with what Nowell-Smith and the literature analyses indicated about human goals.

But it seems possible to say also that Rogers' theory of personality goals receives significant enrichment and criticism from the value language analysis. What Rogers discovers in the conversations

and the relationship of therapy, what he supports by controlled research, is confirmed through a close study of the very logic of the language a person uses when he articulates himself in the area of values, for he cannot help but "put himself into" his value discourse. Language analysis may be particularly helpful and even critical of Rogers' consideration of the client as moving from "fixed" and "static" goals to "fluid," open and indeterminate ones. The words 'fixed' and 'fluid' may not capture as accurately as possible the results of Rogers' own work. There may be in these words a suggestion of randomness, of complete openness, of lack of direction in realization of goals. Although Rogers by no means intends such an interpretation, his use of language can remain open to it. The analysis of value language on the other hand reveals a remarkable continuity and precision along with flexibility and freedom in finding new uses for words. There seems something "stable" even in the movement toward vague and indeterminate goals. If in Julius Caesar the word 'noble' attests to indeterminacy of goals because of its shifting uses, it also exhibits a stability in the direction of the tendencies toward those goals, for unless there were "family resemblance" among its many uses, the word 'noble' could not play the dramatic role it does in the play. If there were no continuity, then the uses of the word would fail dramatically because the tension among the similar yet differing 'nobilities' would cease to operate.

If the many meanings of the word 'love' in Antony and Cleopatra attest to the indeterminacy of human goals, still the continuity in the development of love and the resemblance among the uses of the word both

help to create the drama and point to a "fixity," a stability and directionality in the general contours of the tendencies and of the vague goals. To conclude: linguistic analysis seems an avenue of approach to the person, an avenue which could prove helpful to psychotherapy in extending and corroborating theories about the complex goal-directions of the human person.

3-4. Directing And Directed

Questions Three and Four appear together here because of the relationship in the responses.

Question Three: Is a person tending toward these goals as directed toward them by something within himself other than his conscious decision and choice?

Question Four: Is a person tending toward these goals as directing himself toward them?

3-4.1. Nowell-Smith

Neither the value language analysis itself nor the listing of attitudes operative in value language treats directly of "conscious" or "unconscious," "controlled by reason" or "irrational." But an examination of the value discourse jobs and of the attitudes operative in them shows the presence of all these characteristics in the orientations of the language-user.

According to Nowell-Smith, the language of value has many and varied uses. When he comes to list the jobs such discourse undertakes, he lists many and varied tendencies in the person; and among these

tendencies would be conscious decision and choice as well as impulses and emotions which could arise without conscious instigation or control. These uses include expressing tastes and preferences, expressing decisions and choices, grading and advising, evaluating, admonishing, warning, persuading. The various pro- and con-attitudes in the open-ended list include attitudes which are rational and volitional and others which are not. Although he by no means set out to describe the tendencies in the man who uses value language, Nowell-Smith provided many elements of such a description in his attempt to account for the complex logic of the discourse.

3-4.2. Shakespeare And The New Yorker

For Lear, Brutus and Cleopatra, growth as a person required rational thinking, judgment, decision and choice; but such growth also demanded awareness of the many tendencies already evaluating within the self; acceptance and respect for these tendencies; and finally conscious action which took those tendencies into consideration. Lear comes to self-knowledge through the discovery of many impulses, emotions and subtle evaluations within himself. Brutus comes to see his own inadequacies in judgment and in emotional expression while at the same time he is determining the shape of his destiny through his kindness to a servant, his warm response to Cassius and his choice of death instead of dishonor. Cleopatra comes to awareness of her own powers of stability and heroism, and at the same time specifies and articulates the quality of her love for Antony in her deliberate choice of her

"fire and air" elements and of Roman suicide as a step to realizing a noble and immortal love.

The voter in Daley Unruh's presidential election looks for a man with a "sense of rightness" combined with good judgment and decisiveness. In discussing the decision to tear down and to build, the Long-Winded Lady must speak of sensitivities to an atmosphere, undefinable responses to Le Steak personnel and to the Five Girls. The car advertisements invite a choice based on many vague, perhaps irrational aspirations.

3-4.3. Carl Rogers

For Rogers, the human person is a society of impulses, feelings, thoughts, decisions, both conscious and unconscious, rational and non-rational. This society of varied tendencies, when left to itself, has the harmony and unified goal-direction of an organism in the process of becoming itself. Those impulses and feelings not directly proceeding from conscious decision are extremely significant in Rogerian theory, for the aim of psychotherapy is to lead the client to an awareness of these very tendencies. Such awareness and acceptance will in turn free these orientations to operate according to their own rhythm and directionality. They will seek their own equilibrium and will, when unhampered by defensiveness, work toward the enhancement of the whole person.

In his later work especially Rogers gives much attention to these organismic tendencies whose directions themselves serve as

evaluators. Conscious thought and decision also operate but they operate with sensitivity to the evaluations of all the tendencies within the person--sensory and visceral as well as rational. Decision waits upon a "listening" to the information all the processes within the person can provide.

3-4.4. Conclusion

Once again, in attempting to provide an adequate logical apparatus for value language, Nowell-Smith has revealed much information about the language-user. Value terms serve as tools for performing a vast complex of jobs; the complex of jobs arise from the complex of human attitudes ranging from rational to irrational to non-rational; from conscious, to semi-conscious to unconscious. Nowell-Smith is saying that, given this value language, these are the jobs we are using it for; and these jobs are of certain sorts because attitudes are of certain sorts. The main elements of Rogers' fully delineated and direct consideration are found in what Nowell-Smith brings in to support his logical apparatus for value language. Such indirect support can bring significant confirmation to the Rogerian approach.

Value words in Shakespeare function with dramatic power because concentrated in their uses are many levels of the emotions and aspirations which give the whole play power, depth and meaning. The New Yorker car ads as well as the Long-Winded Lady's essay count on the presence of many attitudes focused in the uses of 'good,' 'rugged,' 'bad' and 'harm.' To explain the power of the value language we must

advert to the shifting mesh of attitudes in the language-users. Here again both the strict analysis of the logic of value language and the theories of client-centered therapy can receive support because what they say about the human person appears "true to life" in concentrated, concretized dramatic form.

What Rogers contributes to conclusions from value language analysis is a more explicit and complete cataloging of the nature, power and direction of the tendencies operating within the person. He delineates the rational, the sensory, the visceral; the attitudes of which the person is aware, those which he denies to consciousness, and so on. Rogers is also able to give a detailed consideration of the harmony among the attitudes. In examining this harmony he is attempting to support his own theory of the basic "positive" directions of the person's tendencies. His picturing the person as organismic process enables him to call attention to a multiplicity of orientations still operating for the good of the total person.

In support of his theory that the person's tendencies are multiple and basically harmonious Rogers could well look to the uses of value language in literature. In Shakespeare, much of the dramatic effect depends on concentrating many human tendencies into the uses of one single word. 'Foul' for instance is effective because its many uses in one scene call into play sensory, visceral, rational--conscious and unconscious--powers; pain, outrage, hatred, terror of supernatural evil. Weather, fiend and unnatural daughters are all "foul." That such divergent objects can elicit such divergent tendencies and, at the

same time, that one word can be used in all these ways, suggests a harmony among the differing tendencies. Such uses of value language in literature might help psychotherapists attend with greater care to the clients' discourse about what they consider worthwhile. Analysis of such value language can reveal many levels of response in the clients. Therapists might well look to literature as presenting in concentrated form significant evidence in support of Rogerian theories of the multiplicity and unity of human tendencies.

5. Awareness Of Tendencies And Awareness Of Goals

Question Five: Are a person's goals at least somewhat revealed through his discerning the orientation of his tendencies, feelings, impulses, thoughts, aspirations?

5.1. Nowell-Smith

Nowell-Smith has little to say that would directly touch on this question. When he speaks of the Good Life, however, he does indicate that a person can change his overall conception of this life thanks to some accidental happening that may bring him to awareness of new values. And, in the language analysis itself, there are suggestions that awareness of one's tendencies might lead to awareness of one's goals. For the analysis indicates that the goals of a person may be vague, indeterminate, changing, the objects of an ongoing search; yet they can function as goals thanks to the directionality found in the many attitudes operative in the person. The attitudes are sensitive to their objects even when those objects have been previously unknown. If a

person, then, wanted to discern the shape of his vague and open goals, he might make some progress by being aware of the directions of his many and varied attitudes. Attentiveness to those attitudes, awareness of their orientations, would help him discover something of the cast of his complex, overall goals.

5.2. Shakespeare

The uses of the words 'foul' and 'love' in King Lear depend to some extent on Lear's coming to awareness of certain tendencies within himself which he had not recognized before. What he would have called 'foul' and what he would have recognized as love in the beginning of the play differ from the meanings he would give to these words by the time the play closes and he has found his loving daughters foul and his foul daughter loving. To make this change in the meaning, he has had to become aware of his own pride, self-deceit, his own needs, his own hunger for power and honor. Awareness of his own false self-concept is almost the pivot on which his evaluations of 'foul' and of 'love' seem to turn. The value language articulates and reflects the changes in his self-awareness. Brutus too becomes noble in a new way after he realizes his own need to express emotion. For both Lear and Brutus, what it means to be a man changes thanks to growth in awareness. But it seems true to say that the analysis of the value language would not by itself reveal the help which awareness of tendencies can bring in man's discernment of the shape of his goals.

5.3. Carl Rogers

The seven stages of Rogerian psychotherapy, as he delineates them in Person, are seven steps to awareness of one's own tendencies as the indispensable way to becoming aware of one's real goals. Coming to awareness of all one's experiences, feelings, thoughts; accepting these without condemnation; letting them proceed according to their own rhythm and direction; letting them be one's self at the moment of their existing; permitting them to find the complex and rational harmony which they, when unobstructed, tend toward; permitting the self to be what it really is--that process of fluid, changing, basically harmonious though often obscure experiences; all of these are what the whole of Rogerian psychotherapy hopes to achieve.

Because the self is constantly developing in new ways, the goals change in their specification. To know what these goals are at each moment, the person must be aware of the movements of the total process which is himself; he must be aware of his feelings, tendencies, impulses, thoughts, aspirations. Such awareness assists conscious thought and decision because far more of the factors in the situation are available to consciousness and can function as evidence in thinking, planning, deciding, choosing. But awareness has a second function: being one's feelings, tendencies, reactions consciously and openly here and now is being oneself. These movements are one's self. Analysis of them is not necessary, but awareness of them, acceptance of them as belonging to oneself, are essential. The goals are coming into being in the process itself. The meanings, goals, values of experience are not then

imposed upon experience but are inherent in it and are discovered within the experience itself. Awareness of what this experience really is becomes necessary for discovering the meaning, value, goal of the experience.

5.4. Conclusion

The approach of psychotherapy is able to fill out what value language analysis merely indicates about the relationship between awareness of tendencies and awareness of goals. According to Rogers, coming to awareness of the real cast and orientation of one's tendencies means coming to progressive awareness of one's fundamental goal which is to be one's self; for the self is the complex of these feelings, emotions, impulses, thoughts, choices which, when unobstructed, will work together for the harmonious enhancement and growth of the whole organism, the whole person.

Yet value language analysis has a contribution to make to psychotherapy. For instance, psychotherapy might well take careful notice of the fact that in our employment of value language we seem able to recognize new uses even when these uses are previously unknown. The precision in our flexible language reveals a sensitivity to appropriateness, an ability to recognize evidence and to make a judgment even when we are not previously familiar with the new use. We seem here to find a manifestation of several items: 1) that the tendencies have a given, if very general, direction; 2) that the language-user does exercise discrimination and judgment in view of such directionality;

3) that both the tendencies and the judgment can operate without complete certitude and clarity on the part of the language-user; 4) that attentiveness to the direction of the orientations and awareness of the process of judging, can adumbrate the contours of a person's vague goals. The unity of the goals is also supported by the fact that one value term can bear these many, differing but related uses.

Value language in literature can confirm psychotherapy's theory that coming to awareness of one's real tendencies can change the person's life. The uses of 'love' at the beginning and end of the plays attests to a development of character in both Lear and Cleopatra who have, thanks to conflict and suffering, come to a greater awareness of their own real orientations. Here in a form clarified and concentrated for the sake of dramatic effect psychotherapy can find a manifestation of what it holds to be exhibited in the long and slow sessions of client interviews.

6. Conflict And Interaction

Question Six: Are the tendencies, aspirations, etc., discovered

a) through conflict leading to awareness and active reintegration?

b) through other people?

6.1. Nowell-Smith

The value language analyses of Nowell-Smith do not directly investigate either conflict or the presence of others as leading to the awareness of a person's own real orientations. Yet in analyzing

the language we discover a schema in which conflict could develop and a structure that demands the presence of others for its existence.

Several aspects of value language suggest that conflict of values is possible. For instance, both pro- and con-attitudes lie at the root of value discourse. Each includes varying types of tendencies, emotions, aspirations, volitions. Each attitude itself, as the flexible and precise value language indicates, seems restless, ongoing, capable of recognizing ever-changing ways of realizing its objects. The harmony existing among the attitudes could well be an ideal. The human action into which all the tendencies converge has a complexity open to mistake, failure and contradiction.

Among the value discourse functions are appraising, re-appraising, passing verdicts. Appraisal is necessary not only for the discovery of values but possibly because tendencies and goals, pro- and con-attitudes, are sometimes in conflict. Perhaps many of the changes in the usage arise from discoveries made through conflict of tendencies, through appraisal and choice in the face of tension and opposition.

As for interaction with other persons: by being a language, value discourse does indicate the interaction of the language-user with other persons. The theory operative here is that language is a way of being for a community. The presence of rules and conventions demands the presence of a community of persons, both disposed to learning and forming rules and able to take new members into its own "way of life." If this theory is accepted, then there is basis in analysis of value language for at least the presence of a community of interacting persons.

None of this indication of interaction among persons explicitly says that such interaction will lead to awareness of one's own tendencies. Yet many of the functions of value language, such as appraising, approving, praising, suggest that the interaction with others might indeed influence one's awareness of one's own tendencies and goals.

Nowell-Smith does suggest that both conflict and the presence of other persons can help a man alter his conception of the Good Life. Acting against one's principles or meeting a person whose life exhibits new values can make an individual reappraise his view of what is worthwhile in life. That these observations could arise merely from the value language analysis is doubtful. Yet the analysis does delineate characteristics among the varied uses, which presuppose the kind of conflict and interaction with others that could lead the language-user to awareness of his own orientations.

6.2. Shakespeare And The New Yorker

Conflict with his daughters along with the suffering in the storm help Lear to realize his own arrogance and vanity and his need for love and forgiveness. He comes to discern much better who he really is. Conflict leads him to new insight into what it means to be Lear. Brutus discerns better the shape of nobility thanks to his defeat and to the failure of his rational planning. He discovers the limitations of his judgment as well as the strength, power and truth of his own emotions.

Other persons may lead a man to awareness of the shape of his own tendencies, according to the analyses from literature. Other persons may exhibit values that an individual recognizes and desires; or, others may lead him to find those values in himself or to develop his potential for them. Summer in the City workers helped the people in the slums to discover some of their own capabilities for human living. The Fool, Edgar and Cordelia help Lear to self-awareness. Both conflict and the person of Antony help Cleopatra realize her own powers of resolution, stability, her own elements of "fire and air."

There is a sense in which conflict is dramatically important within the value discourse itself in both Shakespeare and The New Yorker selections. The tension within the word between several of its uses, all of which are operative in the discourse, functions as a way of advancing the total art work. 'Foul,' 'love,' 'noble,' 'bad,' 'harm,' 'good' project in the city--all of these words have meanings pulling against each other in an illuminating tension that articulates and reveals the condition of the speakers. Analysis of just what the persons are saying becomes a revelation of the persons themselves.

6.3. Carl Rogers

It is indeed conflict that leads to self-awareness in Rogers' psychotherapy. Persons come to the counselor because they experience tension and struggle. Although the obvious problem may be external--for instance, a question of job, marriage, failure in school--the underlying problem is a conflict between a false and fixed self-concept and

the real self which wants to emerge. Clients are asking fundamentally, Who am I? How can I find myself? Defending the inadequate self-concept against injury means denying to awareness many sensory and visceral experiences which nevertheless remain real experiences. As their reality asserts itself against the self-concept, conflict results. During therapy conflict continues as the person begins to allow denied experiences to come to light and as he begins to relax the rigid self-concept. A person continues in therapy, Rogers says, when the pain of growth is less than the pain which led the person to seek help.

"Other people" are part of the central "method" of Rogerian psychotherapy. Through them the conflict leading the person to therapy can become fruitful in discovering who one really is. The central method is simply a warm, accepting, genuine human relationship between counselor and client. The therapist's attitude of understanding and acceptance frees the client to be more understanding and accepting of himself and allows him to face experiences within himself which he has hidden from consciousness. The presence of another person in genuine relationship with the client becomes the main means of growth in self-awareness for the client.

6.4. Conclusion

In considering Question Six, we can say that Nowell-Smith's analysis of value language delineates among the varied uses certain characteristics which presuppose the kind of conflict and interaction with others that could lead the language-user to awareness of his own

orientations. The analysis of value language operating in literature did reveal the presence of conflict and the function of other persons in the language-user's journey to self-awareness. The words themselves have tension among their uses; the terms have "interior meaning shifts" which depend in part on how the person himself is changing through conflict and through interaction with others. Here in literature we have context for uses that show how pro- and con-attitudes, the explanatory structures for value-language, can indeed operate in conflict as well as in communication with others. The context too can, as with Lear and Cleopatra, show how conflict and interaction will lead to self-awareness. The meaning of 'love' in both plays witnesses to the changes in the persons.

Psychotherapy can again treat these interactions and these conflicts more explicitly, analyze them at greater length, spell out certain of their functions, confirm their presence and operation by research. Yet the confirmation coming from value language analysis is important. It seems that especially here the dramatic uses of value discourse can actually provide help to psychotherapy. The value language examples appearing in Shakespeare were concentrations of human interaction and conflict. The artist, by selection, clarification and focus, eliminated many irrelevant materials and revealed in the carefully chosen language certain salient features in the development of the human person. The dramatic concentration of the major portion of a lifetime into significant speech can prove a striking revelation of the structure and orientation of the human person.

7. Criterion; Meaning; Open ended Goals

Question Seven: At the conclusion of all these responses is it possible to say that the person himself becomes the criterion of certain values, that the meaning of the values will change as the person begins to realize them in himself, and that he will experience these values as open ended, capable of ongoing changes and development?

7.1. Nowell-Smith

There is good foundation within the Nowell-Smith analyses for answering affirmatively to this question. For Nowell-Smith, when value discourse does the job of appraising, it is ultimately the expert who establishes the criteria and whose application of these criteria counts. The expert here is the person most cognizant of all that the situation involves. When it is a question of what counts as the "good man," it seems that the only person really grasping all the aspects of the case would be the person himself. His oriented attitudes, with all their variety, complexity and at least ideal harmonies, are already providing by their directions criteria against which the person can judge his experience. The person alone would seem to be the real expert in the case of judging what it is for him to be the "good man." The directional and searching character of his attitudes appears in his flexible, nuanced yet precise uses of value language.

But another approach to this question can also find foundation in the value language analysis, although the analysis itself does not treat the topic directly. There is ample room to build the theory that

persons accept from others criteria and evaluations of what it is to be the good man. On this point Nowell-Smith notes that moral philosophy books fail to give us a way of life; to find out how to live well we must look to "good men." A man's conception of the Good Life can be altered when "he meets someone whose character, conduct or arguments reveal to him new virtues that he has never contemplated (313)." Here is then a sense in which a "good man" can become the criterion for human values because he reveals in himself the shape and contour such values assume when they come into existence as norms of the human person.

What Nowell-Smith is saying here does not arise immediately or necessarily from his analysis of value discourse. Yet what the analysis does reveal can well be the grounding for these developments which Nowell-Smith himself makes when he speaks of the Good Life.

The best support in value language analysis for the statement that values are open ended and inexhaustible is in the complexity of the uses and the reasons for uses which Nowell-Smith delineates for value language. He shows the superiority of the tool model over the labeling model because the tool model allows for more nuances, more shadings among the meanings of value terms. He ends his list of value discourse jobs with the phrase "and doubtless many others." There is definitely in his view an openness to new uses.

Again, we must, he says, allow for many sorts of reasons for choosing. Hobbes fails because he oversimplifies these reasons.

Choosing--the value language job with which all the other uses are connected--has no one logic. Surely the word "openness" applies here.

The very fact that Nowell-Smith cannot give exhaustive lists either of attitudes or of the uses to which we put value language is perhaps the most emphatic support for any theory that our values and goals are open ended and inexhaustible.

7.2. Shakespeare And The New Yorker

After the analysis of value language in Shakespeare and in The New Yorker it seems possible to say that persons themselves become the criterion of the values they have actualized; that as they experience these values as their own way of being, they at the same time experience new knowledge of the values themselves; they realize limitations and possibilities; they grasp that the values are open ended, perhaps inexhaustible, capable of ongoing changes and development. In attempting to account for the shifting and shading uses of the language of value in these literary selections, we had to have recourse to the persons in their special situations; we had to place the words in their context; we had to notice carefully the speakers, their characters, their situations and their interplay. Summed up in their packed value language was very much about themselves, their structure and their orientations. But the very shadings and shiftings indicated the shadings and shiftings, the ongoing character of the values they spoke of. The values had such an ongoing character partly because as each speaker began to

experience the values as his own norms he experienced limitations and new possibilities; he experienced that he had not exhausted what he had valued.

Again, as the value language shifted and exhibited endless nuances, we found that the nuances sometimes depended simply on the person realizing the value appearing in the discourse. Each person was in a sense a criterion of the value; he alone realized it in a certain way. The Lady and the Five Girls, Brutus and Antony, Lear and Cleopatra, simply are the life-styles and the values their discourse speaks of. The values of 'Rome' appear in Octavius Caesar, in Lepidus and in Antony--but with a difference. Both Brutus and Antony are "noble," and nobility has a different shade of meaning for each. What 'harm' meant to The Lady changes when she encounters the Five Girls, living concretions of the meaning of the encroaching Office Buildings. Merely accounting for the dramatic function of the value words forces us to consider the structure and orientation of the language-users. These persons are in a real sense embodied in their discourse; unpacking that discourse means penetrating persons.

7.3. Carl Rogers

For Rogers the person himself, as he becomes that self which he truly is, does seem to become the criterion of evaluation for the values he adopts. First of all, he is very close to his own emotions, impulses and their evaluations. With a minimum of distortion he is attentive to all the data of the situation. As he turns from standards set by

others, he learns that he himself is the only judge of what is really enhancing for himself because he is the only one who can be fully attentive to what his whole organism tells him about the direction of the real self, about the 'goal'--what the real self is or is becoming. Who he really is becomes the criterion for what is enhancing or injurious. The criterion is within himself. And since the direction of the organism is vague, since the situation changes, what the person means by 'good' will change.

There is no question but that for Rogers the values which norm a person are open ended and capable of inexhaustible realization. The "fully functioning person" has begun to accept himself as a process without fixed and unchanging goals; he is constantly in the process of evaluating each moment and of evaluating his behavior in each moment to see whether or not it is conducive to his own actualization.

Rogers mentions research which shows that the person undergoing therapy does change in the direction of becoming more and more the locus of his values and does become more and more open to change and fluidity in what he considers his goals to be.

8. Conclusions

At the close of this study of the structure and orientations of the human person through two approaches to these questions, we will now draw the following conclusions.

1. There is fundamental agreement between value language analysis and Rogerian psychotherapy in the responses to the seven questions

drawn from the analysis and posed to Rogers' theories. The pages of this present chapter have indicated that basic agreement.

2. Such correlation of responses supports the conclusions about the structure and orientations of the human person. If two differing ways of getting at problems of person turn out to be in fundamental agreement in their findings, then their findings receive some confirmation. These findings have been summarized in this chapter.

3. If the conclusions of psychotherapy support the conclusions gleaned from value language analysis on questions concerning the structure and orientation of persons, then the theory that language is an embodiment, articulation and even partial actualization of the person receives confirmation. Language is then a way of life. The language-user is so bound up in his discourse that to account for the logic of this discourse, at least when he talks about his values, it is necessary to consider the structure and orientation of his person. What the logic of value language indicates about the person is confirmed by the conclusions of the client-centered approach of Rogerian psychotherapy.

4. Rogerian theories of personality in turn receive confirmation from the analysis of value language. The logic of our discourse about values requires that the language-users have certain structures and orientations; accounting for this logic becomes a groundwork for further understandings about the human person that are in fundamental agreement with the more explicit and experimental findings of psychotherapy. Value language functioning in literature can, with its intensification of normal usage, reveal in a striking way that persons have a structure

and orientation very close to what the psychotherapeutic theories say they are. Value discourse in literature can become a concentrated witness to what the sessions of therapy uncover.

I think we may now conclude that doing linguistic analysis and theorizing from clinical psychotherapeutic experiences are productive, complementary, mutually enriching approaches to questions about the structure, goals and goal-orientations of the human person.

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